A POLITICAL HISTORY ANALYSIS: REGIONAL STUDY SERIES

STUDY REPORT No.13 /June 28, 2024 

PREFACE

THE MILITARY, armed with exclusive access to tools of violence, has perpetrated hundreds of coups and attempts to topple democratically elected governments across West Africa during the last six decades. Most of these military interventions had been carried out by various factions and cliques of the military.  For most of the second half of the last century, the military – like their parasitic elitist counterparts and hangers-on – was attracted to despoil the enormous endowment of the extractive resources of West Africa, as allies of neocolonial forces. They were aided by the available financial muscle entrusted by power and ‘greatly enamoured’ to devour the collective wealth, while feathering their own nest voraciously.  This had led to a culture or pervading situation whereby the parasitic political class, like vultures in waiting, had worked invidiously with feuding groups in the military to chase out other plunderous cliques to have unimpeded access to the region’s wealth.

Coupists in West Africa cite numerous factors and reasons, such as rising insecurity and authoritarian governmental leadership, as justifications for coups d’état.  Although the coupists in the February, 1966 Ghanaian coup cited President Kwame Nkrumah’s “dictatorial” conduct and his one-party system as reasons for the coup, declassified documents later exposed the involvement of American and British intelligence agencies in the coup’s planning, facilitation, provision of incontrovertible intelligence, and execution.  According to what is known today, imperialism ordered the assassination or overthrow of all the progressive nationalists and Pan-Africanists of that time.

Several methods are employed by Western Embassies and their intelligence arms in executing these neocolonial coups against progressive independent sovereign states.  Kwasi Adu, a Ghanaian Leftist, writing in “The Great Deception”, published by the Socialist Forum of Ghana, vividly portrayed one of such methods, as follows: ‘In Nkrumah’s case, the US Government initially used their economic muscle to hamper the ability of the [Nkrumah] government to deliver economic and social development to the Ghanaian population’.  It is also known that then US President Lyndon B. Johnson (1963-1969) and Prime Minister Alec Douglas-Home of the United Kingdom (1963-1964) met at the highest level of government in the Oval Office of the White House, on 12th February, 1964, to review and approve the operational strategy of the regime change through a military coup against the Ghanaian President.

Writing in his book titled “Dark Days in Ghana”, Kwame Nkrumah noted ‘…, the tasks of the CIA, and other similar organizations, is to discover potential quislings and traitors (i.e., the coupists), and to encourage them, by bribery and the promise of political power, to destroy the constitutional government of their countries’.  Was it a wonder, therefore, that the coupists of 24th February, 1966 were paid $13.0 million USD by American intelligence?  The testimony of John Stockwell, a CIA case officer, published in his memoir, titled “In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story”, might be paraphrased as follows: “The Accra Station submitted a proposal to its Langley Headquarters to be permitted to deploy a standby squad during the Accra coup.  The job of this squad was to obliterate the Chinese Embassy through bombing, kill every occupant, and steal classified and confidential documents”.

The truth of the matter, however, is that for most coupists, these unsavoury interventions have become the road to economic and political power and having ‘easy access to money’, to quote Onyeisi Chiemeke from his seminal book, titled “June 12 Election: Campaign for Democracy & The Implosion of the Nigerian Left”.    Yet, for others, the primary objective of usurping state power is to enable the army to take power of and for itself by using and exploiting others – to paraphrase Captain Thomas Sankara.

The 1970s and 1980s of the twentieth century witnessed major debates throughout West Africa to dissuade the military from meddling in politics.  The central issue of these debates revolved around the role that ought to be assigned to the military in society, the political class’s own expectations of the military, and how to keep them away from politics.  In Nigeria, for instance, the position of Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe and his peers was to establish ‘a diarchical process in the sharing of power, …  between the military wing of the ruling class and its civilian counterpart’ based on some acceptable formula.  Unfortunately, this position saw the military as a group by and for itself, separate and ‘distinct from the [Nigerian] state’.  The resultant effect is that the military in Nigeria has come ‘to see itself as a separate community that should be appeased’ by the Nigerian society.

In Ghana‘s case, the debate peaked in 1989 during the agitations for a return to civilian rule after

General Kutu Acheampong’s APC [Army-Police-Civilian] model was rejected in the mid-1970s.  Vice-President Kow Nkensen Arkaah [1993-97] believed that the most effective way to eliminate the influence of the military was for the ruling class to have authority over the command structures of the armed forces.  His idea aimed to ensure that only children of the ruling class would be commissioned as officers in the military.  Following extensive discussions, a compromise was reached resulting in the inclusion of the immunity clause in the 1992 Fourth Republican Constitution. This clause provided legal protection for individuals involved in coups and attempted coups between 1966 and 1990.

Contributing to the debate in direct response to those who took the stance that the military should no longer be in politics, in Burkina Faso then Haute Volta [Upper Volta], Captain Thomas Sankara had this to say: ‘we are convinced that the best way [or strategy] to limit the usurpation of power by a group of individuals, military or otherwise, is to place responsibility in the hands of the people from the outset.’  In other words, ‘the best way to avoid the army usurping power by and for itself is to already have the Voltaic people sharing this power’.

In French West Africa itself, most of the debates took the form of “Sovereign Conferences”. At these conferences, power was wrestled from the military through constitutional guarantees, only to see most of these generals put away their military uniforms for civilian ones.  In effect, nothing changed, as the military in massive brutalities put down every resistance of the people.  In some instances, the reversal was achieved through complicit support of France.  In Benin, for instance, General Mathieu Kérékou was defiant, as did General Etienne Eyadéma of Togo.  It was not ‘until the bastion of the resolved will’ of the Beninese smashed his power base through ‘a historical struggle’ that the people of Benin got rid of the military in that country’s politics.

One conclusion that could safely be reached from the great debates of the 1970s and 1980s is that the political class of West Africa had ‘bargained on their knees’ at the time, to paraphrase Bagelot, cited by Onyeisi Chiemeke.  And, of course, ‘when you are on your knees, you are not bargaining but simply begging’.  Any surprise, therefore, that the phenomenon of coups d’état is still with us, and even now more pervasive than before?

In most recent times, some successful military coups d’état occurred in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, regarded as the “Coup Belt” of West Africa.  Given the character of these coups, which were markedly against French imperialism and sought to restore the independence of the sovereignty of the peoples of the respective countries, some political analysts and watchers of the West African scene have described them as “Sovereign Coups”.  This, however, was not the first time such coups had occurred.  In the early 1980s, similar types of coups occurred in Haute Volta (Upper Volta; later to be renamed Burkina Faso) and, to some extent, Ghana; though these were not labelled as “Sovereign”.

In defining the parameters of “Sovereign Coups”, Captain Sankara opined that they ‘enabled us [the coupists] to link up with the Voltaic people, to get them to express themselves and tell us what their deepest and most sincere aspirations were, to get to know them. This then made it possible to define a policy which was to get the Voltaic people to increasingly take power and run it genuinely in their own interests… it’s not that there are revolutionaries in the barracks and others outside the barracks. The revolutionaries are everywhere. The army is a component of the Voltaic people, a component subject to the same contradictions as the other layers of the Voltaic people. We have taken power out of the barracks … It is about the military living with the Voltaic people, suffering with them, and fighting by their side at all times.’

We, at the Institute, firmly believe that the essence of any “sovereign coup” should clearly be defined, to be easily recognised from other forms of coups d’état.  A characteristic of such coups is that popular power should be taken out of the barracks to ginger and empower the people’s struggle against such enemies as imperialism and their local allies, ‘who have plotted and schemed behind their backs’ all this while.  Besides, they should be directed against neocolonial domination and exploitation, and employ popular struggles to regain the sovereignty of the people.  Though these may not be sufficient for the building of a new society, they may provide a ferment in which the people systematically refused to be governed as before.  These may be done, from the outset, through massive mobilisations and promotion of voluntarism while emphasising the people take charge of their destiny and development in their own hands.

ABSTRACT

The countries of West Africa have faced decades of recurrent political and economic decay since gaining independence from their respective French, British, Spanish and Portuguese colonial masters, owing to frequent policy paralysis and excessive interference from the metropolises. The subsequent elusiveness of political dividends that followed independence in the late 1950s and throughout the 1960s and the inability to devise feasible, all-inclusive, political systems and institutions to complement economic growth and development had spawned numerous non-constitutional and constitutional coups d’état throughout West Africa. 

From 1950 to date, there have been 106 successful military coups in Africa, out of which West Africa alone accounts for 60. Burkina Faso is the leading country with 9 military coups, followed by Benin, Nigeria and Niger with 6 each. Ghana, Mali, Mauritania, Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau experienced 5 military coups each. Others are Togo (2), Guinea (2), Gambia (2) while Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia have one each. The only West African country with no military coup history is Senegal, even though there were recorded ‘constitutional coups. The latter also featured in La Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Mali, Togo, and Benin. Most of these illegal intrusion into governance have been attributed to internal antagonisms and cleavages, such as tribal infighting and inability of the traditional political parties to build and establish a broad inclusive multi-ethnic political base among the mass of the people. In certain instances, this incapacitation led to adoption and use of the most repressive measures to ensure survival of civilian autocratic governments and the various military regimes. 

Additionally, there are numerous chronic economic problems which are not solvable by the inherited colonial institutions.  For instance, the economic deterioration of the 1960s through to the 1970s were the direct results of neocolonial manipulations of non-oil commodity prices. These deliberate actions did not only lead to dampening of demand for our traditional exports but also drastically eroded the national receipts of various West African governments, leading to a fall in standards of living; particularly in education and health, and prepared the grounds for various military takeovers of power. Between 1960 and 2023, there had been nearly 215 counter coups and other abortive attempts in Africa caused by structural deterioration in the armed forces’ organisational integrity, breakdown in the chains of command and discipline.  A few of those illegal interventions were also the result of ideological and personality differences. 

A review of comparative theoretical and empirical literature has also shown the roles played by the West in the African debacle. By and large, the military and constitutional coups are direct consequences of geopolitical rivalry with regard to who controls Africa’s endowed natural resources. At the height of the Cold War, the West, in particular, is known to have employed both covert and overt strategies to destabilise radical regimes that confront headlong the issues of imperialism and neocolonialism.  In order to minimise their becoming centres of regional subversion of the capitalist system, Britain, for instance, is known to have covertly carried out 42 military coups d’etat in her overseas territories since 1945, including the February 24, 1966 coup in Ghana. The French, on the other hand, as part of her neocolonial arrangement, had the right to send French Expeditionary troops to intervene militarily to defend its interests and employed it effectively to foster and consolidate coups d’état in her neo-colonies, as a way of getting rid of undesirable leaders.  

Some of the covert vehicles employed in such regime change included: 

• in-country distribution of leaflets while embarking upon mailing-in operation from other countries. These leaflets are mailed by front organisations, such as the Commonwealth Relations Office (CRO) and Information Research Department of UK’s Foreign Office (IRO) and similar agencies to targeted universities, students in higher institutions and teachers; 
• leaking detailed confidential factual information on radical government leaders and their close advisers, as parts of misinformation and disinformation campaigns; 
• creating and using fictitious groups and movements to promote internal dissensions and whip up social tensions; 
• publishing special magazines, such as “The African Review”, to disparage radical leaders and sow anarchy; and 
• misusing the foreign services (mostly embassies, high commissions), external intelligence agents from the CIA, MI5, MOSSAD, etc., to provide financial and institutional support and other inducements to would-be coup plotters.  

Another type of coup prevalent in Africa is the ubiquitous silent coups perpetrated by the international corporate sector. These coups take the forms of corporate funding of large international NGOs (such as CARE USA, which collaborated with Coca-Cola for 30 years, Oxfam, and Save the Children), influencing public policy, and using special development vehicles,like the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC)^[1]  and New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition in Africa. It is worth noting that this phenomenon of silent coups flowed from the nationalist awakening and agitations of the Second World War. It would be recalled that these agitations for freedom and independence made them (nationalists) to become increasingly independent and assertive thereby threatening the global colonial possessions of the imperialists. These risks posed to the latter subsequently forced the West to rally around their common interests leading to the building of neo-colonial infrastructure and institutions to protect the interests of their respective corporate sectors. 

To ensure the survival of the status quo, multinational corporations and conglomerates became engaged in several insidious acts in their pursuit to control the world resources and maximise their respective profits. Some of these acts include: 

• directly undermining constitutions of host countries and their democratic rights; 
• writing laws and treaties directed at privatising the public goods and resources of the world; 
• deployment of corporate armies to secure corporate territory, power and decision making at the blind side of sovereign constitutional bodies;   
• suing sovereign democratic governments in invisible courts; and 
• deciding and agreeing on policy prescriptions with only the executive arms of national governments without the involvement of local legislatures.  

Three types of coups are recognisable as permanent features of illegal intrusion of governance in West Africa. Depending on their character and content, these may be classified as Non-constitutional, Constitutional and Military coups. The Nonconstitutional coups may be radical-led or moderate-led, depending on the charm and ideological orientation of the leaders. Constitutional coups involve the manipulation of the legal and constitutional frameworks to maintain or gain power. These coups often occur under the guise of legality, where leaders exploit loopholes or ambiguities in the law to justify their actions. Military coups are carried out by armed forces, often resulting in the overthrow of a civilian government. These coups are characterised by the military’s direct involvement in seizing control of the state.

The present study seeks to gain insight and improve our understanding of the real actors and their motivations for prosecuting these coups. The main research questions the study will address include: 

• delineating the coup belt in West Africa and developing a typology of the coup types by their respective orientations; 
• causative factors; 
• the key domestic players or social forces that prosecuted the coups; 
• roles (overt and covert) played by foreign capital and the Global North in

the mobilisation, financing, and execution of the coups; 

• dynamics and level of transnational or intra-subregional influence in the planning and execution of coups; and/or
• impacts of the coups on the subregion. 

INTRODUCTION 

In the tumultuous landscape of West Africa, where the winds of political change often blow like a tempest, coups have been a recurring motif in the region’s post-colonial narrative. Since gaining independence, West African nations have wrestled with the persistent spectres of political and economic instability. The legacy of colonialism left deep scars, with arbitrary borders, weak institutions, and fractured identities. This has sown the seeds for a vicious cycle of authoritarianism, corruption, and poverty, creating fertile ground for coups d’état to take root and flourish. 

The motivations behind examining the historical context and external influences on coup dynamics in West Africa are multifaceted and deeply intertwined. Understanding the intricacies of these coups goes beyond mere academic curiosity; it is crucial for policymakers, analysts, and everyday citizens alike. By unravelling the threads of these turbulent events, we can uncover patterns, spot vulnerabilities, and perhaps even chart a course toward more stable and enduring governance. This deep dive into the past and present of West African coups is not just a scholarly pursuit, but a vital endeavour to illuminate paths to a more secure and prosperous future. In this exploration, our focus will be on several key research questions and areas. First, we aim to understand the different types of coups that have occurred in West Africa and what distinguishes them. This involves looking at the methods, motivations, and outcomes of coups; ranging from military takeovers to more subtle forms of political and economic manipulations engendered by neocolonialism. 

Furthermore, we seek to delve into the underlying drivers behind coups in the region. These range from socio-economic grievances to power struggles and ethnic tensions. Unemployment, inequality, and resource mismanagement often create fertile ground for dissent, while entrenched elites vie for control of the state apparatus, leading to cycles of instability. 

Another crucial aspect of our investigation is the role of foreign involvement in coup dynamics. Throughout history, external actors, whether regional powers or global players, have often played a significant role in shaping events in West Africa. This influence can range from overt military intervention to covert support for political factions, each bringing its own set of repercussions for the region’s stability and sovereignty. By peeling back, the layers of foreign involvement, we can better understand the intricate web of influences that have historically swayed West Africa’s political landscape, for better or worse. 

By shedding light on these aspects, we endeavour to contribute to a deeper understanding of the intricate dynamics of coups in West Africa. Through rigorous analysis and insightful investigation, we hope to offer valuable insights into a region where political instability has profound ramifications for its people and the broader international community. 

HISTORY OF COUPS IN WEST AFRICA 

Since gaining independence from colonial powers in the late 1950s and early 1960s, West African nations have been plagued by a series of military and constitutional coups, reflecting the region’s tumultuous political landscape. These coups, driven by various factors, such as political instability, economic challenges, and external interference, have significantly shaped the governance stability of these nations. 

BURKINA FASO 

Burkina Faso (previously the Republic of Upper Volta under the French regime) has emerged as a notable example, experiencing nine (9) military coups since it gained independence from France on August 5, 1960 (T.Y., 2024). The country initially experienced relative political stability under its first president, Maurice Yaméogo. However, Yaméogo’s autocratic rule and unpopular economic policies led to widespread discontent. In January, 1966, a popular uprising, supported by labour unions and students, led to the first coup in Burkina Faso’s history. The military, led by Lt. Col. Sangoulé Lamizana, overthrew President Yaméogo. Lamizana ruled until 1980, implementing a series of military and civilian governments, but struggled with economic challenges and social unrest (Abdoulie, 2017). In November, 1980, Col. Saye Zerbo led a coup against Lamizana, citing corruption and economic mismanagement. Zerbo established the Military Committee of Recovery for National Progress (CMRPN) but failed to stabilise the country. His regime was marked by repression and further economic decline (Grira, 2014). In November, 1982, yet another coup took place. Major Jean-Baptiste Ouédraogo led this coup, which established the Council of Popular Salvation (CSP). However, internal conflicts within the CSP led to instability (Eizenga, 2021). In August, 1983, Capt. Thomas Sankara, supported by a group of young officers, including Blaise Compaoré, staged a coup and took power. Sankara pursued radical socialist policies, including land reforms, nationalisations, and a focus on self-sufficiency. He changed the country’s name to Burkina Faso, meaning “Land of Upright Men” (Blackburn, 1983).

On October 15, 1987, Blaise Compaoré, a close ally of Sankara, led a coup that resulted in Sankara’s assassination. Compaoré cited Sankara’s revolutionary policies as detrimental to the country. Compaoré’s regime, which lasted for 27 years, was marked by relative stability but also by allegations of human rights abuses and corruption (T.Y., 2024). In October, 2014, widespread protests erupted against Compaoré’s attempt to extend his presidency by amending the constitution. The mass protests, often referred to as the Burkinabé Uprising, led to Compaoré’s resignation and exile. Following Compaoré’s ouster, a transitional government was established. However, in September, 2015, elements of the Presidential Security Regiment (RSP) loyal to Compaoré attempted a coup against the transitional government. The coup failed due to lack of popular support and resistance from the national army. In 2022, Burkina Faso experienced another coup. Lt. Col. Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba overthrew President Roch Marc Christian Kaboré, citing the government’s failure to effectively address the escalating jihadist insurgency in the region. Damiba’s rule was short-lived, as he was ousted in September, 2022 by Capt. Ibrahim Traoré, marking yet another chapter in the country’s tumultuous political history

(T.Y., 2024); andmaking it one of the most coup-prone countries in the region. The frequent disruptions have led to political instability, weakening governance structures, and hindering the country’s development. The cycle of coups has entrenched a culture of instability, making it challenging to establish sustainable governance.  

BENIN 

Similarly, Benin has faced its fair share of coups, with six (6) recorded since independence. Political turmoil and power struggles among elites have contributed to recurrent coups, leading to periodic disruptions in democratic processes and hindering socio-economic progress.  Weak governance has further exacerbated the challenges, perpetuating a cycle of instability.  Benin, located in West Africa, has a complex political history marked by several coups and significant shifts in governance.  Formerly known as Dahomey until 1975, Benin has a complex political history characterised by multiple coups and a transition from colonial rule to independence. 

Benin was a powerful kingdom before becoming a French colony in the late 19th century. Dahomey gained independence from France on August 1, 1960, and Hubert Maga became its first president.  The area now known as Benin was historically home to several powerful kingdoms, including the Kingdom of Abomey.  It became a French colony in the late 19th century and was incorporated into French West Africa in 1904.  

Following independence, Benin experienced significant political instability marked by a series of coups. Between 1963 and 1972, the country saw six (6) coups as different factions vied for power.  In 1972, Major Mathieu Kérékou seized power through a military coup that established him as the head of state, beginning a Marxist-Leninist regime in 1974 and renaming the country the People’s Republic of Benin in 1975.  Kérékou’s rule, although marked by initial stability, faced opposition from various groups, including students and trade unions, which led to civil unrest and protests.  One of the primary reasons for the civil unrest was the economic difficulties Benin faced during Kérékou’s rule. The country’s economy was plagued by mismanagement, corruption, and inefficiency.  As a result, there was widespread poverty, unemployment, and a lack of basic services.  The economic situation deteriorated further in the 1980s due to a global recession, which hit the country’s primary exports hard and led to a significant decrease in national revenues.  The student population, which traditionally played a significant role in political activism in many African countries, was particularly vocal against the lack of political freedoms and poor economic conditions.  Protests and strikes organised by students highlighted their demands for better educational facilities, freedom of expression, and political reforms. 

By the late 1980s, under economic and social pressures, Kérékou abandoned Marxism-Leninism because political dissent was not tolerated, and opponents were often silenced through repression. This led to growing dissatisfaction among the population, who felt oppressed and disenfranchised. In 1990, Benin adopted a new constitution, transitioning to a multiparty democracy.  Kérékou lost the 1991 presidential election to Nicéphore Soglo, marking the first peaceful transition of power in the country.  Kérékou returned to power in 1996 after winning another election. 

In recent years, Benin has experienced more stable governance, with significant political figures, including Thomas Boni Yayi, who served two terms as president from 2006 to 2016, and Patrice Talon, who was elected in 2016 and re-elected in 2021.  Talon’s administration has been noted for economic reforms but also criticized for restricting political freedoms.  Benin’s political evolution from a series of coups to a relatively stable democracy highlights the country’s resilience and the ongoing challenges in balancing governance and civil liberties.  

NIGERIA 

Furthermore, Nigeria, one of the largest and most populous countries in West Africa, has also grappled with six (6) military coups since independence.  Nigeria has experienced a turbulent political history marked by multiple coups and military rule interspersed with periods of civilian governance.  Nigeria gained independence from Britain in 1960 and became a republic in 1963.  However, political instability soon emerged, leading to ethnic tensions and corruption. This period ended with Nigeria’s first military coup on January 15, 1966, which brought Major General Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi to power.  The coup was driven by dissatisfaction with the government’s inability to manage ethnic tensions and corruption.  Aguiyi-Ironsi’s rule was short-lived, as a counter-coup in July, 1966 led to his assassination and the rise of General Yakubu Gowon.  The period was marked by severe ethnic conflicts, culminating in the Biafran War (1967-1970), a devastating civil war sparked by the southeastern region’s attempt to secede as the Republic of Biafra.  Gowon was eventually overthrown in another coup in 1975, leading to a series of military rules until 1979, when Nigeria returned to civilian rule with the Second Republic in October, 1979, electing Shehu Shagari as president.  However, widespread corruption and economic difficulties led to another military coup in 1983, bringing General Muhammadu Buhari to power.  Buhari’s regime was also short-lived; he was overthrown in 1985 by General Ibrahim Babangida, whose rule saw economic reforms and an unsuccessful attempt to transition back to civilian rule, ending with the annulled 1993 elections.  General Sani Abacha seized power in a coup in November, 1993.  His regime was characterised by repression and corruption until his sudden death in 1998.  General Abdulsalami Abubakar succeeded him and initiated a transition to democracy, leading to the establishment of the Fourth Republic in 1999. The Fourth Republic began with the election of Olusegun Obasanjo as president in 1999, marking the start of a relatively stable democratic period.  Subsequent presidents included Umaru Musa Yar’Adua (20072010), Goodluck Ebele Azikiwe Jonathan (2010-2015), and Muhammadu Buhari, who was elected in 2015 and re-elected in 2019. This period has been marked by efforts to combat corruption, economic challenges, and the ongoing Boko Haram insurgency.  

Overall, Nigeria’s political history reflects a complex interplay of military and civilian rule, with persistent challenges, including corruption, ethnic and religious tensions, and economic instability.  Factors such as ethnic tensions, corruption, and power struggles have fuelled these coups, leading to political polarisation, economic instability, and social unrest.  These recurring coups have undermined governance stability and eroded public trust in the political system. 

NIGER 

Niger, also with six (6) military coups, shares similar vulnerabilities with its neighbour Burkina Faso.  Weak governance, economic challenges, and ethnic tensions have made Niger susceptible to political instability and military intervention.  The consequences include hindered development efforts and exacerbated social tensions within the country.  Niger has experienced a turbulent political history marked by multiple coups since its independence from France in 1960.  Niger’s initial coup occurred in 1974 when Colonel Seyni Kountché ousted President Hamani Diori, citing widespread corruption and economic mismanagement. Kountché’s regime, which lasted until he died in 1987, was characterised by military rule and limited political freedoms.  

After a brief period of democratic rule, Colonel Ibrahim Baré Maïnassara overthrew the government of President Mahamane Ousmane in 1996.  Maïnassara’s rule was marked by allegations of electoral fraud and human rights abuses until his assassination in 1999.  

Following Maïnassara’s death, Major Daouda Malam Wanké led another coup, establishing a transitional government that eventually paved the way for democratic elections later that year.  This coup is notable for its relatively quick return to civilian rule.  

President Mamadou Tandja, who had controversially extended his mandate, was ousted in 2010.  The military, under the Supreme Council for the Restoration of Democracy, justified the coup as a response to Tandja’s constitutional manipulations.  This led to the election of Mahamadou Issoufou in 2011, marking a return to civilian governance (Attempted Coup in Niger: Backgrounder, 2023).  The latest coup took place in July,

2023, when President Mohamed Bazoum was deposed by members of his own guard, led by General Abdourahmane Tchiani.  The coup leaders cited deteriorating security conditions as their justification.  This event threw Niger into political turmoil and drew significant international condemnation.  

Throughout these cycles of coups and attempted coups, Niger has struggled with political instability, economic challenges, and security threats, particularly from militant groups, such as Boko Haram and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.  Despite these challenges, Niger has seen periods of democratic progress, particularly in the 2010s, which saw improvements in economic growth and security under civilian rule. 

GHANA 

Despite its reputation as a stable democracy, Ghana has faced five (5) military coups since independence. These coups have disrupted democratic processes and undermined confidence in the political system, highlighting the persistent threat to regional governance stability.  Ghana has experienced several significant coups since gaining independence in 1957.  Here is a comprehensive overview of these coups and their impact on the country’s political history. 

Kwame Nkrumah led Ghana to independence on March 6, 1957, and served as Prime Minister and later as President. His administration was characterised by strong centralisation and socialist policies, but increasing authoritarianism and economic challenges led to widespread discontent.  Nkrumah’s government was overthrown while he was abroad, in a coup led by Colonel Emmanuel Kotoka and Major Akwasi Afrifa. The coup, of February 24, 1966, was driven by economic difficulties, corruption, and Nkrumah’s dictatorial tendencies. The National Liberation Council (NLC), led by Lieutenant General Joseph Ankrah, assumed power, promising to restore democratic governance. 

The civilian government of Kofi Busia, elected in 1969, was overthrown in 1972 by Colonel Ignatius Kutu Acheampong, due to economic problems and dissatisfaction with Busia’s austerity measures. Acheampong established the National Redemption Council (NRC), which was later renamed the Supreme Military Council (SMC).  Internal dissatisfaction within the military led to the overthrow of Acheampong by his deputy, General Fred Akuffo, who promised to return the country to civilian rule. However, his regime was short-lived due to continued economic decline and lack of popular support.  Flight Lieutenant Jerry John Rawlings led a coup against the SMC.  Initially unsuccessful in May, 1979, he was freed from prison by mutinous soldiers in June, 1979. Rawlings established the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), which executed several senior military officers for corruption and oversaw a transition to civilian rule with elections later that year, resulting in the presidency of Hilla Limann.  Discontent with

President Hilla Limann’s government led Rawlings to stage another coup, overthrowing Limann and establishing the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC).  Rawlings’ regime implemented significant economic reforms and transitioned the country back to democratic governance by 1992 (Feit, 2011).

Rawlings transitioned from military to civilian rule and was elected as President in 1992, serving two terms until 2000.  Since then, Ghana has maintained relative political stability with regular democratic elections, marking a significant shift from its earlier history of coups. 

LIBERIA  

Liberia’s political history is marked by several significant coups and periods of civil unrest, which have profoundly influenced the nation’s development.  Liberia was founded in 1822 by the American Colonization Society as a settlement for freed American slaves. The Americo-Liberians, descendants of these settlers, dominated the political landscape for more than a century. This period was characterised by a hierarchical social structure and significant marginalisation of indigenous Liberian ethnic groups.  

The first major coup occurred on April 12, 1980, when Master Sergeant Samuel K. Doe led a group of non-commissioned officers in overthrowing President William R. Tolbert, Jr. Doe’s coup marked the end of Americo-Liberian political dominance. Doe’s government initially promised reform but soon became authoritarian, marked by human rights abuses and corruption.  Doe’s rule ended with his assassination in 1990 during the First Liberian Civil War, which was driven by ethnic tensions and rivalries among various factions. The war devastated the country and led to the rise of warlord Charles Taylor, who eventually became president after winning the 1997 elections. 

However, Taylor’s presidency was marred by accusations of war crimes and support for rebel movements in neighbouring countries, leading to the Second Liberian Civil War. This conflict ended in 2003 with Taylor’s resignation and exile.  Following Taylor’s departure, a transitional government led by Gyude Bryant was established to restore order and prepare for democratic elections. The 2005 elections resulted in the historic election of Ellen Johnson Sirleaf as Africa’s first female president. Sirleaf’s presidency focused on rebuilding Liberia’s institutions and infrastructure. 

In 2017, George Weah, a former international soccer star, won the presidential elections, marking the first peaceful transfer of power between democratically elected leaders in Liberia in over 70 years. Weah’s administration continues to face challenges, including economic instability and corruption, but represents a continued effort toward democratic governance.  This political history underscores the significant turmoil Liberia has experienced and the resilience of its people in striving towards peace and stability. 

MAURITANIA 

Mauritania has experienced multiple coups since its independence in 1960.  Here is a brief overview of its political history, with a focus on the coups. 

Mauritania gained independence from France in 1960.  The initial years saw a civilian government under President Moktar Ould Daddah.  However, economic difficulties and ethnic tensions led to instability.  In 1978, a coup d’état led by Colonel Mustafa Ould Salek ousted President Ould Daddah, initiating a period of military rule that lasted for over a decade.  In 1980, Colonel Mohamed Khouna Ould Haidalla took power but was overthrown in a 1984 coup by Colonel Maaouya Ould Sid’Ahmed Taya, who established himself as the leader. Taya’s regime lasted until 2005.  During Taya’s rule, Mauritania adopted a new constitution in 1991 that introduced multiparty politics, but his government was marked by authoritarian practices and ethnic conflicts. 

In June, 2003, a failed coup attempt highlighted the growing discontent within the military and among civilians due to Taya’s policies, including his alignment with the US in anti-terrorism efforts and recognition of Israel. On August 3, 2005, while Taya was abroad, a successful coup led by Colonel Ely Ould Mohamed Vall ousted him. Vall promised a transition to democracy and organised elections within two years.  After a brief period of civilian rule, President Sidi Ould Cheikh Abdallahi, who was elected in 2007, was overthrown in a 2008 coup led by General Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz. The coup was a response to Abdallahi’s dismissal of top military officials, including Abdel Aziz.  Abdel Aziz eventually resigned from the military and won the subsequent presidential election in 2009, solidifying his control over Mauritanian politics. 

Abdel Aziz remained in power until 2019, when he stepped down, and his defence minister, Mohamed Ould Ghazouani, won the presidential election. This marked the first peaceful transfer of power between elected presidents in Mauritania’s history. Mauritania’s political landscape has been significantly shaped by these coups, reflecting ongoing challenges in governance, military influence, and efforts towards democratisation. 

THE GAMBIA 

The Gambia has had a turbulent political history marked by coups and attempts to establish a stable democratic governance.  The Gambia gained independence from British colonial rule on February 18, 1965, becoming a constitutional monarchy within the Commonwealth with Elizabeth II as Queen, represented by a Governor-General.  In 1970, a referendum established The Gambia as a republic, with Dauda Kairaba Jawara becoming the first President. 

The first major political upheaval came in 1981 when Kukoi Samba Sanyang led an attempted coup against Jawara’s government.  The coup was suppressed with the intervention of Senegalese troops under the Senegambia Confederation agreement, which was an attempt to unify The Gambia and Senegal economically and militarily.  On July 22, 1994, a bloodless coup led by Lieutenant Yahya Jammeh and other junior officers overthrew President Jawara. The coup was driven by dissatisfaction within the Gambian National Army over unpaid salaries and limited opportunities for advancement.  Jammeh established the Armed Forces Provisional Ruling Council (AFPRC) and ruled by decree until elections were held in 1996, which he won, thus legitimising his regime.  

Jammeh ruled The Gambia with an authoritarian grip from 1994 until 2017.  His tenure was marked by human rights abuses, suppression of the press, and crackdowns on political opposition.  He was re-elected in several controversial elections until he was defeated by Adama Barrow in the December, 2016 elections.  

Adama Barrow became President in January, 2017 after defeating Jammeh.  His administration has faced challenges, including a failed coup attempt in December, 2022.  This attempt, involving disgruntled soldiers, was quickly thwarted.  Barrow’s government has been urged to strengthen democratic institutions to prevent such incidents in the future.  Throughout its history, The Gambia has experienced significant political instability, but efforts continue to establish a more robust democratic governance system. 

GUINEA 

Guinea has also experienced several significant political upheavals since gaining independence from France in 1958, marked by a series of coups.  Guinea’s first president, Ahmed Sékou Touré, who led the country from independence until he died in 1984, ruled with an authoritarian grip, but there were no coups during his tenure.  After Touré’s death, Colonel Lansana Conté seized power in a bloodless coup, abolishing the constitution and establishing military rule. Conté remained in power until he died in 2008, with his tenure characterised by corruption and economic decline.

 Following Conté’s death, Captain Moussa Dadis Camara led a coup, citing the need to end corruption.  His rule was short-lived; an assassination attempt in 2009 left him wounded and led to his removal from power.  The subsequent military leader, General Sékouba Konaté, transitioned the country towards civilian rule.  The first democratic elections were held, and Alpha Condé became the first freely elected president of Guinea.  However, his tenure was also marked by allegations of corruption and authoritarianism. 

 On September 5, 2021, Colonel Mamady Doumbouya led a military coup that deposed President Condé, citing corruption, mismanagement, and disrespect for democratic principles as reasons.  This coup occurred after Condé had controversially altered the constitution to secure a third term in office.  These coups highlight the instability and recurring challenges to democratic governance in Guinea.  Each coup has been driven by a combination of political, economic, and social grievances, often involving dissatisfaction with long-term leaders who failed to address the needs of the populace. 

MALI 

Mali has experienced a tumultuous political history marked by multiple coups and ongoing conflicts.  Mali gained independence from France, in June, 1960, with Modibo Keita as the first president.  In November, 1968, Keita was overthrown in a coup led by Lieutenant Moussa Traoré, who then ruled until 1991.  Traoré was ousted in a coup by Amadou Toumani Touré, leading to a transition to democracy.  This set the stage for

Mali’s first democratic elections in 1992, with Alpha Oumar Konaré becoming president.  

Touré, the leader of the 1991 coup, was elected president in democratic elections, in 2002 and re-elected for a second term in 2007.  Amidst a Tuareg rebellion in the north and discontent over the government’s handling of the crisis, Touré was ousted in a coup by the military led by Captain Amadou Sanogo, in 2012.  This coup exacerbated the instability, leading to the occupation of northern Mali by various Islamist groups.  France intervened militarily to help Malian and African Union forces reclaim northern Mali from Islamist rebels.  

President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta was deposed by military officers led by Colonel Assimi Goïta following protests against corruption and the government’s failure to handle the insurgency.  A transitional government was formed with Bah N’Daw as interim president and Goïta as vice president.  Goïta led another coup, arresting N’Daw and Prime Minister Moctar Ouane, and subsequently declared himself interim president.  This coup, described as a “coup within a coup”, led to further international condemnation and sanctions. 

The rebellion by the Tuareg ethnic group seeking autonomy in the north has been a recurrent issue, significantly impacting Mali’s stability.  The rebellion was exacerbated by the return of heavily armed Tuaregs from Libya after Gaddafi’s fall.  Islamist groups, including Ansar Dine and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), took control of northern Mali in 2012, imposing strict Sharia law and destroying cultural heritage sites, which led to the French intervention. These events highlight Mali’s ongoing struggle with political instability and armed conflict, complicating efforts to establish lasting democratic governance and peace. 

LA CÔTE D’IVOIRE 

Ivory Coast (Côte d’Ivoire) gained independence from France on August 7, 1960 under the leadership of Félix Houphouët-Boigny, who became the nation’s first president.  His tenure was marked by political stability and significant economic growth, often referred to as the “Ivorian miracle”, due to the country’s rapid development and prosperity.  Houphouët-Boigny ruled until his death in 1993, maintaining a strong grip on power and promoting a pro-Western foreign policy. 

After Houphouet-Boigny’s death, the country entered a period of political instability. Henri Konan Bédié succeeded him but faced growing discontent and economic difficulties.  In December 1999, Ivory Coast experienced its first coup d’état. General Robert Guéï led a military uprising that ousted President Bédié.  This coup was initially perceived positively by some Ivorians, hoping for political reform and stability.  However, Guéï’s rule was short-lived as he attempted to manipulate the 2000 presidential election, leading to widespread unrest when he declared himself the winner, despite Laurent Gbagbo’s apparent victory.  Following mass protests, Guéï fled, and Gbagbo assumed the presidency.  

In 2002, a failed coup attempts against Gbagbo triggered a civil war, splitting the country into a rebel-held north and a government-controlled south. The conflict was rooted in ethnic, religious, and regional divisions, exacerbated by political exclusion and economic disparities.  The 2010 presidential election, meant to reunite the country, instead led to another crisis. Alassane Ouattara was declared the winner, but Gbagbo refused to concede, resulting in a violent standoff and a brief civil war.  International forces, including the United Nations and French military, intervened, ultimately leading to Gbagbo’s arrest and Ouattara’s inauguration in 2011.  

Ouattara’s tenure has seen efforts to rebuild the nation and its economy.  However, political tensions persist, particularly around issues of constitutional amendments and presidential term limits.  In 2020, Ouattara’s controversial decision to run for a third term sparked further unrest, but he ultimately secured victory, amidst opposition boycotts and allegations of electoral malpractices.  Overall, Ivory Coast’s political history has been marked by cycles of stability and turmoil, significantly influenced by ethnic and regional dynamics. The nation, nonetheless, continues to strive for lasting peace and democratic governance. 

SIERRA LEONE 

Sierra Leone gained independence from the United Kingdom on April 27, 1961.  Initially, it had a parliamentary system under Prime Minister Sir Milton Margai, leader of the Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP).  His brother, Sir Albert Margai, succeeded him but faced political instability and allegations of corruption. 

The first significant coup occurred on March 21, 1967, when Brigadier David Lansana arrested the newly elected Prime Minister Siaka Stevens of the All-People’s Congress (APC), claiming that the army should oversee a transition to a civilian government.  This led to a series of counter-coups, with military officers seizing power and eventually restoring Stevens in April 1968.  By the early 1990s, the government of President Joseph Momoh, who succeeded Stevens, was struggling with economic decline and a brutal civil war initiated by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in 1991.  On April 29, 1992, young military officers, led by Captain Valentine Strasser overthrew Momoh, citing government corruption and failure to address the RUF insurgency.  Strasser’s National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) ruled until 1996 when internal dissent and international pressure led to elections. 

In 1996, Ahmad Tejan Kabbah was elected president in a return to civilian rule.  However, this period of democracy was short-lived.  On May 25, 1997, disgruntled soldiers, led by Major Johnny Paul Koroma, staged another coup, forming the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and inviting the RUF to join the government.  This regime was marked by chaos and violence until ECOMOG forces, primarily from Nigeria, restored Kabbah to power in 1998. 

The civil war continued until 2002, causing immense suffering and loss of life.  International interventions, peacekeeping missions, and the disarmament of combatants eventually led to the Lomé Peace Accord in 1999 and the official end of the conflict in 2002.  Sierra Leone has since made strides in democratic governance, although it remains challenged by economic and social issues.  These coups and the prolonged civil conflict have profoundly impacted Sierra Leone’s political and social fabric, shaping its contemporary governance structures and efforts toward peace and stability. 

TOGO 

Togo’s post-independence political history began with high hopes but quickly descended into turmoil.  On April 27, 1960, Togo gained its independence from French colonial rule, and Sylvanus Olympio became its first president.  Olympio’s tenure, however, was short-lived.  On January 13, 1963, a coup led by a group of disaffected soldiers, including Sergeant Etienne Eyadéma (later known as Gnassingbé Eyadéma), culminated in Olympio’s assassination.  This coup, Africa’s first post-independence military coup, was driven by dissatisfaction with Olympio’s economic policies and his exclusion of former French colonial soldiers from the new Togolese army. The immediate aftermath of the coup saw the installation of Nicolas Grunitzky as president. Grunitzky, however, struggled to maintain political stability, facing opposition from various factions within the country.  Grunitzky’s inability to consolidate power led to another coup on April 13, 1967.  This time, Lt. Col. Etienne Eyadéma led the military intervention that ousted Grunitzky.  Eyadéma’s rise to power marked the beginning of a long and autocratic rule. Declaring himself president, Eyadéma established a military regime that would dominate Togolese politics for nearly four decades. 

Under Eyadéma’s rule, Togo became a one-party state with the Rally of the Togolese People (RPT) as the sole legal party.  His government was characterised by strict authoritarian control, human rights abuses, and the suppression of political opposition.  Despite occasional uprisings and attempted coups, such as the one in 1986, Eyadéma managed to maintain a firm grip on power, often using such challenges as pretexts to tighten his control further. 

The early 1990s brought a wave of political change across Africa, with many countries transitioning from authoritarian regimes to more democratic systems.  In Togo, internal and international pressure forced Eyadéma to concede to some political reforms.  In 1991, a National Conference was convened, which sought to establish an interim government and reduce Eyadéma’s powers.  This period marked a brief and hopeful moment for democratic transition in Togo.  However, the political standoff that ensued between Eyadéma’s supporters and the interim government led to increased instability.  The military intervened to restore Eyadéma’s authority, effectively derailing the democratic transition.  By the mid-1990s, Eyadéma had reasserted his dominance, though political unrest and opposition protests continued to flare up sporadically. 

Gnassingbé Eyadéma’s death on February 5, 2005, precipitated another significant political crisis in Togo.  In a move that resembled a coup, the military quickly installed Eyadéma’s son, Faure Gnassingbé, as president, bypassing the constitutional provision that called for the Speaker of the National Assembly to assume the role temporarily.  This blatant disregard for constitutional norms drew international condemnation and internal unrest.  Under significant international pressure, Faure Gnassingbé stepped down temporarily, allowing for elections to be held.  Despite allegations of electoral fraud and violence, Faure emerged victorious and officially took office as president.  His ascension marked the continuation of the Eyadéma family’s dominance in Togolese politics. 

Since 2005, Faure Gnassingbé has managed to consolidate his power, winning multiple elections amid ongoing allegations of fraud and repression.  His administration has faced periodic protests and opposition movements, yet he has maintained control through a combination of political manoeuvring, repression, and international diplomacy.  Faure’s rule highlights the persistent challenges in Togo’s quest for democracy.  Despite the formal trappings of democratic institutions, the reality on the ground is one of restricted political freedoms, limited press freedom, and a government that tolerates little dissent. 

GUINEA BISSAU 

Guinea-Bissau’s path to independence was marked by a prolonged and brutal armed struggle against Portuguese colonial rule, led by the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC). After a decade of guerrilla warfare, Guinea-Bissau unilaterally declared independence on September 24, 1973, a declaration recognised by Portugal in 1974, following the Carnation Revolution of April, 25. 

The early years of independence were fraught with political instability.  In 1980, a coup led by Prime Minister João Bernardo “Nino” Vieira ousted President Luís Cabral, marking the beginning of Vieira’s lengthy and contentious rule.  This coup set a precedent for military involvement in politics, a pattern that would continue for decades.  On November 14, 1980, Prime Minister João Bernardo Vieira led a coup against President Luís Cabral, citing mismanagement and ethnic favouritism.  Vieira assumed the presidency, suspended the constitution, and consolidated power under a one-party system dominated by the PAIGC. Vieira’s rule was marked by periods of relative stability interspersed with economic difficulties and political repression.  His administration faced multiple challenges, including a struggling economy, internal dissent, and regional conflicts. 

By the late 1990s, discontent with Vieira’s rule had grown, exacerbated by economic decline and accusations of corruption.  In June, 1998, a military rebellion led by General Ansumane Mané erupted, plunging the country into civil war.  The conflict resulted in significant loss of life and displacement.  In May, 1999, Vieira was ousted and fled into exile.  The civil war left Guinea-Bissau deeply divided and its infrastructure devastated.  The transitional government struggled to restore order and stability.  On September 14, 2003, a coup led by General Veríssimo Correia Seabra ousted President Kumba Ialá, who had been elected in 2000 but whose presidency was marred by allegations of authoritarianism and incompetence.  The coup was bloodless, and Seabra cited Ialá’s failure to address the country’s pressing issues as justification.  A transitional government was established, leading to elections in 2005. 

On March 2, 2009, President João Bernardo Vieira was assassinated by soldiers, purportedly in retaliation for the killing of the army chief of staff, General Batista Tagme Na Waie, the previous day.  This assassination plunged the country into another period of instability.  Despite this, the presidential election proceeded, and Malam Bacai Sanhá was elected president later that year.  On April 12, 2012, a military coup occurred just weeks before a presidential run-off election.  The coup was led by General António Indjai, and the coup leaders cited concerns over an alleged secret deal with Angola involving security forces.  The coup disrupted the electoral process and led to a transitional government, delaying democratic processes.

Since the 2012 coup, Guinea-Bissau has struggled to achieve lasting political stability.  The country has seen multiple interim governments, frequent leadership changes, and ongoing interference by the military in political affairs.  The political landscape remains volatile, with elections often marred by allegations of fraud and political violence.  In 2014, José Mário Vaz was elected president, bringing a brief period of hope for stability.  However, his presidency was also marked by political infighting and tensions with the military.  In 2019, Umaro Sissoco Embaló won the presidential election, but his victory was contested by his opponent, leading to further political uncertainty. 

SENEGAL 

Senegal, on the other hand, stands out in West Africa for its relatively stable political history, characterised by democratic transitions and the absence of successful military coups.  After gaining independence from France in the August of 1960, Senegal’s first president, Léopold Sédar Senghor, established a single-party state.  Senghor ruled until 1980, when he voluntarily stepped down, handing over power to his Prime Minister, Abdou Diouf.  Diouf’s presidency saw the introduction of multi-party politics and economic reforms, but he was eventually defeated in the 2000 presidential elections by opposition leader Abdoulaye Wade.  This marked Senegal’s first peaceful transition of power through democratic elections. 

Under Wade’s presidency, Senegal saw significant infrastructure developments, but his attempts to amend the constitution to allow a third term led to widespread protests.  In 2012, Macky Sall defeated Wade in the elections, reinforcing the country’s democratic credentials. Sall’s tenure has been marked by economic growth initiatives but also controversies, including allegations of corruption and suppression of the political opposition.  Senegal has experienced political tension and protests, particularly surrounding the potential candidacies of opposition figures like Ousmane Sonko.  However, the country has maintained a tradition of resolving political conflicts through elections rather than military interventions, distinguishing it from many of its regional neighbours that have faced multiple coups in recent years. 

A.  INTERNAL CONFLICTS  

A.1.  FAILED DEMOCRACY 

In a failed democratic system, the mechanisms of democracy, such as free and fair elections, the rule of law, the protection of civil liberties, and government accountability, are either absent, compromised, or manipulated to serve the interests of a ruling elite or specific groups within society. 

A.1.1.  ELECTION IRREGULARITIES 

While elections may take place, they are often marred by irregularities, such as voter intimidation, fraud, and manipulation of electoral processes.  Nigeria witnessed several instances of election irregularities, particularly during its military rule from the 1960s to the 1990s.  Military regimes often manipulated electoral outcomes through voter intimidation, ballot stuffing, and coercion to maintain power.  In the 2003 presidential election in Togo, opposition parties said officials stuffed ballot boxes while opposition supporters faced intimidation or were barred from polling stations.  They also alleged the creation of fictitious polling centres and reported that some existing centres did not receive any ballots.  Furthermore, officials sympathetic to Eyadéma closed polling centres before the official closing time of 17:00 GMT, denying many of Togo’s 3.2 million voters the opportunity to decide the country’s leadership for the next five years (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2003). The Guinean presidential election was not left out, and the 2013 elections were also reported to have many irregularities from international monitors.  The finding that breaches and irregularities in certain constituents prevented a significant number of votes from being taken into account. A more recent situation of some documented irregularities was the 2023 Nigerian presidential election which was held on 25th February, 2023, where the two major political parties called for the presidential election to be cancelled and rather rerun.  Stating that the election had been compromised by vote rigging and widespread violence (Maclean and Peltier, 2023).  This undermines the legitimacy of election outcomes and erodes public trust in the democratic process. 

A.1.2.  INOPERATIVE RULE OF LAW 

Due to the lack of the rule of law, in a failed democracy, the rule of law is often undermined, with selective enforcement of laws, a lack of judicial independence, and arbitrary use of state power to suppress dissent or target political opponents.  In many cases, selective enforcement of laws has been used by governments to target political opponents or protect those in power. This creates resentment and undermines the legitimacy of the government, often leading to social unrest or opposition movements that can culminate in coups.  For instance, in Ghana, the selective enforcement of laws by the government of Kwame Nkrumah in the 1960s contributed to discontent and ultimately led to his overthrow in February, 1966. 

Governments that arbitrarily use state power to suppress dissent or target political opponents often create conditions ripe for coups.  When citizens perceive that their rights are being violated and that they have no recourse through legal channels, they may turn to extra-legal means, such as supporting a coup, to effect change.  The December, 1981 coup in Ghana, led by Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings, was partly a response to the perceived corruption and authoritarianism of the ruling government, which had been accused of arbitrary arrests and human rights violations.  The coup was seen as a means to achieve a more just and equitable society in the face of a government that had lost the trust and confidence of its people. 

A.1.3. VIOLATION OF CIVIL LIBERTIES 

Basic civil liberties, such as freedom of speech, assembly, and the press, are frequently curtailed or violated.  Dissent is stifled through censorship, activist harassment, and restrictions on political participation.  Military coups in Nigeria, such as those in 1966, 1983, and 1993, were often triggered by grievances over government authoritarianism, corruption, and the stifling of dissent.  Restrictions on political participation and, activists’ harassment created an environment of discontent, making military intervention more likely as a means of influencing change. 

Yahya Jammeh’s regime in Gambia was characterised by widespread human rights violations, including violations of civil liberties.  The suppression of freedom of speech and the press, along with the harassment of activists, fuelled opposition to the government.  Jammeh rose to power through a military coup in July, 1994, and the lack of civil liberties under his rule created conditions conducive to further instability and coup attempts, such as the failed coup attempt of December, 2014.  

The erosion of civil liberties in Mali, resulting in restrictions on freedom of speech, assembly, and the press, contributed to popular discontent with the government.  Widespread corruption, electoral irregularities, and the government’s failure to address security challenges in the north further fuelled grievances.  The August, 2020 coup was partly a response to these issues, with the military citing government incompetence and corruption as reasons for intervening.  

A.1.4.  CORRUPTION AND CRONYISM 

Corruption is widespread, with public officials using their positions for personal gain rather than serving the public interests.  Cronyism and nepotism undermine meritocracy and lead to a lack of accountability and transparency in governance.  

In Nigeria, during the military rule of General Sani Abacha in the 1990s, corruption reached unprecedented levels.  Public officials embezzled billions of dollars from state coffers, and key government positions were filled with Abacha loyalists, regardless of merit.  This widespread corruption and nepotism fuelled public anger which ultimately contributed to an unsuccessful attempt to oust Abacha through a coup in 1993. 

In Sierra Leone, the government of President Siaka Stevens (1967-1985) was notorious for corruption and cronyism.  Stevens and associates amassed wealth through various corrupt practices, including the embezzlement of state funds and the awarding of contracts to cronies. The lack of accountability and transparency in governance contributed to widespread poverty and inequality, leading to social unrest and eventually to the military coup in 1967 which brought Stevens to power. 

Burkina Faso has also experienced coups driven by corruption and nepotism.  The 2014 uprising and subsequent coup that ousted President Blaise Compaoré (1987-2014) were fuelled, in part, by public outrage over his attempts to extend his 27-year rule through constitutional changes, seen as a means to protect his cronies and maintain their grip on power.  The Compaoré regime was marked by corruption and nepotism, which weakened social and economic conditions in the country.

In Guinea, under the long rule of President Lansana Conté (1984-2008), government officials and members of Conté’s inner circle were accused of embezzling public funds and engaging in corrupt practices.  The lack of accountability and transparency in governance fuels public discontent and contributes to periodic unrest and coup attempts.  Conté’s death in 2008 resulted in a military coup and subsequent political instability and fuelled discontent among the population. 

During the rule of President Amadou Toumani Touré (2002-2012) of Mali, who was ousted in a coup in 2012, there were allegations of corruption within the government and the military. The mismanagement of resources and lack of transparency in governance have exacerbated social and economic inequality, particularly in the northern regions of the country. These grievances, along with discontent over the government’s handling of the Tuareg rebellion, contributed to the coup. 

Under the long rule of President Abdoulaye Wade (2000-2012) of Senegal, there were allegations of corruption involving high-ranking officials, including members of Wade’s family. Critics accused the government of favouritism and nepotism in awarding contracts and making appointments.  This corruption and lack of accountability fuelled public anger and contributed to social unrest, including widespread protests and clashes with security forces. 

In Côte d’Ivoire, during the presidency of Félix Houphouët-Boigny, who ruled from independence in 1960 until he died in 1993, there were allegations of corruption and favouritism towards his ethnic group and close associates.  The lack of transparency in governance and the concentration of power within a small elite contributed to growing discontent among other ethnic groups and the broader population.  This sustained mass discontent ultimately led to the Ivorian Civil War in 2002 and subsequent coups and political unrest. 

A.1.5. WEAK INSTITUTIONS 

Democratic institutions, including the legislature, judiciary, and electoral bodies, typically lack independence, efficiency, and effectiveness. This allows the executive branch to exert undue influence and consolidate power, further undermining democratic governance. 

In Senegal, weak institutions have hindered democratic progress.  The judiciary has been accused of political bias and a lack of independence, particularly during elections.  The legislature, while constitutionally empowered, often delays to the executive, thus limiting its ability to hold government accountable.  Electoral bodies have faced challenges related to transparency and impartiality, leading to disputes over election results.  This concentration of power within the executive branch undermines democratic governance, fosters political polarisation, and erodes public trust in the system. 

Mali‘s institutions have been particularly fragile, as evidenced by the 2012 coup and subsequent political crises.  The judiciary suffers from corruption and inefficiency, with political interference compromising its independence.  The legislature has been weak and ineffective in providing oversight of the executive branch, often overshadowed by presidential power. Electoral bodies have faced allegations of bias and manipulation, contributing to disputes over election results and further undermining confidence in democratic processes. The lack of institutional capacity has allowed the executive to consolidate power, exacerbate governance challenges and contribute to political instability. 

A.1.6.  POLITICAL INSTABILITY 

Failed democracies often experience political instability, with frequent changes in government, civil unrest, and coups or other forms of extra-constitutional power grabs.  Political instability is often marked by a cycle of protests, demonstrations, and occasionally violent confrontations between the government and its citizens.  Azam et al (1996) defined it as, “an eruption of political violence (demonstrations, riots, coups,) that depend on economic policies and are related to the redistribution of wealth despite withdrawals made by the government, which lead to the problematic economic inequality and lead to a high human cost when repression is severe”.  This unrest can stem from grievances over issues such as social injustice and perceived electoral fraud.  In such environments, the rule of law may be compromised, leading to a breakdown in public trust and intensifying the challenges of governance.  Therefore, political instability represents a fundamental challenge to the stability and functioning of a nation’s political system.  

In Sierra Leone, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) used propaganda to manipulate public opinion by portraying themselves as liberators while demonising the government, inciting violence, and receiving foreign support, all of which prolonged the conflict and suffering of the Sierra Leonean people (Johnson, 2018; Brown, 2021).  In the postelection crisis in the Ivory Coast during 2010-2011, misinformation played a significant role in delegitimising President Laurent Gbagbo’s government.  False narratives about electoral fraud and human rights abuses were spread by opposition forces and amplified by international media, creating a pretext for foreign intervention and further polarising society, contributing to the ensuing violence (Williams, 2015; Harris, 2016).  

Mali, used misinformation to justify the 2012 military coup that ousted President Amadou Toumani Touré.  False narratives regarding the government’s handling of the Tuareg rebellion and alleged ties to Islamist militants were propagated to delegitimise Touré’s administration, with foreign powers intervening militarily under the pretext of combating terrorism, thereby influencing political dynamics (Green, 2017; Taylor, 2018). 

A.1.6.1. Inter– and Intra-Party Rivalries 

Nigeria has faced numerous coups, and political instability has often been cited as one of the major reasons for military intervention.  The failed census which was filled with widespread manipulation orchestrated by regional leaders seeking to bolster their political influence through inflated population figures is said to have been the mechanism on which the coups began in the country.  The constitutionally mandated census held significant political implications because seats in the House of Representatives were allocated based on population. The Northern Region’s political strength, led by the NPC, largely stemmed from the 1952-53 census, which identified 54 per cent of the country’s population in that area.

A national campaign in early 1962 emphasised the importance of the forthcoming census, linking it to parliamentary representation and financial support for regional development.  Widespread abuses, including intimidation of opponents, manipulation of the constitution and courts, diversion of public funds, election rigging, and corruption of public officials, further fuelled popular disillusionment.  Leading up to the 1964 elections, the political scene was tumultuous.  The 1964 national elections were tainted by massive rigging and widespread boycotts, worsening political instability (Metz, 1991). As a result of a sham of elections, by the following year, the Western Region descended into near anarchy as Action Group factions engaged in “Operation Wetie”, akin to “necklacing”, where opponents were doused with fuel and set alight (Bourne, 2015). 

Corruption is also a persistent problem that undermines governance and fuels public discontent. For instance, Ghana experienced its first military coup in 1966, which was partly a response to alleged widespread corruption under President Kwame Nkrumah’s administration.  Similarly, in Nigeria, the 1983 coup that overthrew President Shehu Shagari was driven by allegations of rampant corruption and electoral malpractice.  Sierra Leone’s political instability has been marked by coups and a brutal civil war.  The coup in 1967 which overthrew Prime Minister Albert Margai, was motivated by widespread corruption and nepotism.  Margai’s government was accused of using public funds for personal enrichment and favouring his ethnic group, the Mende, over others. 

The subsequent civil war (1991-2002) further illustrated the severe consequences of prolonged corruption and misgovernance, as rebel groups like the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) capitalised on public grievances (Keen, 2005).

A.1.6.2.  Ideological Struggles  

Liberia has a history of corruption and nepotism, contributing to cycles of violence and instability.  In 1980, Master Sergeant Samuel Doe seized power in a coup, partly motivated by grievances over the corruption and favouritism of the ruling Americo-Liberian elite.  Despite promises to combat corruption, Doe’s regime became notorious for its brutality and graft, fuelling further unrest and eventually leading to civil war (Sawyer, 1992).  Mali has also experienced significant political instability, as highlighted by the 2012 coup.  This coup was driven by dissatisfaction with the government’s handling of the Tuareg rebellion in the north and pervasive corruption within President Amadou Toumani Touré’s administration.  The coup leaders cited the government’s failure to equip the military adequately to combat insurgents and widespread corruption as key reasons for their intervention (Wing, 2013). 

In Guinea, political instability has often been driven by corruption and autocratic rule. The 2008 coup following the death of President Lansana Conté was justified by the junta as necessary to end the corrupt and ineffective governance that had characterised Conté’s rule. The junta promised to combat corruption and restore democratic governance, although they faced significant challenges in fulfilling on these promises (Bah, 2010).  Burkina Faso experienced a significant political upheaval in 2014 when President Blaise Compaoré was ousted following mass protests against his attempt to extend his 27-year rule.  The protests were fuelled by longstanding grievances over corruption, poverty, and political repression. The military briefly took over, pledging to oversee a transition to democratic elections (Harsch, 2017). 

A.1.6.3.  Authoritarianism 

Authoritarianism is another significant factor. Prolonged periods of authoritarian rule often led to political repression and a lack of democratic channels for change, prompting military interventions.  In Guinea-Bissau, President Luís Cabral was overthrown in 1980 by João Bernardo Vieira because of his dissatisfaction with Cabral’s authoritarian policies and perceived favouritism towards Cape Verdeans.  Togo also experienced coups in 1963 and 1967, influenced by its leaders’ authoritarian tendencies and their inability to manage political dissent. 

A.1.6.4.  Electoral Fraud 

Electoral fraud has frequently triggered coups in the region. In Mauritania, the 2008 coup was a reaction to disputed parliamentary elections and allegations of President Sidi Ould Cheikh Abdallahi’s manipulation of the political process to consolidate power. Similarly, in the Ivory Coast, President Henri Konan Bédié’s government was overthrown in 1999 following accusations of electoral fraud and economic mismanagement. 

A.1.6.5. Leadership Vacuums Created by Death or Incapacitation of Leaders 

Leadership vacuums created by the death or incapacitation of leaders often lead to coups. 

Niger‘s 2010 coup occurred during a power vacuum created by President Mamadou Tandia’s controversial attempts to extend his rule beyond constitutional limits. In Guinea, following the death of President Lansana Conté in 2008, Captain Moussa Dadis Camara led a coup, citing the need to restore order in the ensuing political vacuum. 

A.1.7.  POLITICAL PARTY INEFFICACIES 

Political inefficacy has been a pervasive issue across West Africa, leading to coups and political instability in various countries throughout the region.  This includes corruption, nepotism, lack of accountability, economic mismanagement, and failure to uphold democratic principles.  

Nigeria’s post-independence politics were dominated by ethnically and regionally based parties, such as the Northern People’s Congress (NPC), the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC), and the Action Group (AG).  The NPC, representing the northern region, and the NCNC, representing the eastern region, struggled to maintain a cohesive national government.  The First Republic (1963-1966) was marked by corruption, election rigging, and a failure to manage ethnic tensions, particularly between the Igbo, Yoruba, and Hausa-Fulani groups (Falola & Heaton, 2008).  The assassination of prominent political leaders and widespread ethnic violence set the stage for the January, 1966 coup led by Major Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu, which was a response to perceived corruption and mismanagement under Prime Minister Abubakar Tafawa Balewa’s administration.  This coup resulted in a countercoup in July, 1966, leading to the military rule under General Yakubu Gowon.  These events underscored the fragility of Nigeria’s political system and the deep-seated ethnic divisions that political parties failed to bridge (Falola & Heaton, 2008).  Similarly, subsequent coups in Nigeria, such as those in 1975 and 1983, were also motivated by grievances over economic stagnation and ethnic favouritism (Falola & Heaton, 2008). 

Under the leadership of Kwame Nkrumah and his Convention People’s Party (CPP), Ghana initially achieved significant milestone post-independence, including infrastructure development and education. However, Nkrumah’s increasingly authoritarian rule alienated many Ghanaians. The CPP’s centralisation of power, suppression of political opposition, and failure to address economic woes such as inflation and unemployment, led to widespread dissatisfaction.  Nkrumah’s attempts to create a one-party state by banning opposition parties and establishing the Preventive Detention Act, which allowed for the detention of political opponents without trial, further exacerbated tensions (Hutchful, 1979).  This environment of political repression and economic hardship culminated in a military coup in the February of 1966, led by Colonel Emmanuel Kwasi Kotoka, marking the end of Nkrumah’s regime (Hutchful, 1979). 

Another instance of political inefficacies, including economic mismanagement and lack of accountability, led to the 1979 coup led by Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings.  Rawlings accused the military government of President Fred Akuffo of failing to address the country’s economic challenges and allowing corruption to flourish.  The coup resulted in Rawlings assuming power and launching purges against perceived corrupt officials (Shillington, 1992).                        

The political landscape in Burkina Faso was marked by instability and frequent leadership changes.  President Thomas Sankara, who came to power through a coup in 1983, represented a break from the past through his revolutionary and progressive policies.  However, the country’s previous political parties, including the Voltaic Democratic Union (UDV), have struggled with corruption, ineffective governance, and regional divisions, all of which created an environment ripe for military intervention culminating in the 1987 coup that ousted President Thomas Sankara (Harsch, 2014).  Sankara’s government, known for its revolutionary policies, faced criticism for its authoritarian tendencies and economic challenges.  Captain Blaise Compaoré, Sankara’s close associate became his rival and accused the government of failing to address poverty and economic stagnation.  The coup resulted in Compaoré assuming power and reversing many of Sankara’s policies (Harsch, 2014). 

The 1992 coup, led by Captain Valentine Strasser in Sierra Leone, was a response to political inefficacy, including corruption and economic mismanagement.  Strasser accused the civilian government of President Joseph Saidu Momoh of allowing ethnic favouritism and failing to improve living conditions for the population.  The coup led to the installation of a military junta that promised to clean up corruption and restore stability (Gberie, 2005).  Liberia, notably in 1980 and 1989, experienced coups fuelled by dissatisfaction with political inefficacy.  The 1980 coup, led by Master Sergeant Samuel Doe, was motivated by dissatisfaction among indigenous Liberians who felt marginalised by the ruling Americo-Liberian elite.  Doe’s regime perpetuated tribal divisions and corruption, exacerbated political instability (Ellis, 2006).  The 1989 coup, led by Charles Taylor, was driven by grievances over corruption and mismanagement under Doe’s rule.  However, Taylor’s governmentcontinued the cycle of corruption and violence, leading to further instability and civil war (Ellis, 2006).  These inefficiencies were rooted in the longstanding dominance of the True Whig Party (TWP), ethnic divisions, economic mismanagement, and increasing authoritarianism.  Liberia, founded by freed American slaves in the early 19th century, developed a unique socio-political landscape where the Americo-Liberian elite, descendants of the settlers, dominated the political and economic life of the country, effectively marginalising the indigenous African population

(Liebenow, 1987).  The True Whig Party (TWP) has been the ruling party since the 1870s, creating a one-party state characterised by elitism, corruption, and the exclusion of the majority indigenous population (Dunn & Tarr, 1988). 

Mali was also unable to effectively address corruption and economic mismanagement, and the Tuareg rebellion in the north caused public discontent.  The 2012 coup, led by Captain Amadou Sanogo, followed widespread protests against President Amadou Toumani Touré’s administration. Sanogo accused the government of failing to address corruption and security threats (Thurston, 2021).  Additionally, Guinea faced challenges due to governance failures, leading to coups, such as the 1984 coup that ousted President Ahmed Sékou Touré.  The military, led by Lansana Conté, cited the need to address corruption, economic mismanagement, and human rights abuses as justification for the coup.  Conté’s regime, however, continued many of the same practices, including corruption and repression, exacerbating political and economic difficulties in Guinea (Rivière, 2005). 

The Ivory Coast experienced coups driven by administrative fiascos.  The (1999) coup was partly motivated by dissatisfaction with the government’s inability to address corruption and economic stagnation.  Robert Guéï, a northerner, exploited ethnic tensions between the predominantly Muslim north and the Christian-dominated south to consolidate power. However, his regime’s repression and economic mismanagement fuelled further instability, ultimately leading to the Ivorian Civil War in 2002 (Cook, 2011). 

Senegal faced a coup attempt in 2011 driven also by corruption, nepotism, and lack of accountability under President Abdoulaye Wade’s administration.  The attempt, led by a group of dissatisfied military officers, highlighted underlying governance challenges in the country. Wade’s government was accused of favouritism towards his family members and failing to address the country’s economic and social problems. However, the coup attempt was quickly foiled, and Senegal maintained its democracy (Gellar, 2005). 

Niger‘s 2010 coup, led by President Salou Djibo, followed President Mamadou Tandja’s attempt to extend his rule through a controversial referendum.  Tandja’s government was accused of corruption and mismanagement as well, with critics alleging that he sought power at the expense of democracy (Jourde, 2011).  The coup was presented as necessary to prevent Tandja from undermining the country’s constitutional order and to restore democracy (Kandeh, 2010). 

B.  ETHNIC TENSIONS 

B.1. ETHNICITY, TRIBAL RESENTMENT AND COMPETITIONS  

In West Africa, where numerous ethnic groups coexist within national borders, ethnic and tribal divisions are prominent social and political features.  Ethnic and tribal divisions in West Africa are rooted in social distinctions based on ancestry, language, culture, and heritage. These divisions often form the basis of individuals’ identities, shaping their social interactions, political affiliations, and economic opportunities within society. In many West African countries, several ethnic groups coexist within national borders, each with distinct traditions, languages, and customs. These groups may have historical grievances, cultural differences, or competing interests that contribute to social fragmentation and political tensions. 

B.2. COMPETITION FOR RESOURCES   

The competition for political power often intensifies ethnic and tribal divisions in the subregion. Political elites may mobilise support along ethnic lines, using identity politics to rally their ethnic base and maintain their grip on power.  This can deepen existing divisions and create a climate of mistrust and suspicion among different ethnic groups.  Additionally, marginalised or underrepresented ethnic groups may feel disenfranchised by the political system, leading to feelings of exclusion and resentment.  Tribal divisions can also escalate into violence and conflict, particularly in contexts where there are historical grievances, competition for resources, or political manipulation.  Tensions between ethnic groups may erupt into intercommunal violence, civil strife, or even civil war, further destabilising countries and undermining the prospects for peace and development.  In some cases, military leaders exploit these divisions as a pretext for intervening in politics, justifying coups or authoritarian rule as necessary to restore order or protect particular ethnic groups.  

Overall, ethnic and tribal divisions shape the political landscape of West Africa.  Addressing these divisions requires efforts to promote social cohesion, inclusive governance, and respect for diversity.  By fostering dialog, reconciliation, and equitable representation for all ethnic groups, countries in West Africa can work towards building more stable and resilient societies. 

B.3.  HISTORICAL GRIEVANCES  

Tribal conflicts have significantly shaped the political landscape of West Africa, influencing the region’s history since independence in the 1950s. This overview explores notable instances where ethnic tensions have driven political instability and coups in several West African countries. 

Nigeria, Africa’s most populous nation, has experienced several coups incited by ethnic tensions among the Igbo, Hausa, and Yoruba groups.  The January, 1966 coup, led by Igbo army officers, resulted in the assassination of key political leaders, including Prime

Minister Abubakar Tafawa Balewa.  This event intensified ethnic tensions, leading to retaliatory violence and the Nigerian Civil War (1967-1970).  The annulment of the 1993 presidential election, won by Yoruba businessman, Moshood Abiola, sparked further unrest and led to General Sani Abacha’s military regime (Falola & Heaton, 2008). 

Sierra Leone‘s political instability and coups have also been deeply influenced by ethnic divisions.  In 1967, the army overthrew Prime Minister Albert Margai, who was from the Mende ethnic group, due to the perceived marginalisation of northern ethnic groups, particularly the Temne and Limba. The coup, led by Brigadier David Lansana, set off a cycle of military intervention and political turmoil intensified by ethnic grievances (Gberie, 2005).  Ethnic tensions between the Fulani and Malinke communities have been a central theme in Guinean politics.  In 1984, hours after the death of President Ahmed Sékou Touré, Malinke military officers led by Lansana Conté seized power.  This coup, driven by ethnic rivalries, continued cultural homogeneity that characterised Touré’s regime, further sidelining the Fulani and deepening ethnic divisions (McGovern, 2013). 

Similarly, Mali‘s recent history has been marked by ethnic tensions, particularly between the Tuareg and the government in Bamako.  The 2012 coup, led by Captain Amadou Sanogo, was fuelled by frustration among soldiers, many from the Bambara ethnic group, with the government’s handling of the Tuareg rebellion.  The coup plunged Mali into further instability, leading to the takeover of its northern regions by Islamist militants and a French military intervention in 2013 (Lecocq, 2010).  Ethnic divisions have also played a role in Burkina Faso‘s political upheaval.  The 1987 coup that ousted President Thomas Sankara was led by Blaise Compaoré, who capitalised on divisions within the ruling party and dissatisfaction among the Mossi ethnic group.  Compaoré’s regime was marked by ethnic favouritism and corruption, ultimately leading to his ousting in 2014 amid widespread protests (Harsch, 2014). 

In Togo, ethnic divisions between the Kabye and Ewe significantly influenced the political landscape, particularly during the coups of 1963 and 1967.  The 1963 coup, which led to the assassination of President Sylvanus Olympio, an Ewe, was carried out by soldiers predominantly from the north, including the Kabye.  Continued ethnic tensions culminated in another coup in 1967, led by Lieutenant Colonel Étienne Eyadéma, a Kabye, who established a regime favouring the Kabye (Decalo, 1990).  Additionally, Liberia’s history illustrates how tribal divisions can escalate into violent conflicts.  The marginalisation of indigenous groups by the Americo-Liberian elite created deep-seated resentment.  During the civil wars (1989-1997; 1999-2003), leaders like Charles Taylor exploited ethnic loyalty to consolidate power, leading to brutal inter-ethnic violence.  Control over resources, such as diamonds and timber, further intensified these conflicts, resulting in approximately 250,000 deaths and displacement (Ellis, 2006). 

The Ivory Coast has experienced ethnic tensions between the northern and southern regions as well.  The 1999 military coup, led by General Robert Guéï, was also partly motivated by tensions between the predominantly Muslim north and the Christian south. 

Guéï’s exploitation of these tensions for power consolidation further intensified tribal divisions (Bah, 2010).  Also in The Gambia, tribal divisions have played a significant role in shaping politics.  President Yahya Jammeh, who came to power in a 1994 coup, exploited ethnic tensions to maintain control, by targeting groups like the Mandinka.  His regime’s downfall in 2016 was partly due to opposition from a coalition of political parties representing various ethnic groups (Hughes & Perfect, 2008). 

Lastly, Niger has also faced tribal conflicts, particularly between the Hausa and Zarma Songhai groups.  The 2010 military coup, led by Major Salou Djibo, highlighted these ethnic divisions. Although the coup cited corruption and mismanagement, the underlying tribal tensions played a crucial role, emphasising the challenges of governing a multiethnic society (Baudais & Chauzal, 2011). 

B.4.  DOMINANCE OF ETHNIC GROUPINGS IN THE STATE ARMS OF

         COERCION

During the colonial era, European powers often recruited soldiers and policemen from specific ethnic groups that they perceived as more “martial” or “loyalty”.  This practice was intended to prevent unity among the colonised peoples and to ensure that security forces would act in the interests of the colonial authorities rather than the local population.  For example, the British in Nigeria heavily recruited from the Hausa-Fulani in the north for military service, while the French in West Africa often favoured certain groups like the Senegalese Tirailleurs (Killingray, 1982). 

After gaining independence, many West African nations inherited military that were not only fragmented along ethnic lines but were also deeply intertwined with politics.  This ethnic imbalance often became a source of tension and instability, as rival groups vied for control over the coercive apparatus of the state.  In several instances, coups have been orchestrated or influenced by specific ethnic groups aiming to protect their interests or to redress perceived marginalisation. 

A typical example is Nigeria’s military history which is rife with ethnic tensions, particularly between the Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, and Igbo groups. The January, 1966 coup, led by predominantly Igbo officers, was followed by a countercoup in July, 1966 led by Hausa-Fulani officers. These coups exacerbated ethnic divisions and eventually led to the Nigerian Civil War (1967-1970) (Nolutshungu, 1975). Ethnic loyalty within the military has continued to influence Nigerian politics and military interventions.  In Sierra Leone, the military coup of 1992, which brought the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) to power, had significant ethnic underpinnings.  The NPRC, largely composed of officers from southern and eastern regions, reflected the underlying ethnic tensions within the military and the wider society (Abdullah, 1998).  The 1999 coup in Côte d’Ivoire, led by General Robert Guéï, highlighted ethnic rivalry, particularly between the northern Dioula and southern Akan groups.  

Ethnic considerations played a significant role in the composition of the military and the support base for various political factions (Akindès, 2004).  The dominance of certain ethnic groups within the military and other state-coercive arms has profound implications for political stability and governance in West Africa.  Ethnic favouritism undermines the professionalism and cohesion of the military, making it more susceptible to factionalism and less effective in maintaining national security.  Coups and attempted coups driven by ethnic motives contribute to recurrent political instability and hinder democratic consolidation. The exclusion of certain groups from military and political power fosters grievances and can lead to cycles of retaliation and violence. 

C.  ECONOMICS 

C.1. RESOURCE CONTROL, THEFT AND THE ELITES    

In the run-up coups in West Africa, the most underlying problems faced by these West African countries are issues of corruption and nepotism.  These again played significant roles in eroding public trust in government institutions and fuelling grievances against ruling elites.  This created fertile ground for military intervention and other forms of political upheaval.  For example, leaders who enrich themselves through corrupt practices, while neglecting the needs of the populace, may face widespread public anger and protests, providing an opening for military officers or opposition groups to seize power.  Similarly, the perception that government positions are awarded based on nepotism rather than merit can intensify social inequalities and breed resentment among those who feel excluded from political and economic systems.  In such environments, coups may be seen as a means to remove corrupt and nepotistic regimes and restore order and justice.  However, coups often perpetuate cycles of corruption and nepotism, as new rulers seek to consolidate power and enrich themselves at the expense of the people. 

Benin, despite being stable, compared to its neighbours, has corruption and nepotism contributing to political instability.  In 1965, a military coup ousted President Hubert Maga, partly due to allegations of corruption within his administration.  Maga’s government was accused of enriching his inner circle while neglecting the broader population, fuelling discontent that ultimately led to his overthrow (Decalo, 1990).  Cape Verde is generally considered one of Africa’s most stable democracies.  However, corruption scandals have surfaced, tarnishing the country’s reputation for good governance.  In 2018, Prime Minister José Maria Neves was accused of nepotism after appointing several family members to government positions. While no coups occurred, these incidents highlighted concerns about political favouritism and eroded public trust in the government (Lobban, 2016). 

Furthermore, during the regime of President Yahya Jammeh in The Gambia, malfeasance was rampant.  Jammeh, who seized power in a coup in 1994, ruled for over two decades, amassing wealth for himself and his inner circle while suppressing dissent.  In 2016, Jammeh’s refusal to step down after losing the presidential election resulted in a political crisis and the threat of regional military intervention.  Ultimately, he was ousted by a coalition of West African forces, highlighting the consequences of corruption and authoritarian rule (Perfect, 2017).  Again, Guinea-Bissau is plagued with chronic political instability, partly fuelled by exploitation. In 2012, the military staged a coup just weeks before a presidential runoff election, citing concerns about corruption and the electoral process.  The military’s intervention highlighted deep-seated frustration with political elites’ failure to address corruption and promote inclusive governance (Forrest, 2014). 

Liberia‘s history has been marked by exploitation, contributing to cycles of violence and instability.  In 1980, Master Sergeant Samuel Doe seized power in a coup, partly motivated by grievances over the corruption and favouritism of the ruling Americo-Liberian elite.  Despite promises to combat corruption, Doe’s regime became notorious for its brutality and graft, fuelling further unrest and eventually leading to civil war (Sawyer, 1992). 

Mauritania has experienced multiple coups driven by corruption.  In 2005, General Ely Ould Mohamed Vall ousted President Maaouya Ould Sid’Ahmed Taya, citing corruption and abuse of power.  Taya’s regime was accused of nepotism toward his ethnic group, the Beydane, which led to widespread discontent and support for the coup (Pazzanita, 2006).  Corruption and nepotism have been persistent challenges in Niger, contributing to political instability.  In 2010, the military ousted President Mamadou Tandja, who had sought to extend his rule through a controversial constitutional referendum.  Tandja’s administration was accused of exploitation, enriching his family members and allies at the expense of the country’s development (Idrissa, 2012). 

Senegal has a reputation for relatively strong democratic governance, but scandals have periodically rocked the country.  In 2012, President Abdoulaye Wade was accused of allegations of nepotism after appointing his son as a government minister, sparking public outrage and protests. Although no coup occurred, these incidents underscored concerns about political favouritism and eroded confidence in the government (Gellar, 2005).  Togo has faced decades of authoritarian rule and political instability, driven in part by cronyism within the ruling Gnassingbé family.  President Gnassingbé Eyadéma, who seized power in a coup in 1967, ruled for nearly four decades, amassing immense wealth for himself and his family while suppressing opposition.  His son, Faure Gnassingbé, succeeded him in 2005, continuing the family’s grip on power during allegations of corruption and nepotism (Heilbrunn, 1997). 

In Sierra Leone, under Joseph Saidu Momoh, corruption was widespread and public resources were systematically siphoned off by officials for personal gain.  This corruption led to a significant deterioration of public services and infrastructure, worsening the hardships faced by ordinary Sierra Leoneans (Keen, 2005).  The country’s economy plummeted due to mismanagement and fund embezzlement, which intensified public discontent and eroded trust in the government (Reno, 1995).  Positions in the government and military were frequently awarded based on loyalty to Momoh rather than merit.  This practice marginalised competent individuals who were not connected to the ruling elite, fostering widespread resentment (Keen, 2005).  In 1992, the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC), led by Captain Valentine Strasser, overthrew Momoh’s government.  The coup was driven by frustration within the military and the general population over the corruption and economic mismanagement (Hayward, 1996).  Initially, the NPRC promised to tackle corruption and improve governance. However, their rule soon mirrored the corruption and nepotism of its predecessors, failing to deliver significant improvements (Keen, 2005).  Later in 1997, Major Johnny Paul Koroma, leading the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), ousted President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah.  The AFRC allied with the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), a rebel group also disillusioned by corruption and the exclusionary practices of the government (Abdullah, 1998). Despite promises of change, the AFRC regime quickly fell into the same patterns of corruption and self-enrichment, further destabilising the country and prolonging civil conflict (Keen, 2005). 

Nigeria’s General Sani Abacha’s regime is notorious for one of the most extensive thefts of public funds in history, with estimates suggesting he embezzled between $3 billion and $5 billion.  This theft drained the country’s resources and crippled public services (Adewumi, 2014).  The misappropriation of funds led to deteriorating infrastructure, poor healthcare, and inadequate education, which fuelled public unrest (Lewis, 2006).  Abacha appointed family members and close associates to key government positions, ensuring loyalty but at the cost of efficiency and meritocracy (Adewumi, 2014).  

In each of these West African countries, cronyism has contributed to political instability, creating conditions ripe for coups or other forms of authoritarian rule. Addressing these issues requires concerted efforts to promote transparency, accountability, and good governance, ensuring that political power serves the interests of a broad population rather than a select group. 

C.1.1. Resource Extraction Control 

Sierra Leone faced challenges during the Siaka Stevens era, from 1968 to 1985.  Economic mismanagement and corruption, especially in the diamond and mineral sectors have created fertile ground for instability.  Western powers, particularly Britain, maintained a keen interest in Sierra Leone’s mining industry, which was pivotal to its economy.  The resulting political instability led to a series of military coups, plunging the country into prolonged turmoil and economic decline (Keen, 2005; Reno, 1995). 

In Liberia, the overthrow of President William Tolbert in 1980 by Samuel Doe was also deeply rooted in economic grievances.  Liberia’s rich resources, including rubber, timber, and diamonds, attracted Western interest, but mismanagement and corruption fuelled internal strife. Western powers initially supported Doe’s regime because of strategic interests but withdrew support as his rule became oppressive.  The subsequent civil war further destabilised Liberia, impacting both its people and its valuable resources (Ellis, 2007; Dunn & Tarr, 1988). 

Also, Ivory Coast during the Félix Houphouët-Boigny era, spanning the 1960s to the 1990s, was closely tied to its economic success, particularly in cocoa production.  Western powers, especially France, had a vested interest in maintaining stability to safeguard their economic interests in the region.  However, economic disparities and political exclusion caused the internal tensions, culminating in a coup attempt in 1999.  The subsequent years of instability threatened Ivory Coast’s cocoa production and the Western interests were dependent on it (McGovern, 2011; Crook, 1990). 

Again, Nigeria‘s history marked by the Biafran War (1967-1970), was fuelled by economic motives, particularly control over oil resources in the Niger Delta region. Western powers, including Britain and the United States, supported the Nigerian government against the breakaway state of Biafra to maintain control over Nigeria’s oil wealth. This intervention prolonged the conflict, resulting in significant loss of life and destabilisation (Smith, 2007; Stremlau, 1977). 

In Guinea, Sékou Touré’s regime faced economic difficulties because of his attempts to nationalise key industries, such as bauxite mining.  Western powers, particularly France and the United States, opposed Touré’s policies and supported opposition groups, leading to internal strife and political instability (Rivière, 2005; Kaba, 1977). 

Additionally, Mali‘s history includes several instances of military coups and political instability, often linked to economic grievances and foreign interests.  The country’s rich mineral resources, including gold and uranium, have attracted foreign investment and intervention, shaped its political landscape, and contributed to cycles of instability (Imperato, 1989; Wing, 2008).  Another West African country to experience political upheavals and coups is Burkina Faso, with economic factors playing a significant role.  The country’s valuable resources, such as gold and cotton, have been subject to exploitation by foreign interests, leading to tensions and instability within the country (Harsch, 2017; Hilgers, 2012). 

C.2. MISMANAGEMENT AND POLICY POVERTY 

Economic challenges have been a significant factor contributing to coups in West Africa, with several countries in the region experiencing political instability.  From Nigeria to Guinea, these challenges have often intensified existing grievances, leading to military interventions aimed at addressing perceived economic mismanagement and inequality.  Nigeria, Africa’s most populous country, faced economic difficulties leading to coups throughout its history.  The 1966 coup, led by Major Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu, was partly motivated by frustration with economic disparities.  Nzeogwu and his group targeted political leaders accused of enriching themselves while neglecting the welfare of the masses.  Subsequent coups in Nigeria, such as those in 1975 and 1983, were also driven by economic grievances, including inflation, unemployment, and income inequality (Falola & Heaton, 2008; Siollun, 2009). 

Notably, the 1984 coup that ousted President Ahmed Sékou Touré in Guinea was a military-led coup by Lansana Conté. He cited the need to address economic mismanagement as justification for the coup. Touré’s government failed to diversify the economy, leading to stagnation and widespread poverty. Conté promised to implement economic reforms but ultimately succumbed to the corruption and mismanagement that plagued his predecessor (Rivière, 2005; Kaba, 1977).  Mali‘s 2012 coup, led by Captain Amadou Sanogo, was a response to fiscal issues worsened by the Tuareg rebellion in the north.  The government’s inability to effectively address poverty, unemployment, and food insecurity fuelled public discontent.  Sanogo and his supporters justified the coup as necessary to restore order and address the country’s economic woes.  However, the intervention further destabilised Mali and led to a prolonged period of conflict (Thurston, 2021; Lecocq, 2013).   

In addition, Ivory Coast has experienced economic issues leading to coups, such as the 1999 coup led by General Robert Guéï.  The coup was partly motivated by dissatisfaction with the government’s failure to address economic stagnation and income inequality.  Guéï exploited economic grievances as part of the many issues in the country at that time to seize power, promising to improve the country’s economic prospects.  However, his regime’s corruption and mismanagement only intensified the situation, leading to further instability (Cook, 2011). 

Furthermore, Burkina Faso‘s 1987 coup, led by Captain Blaise Compaoré, was also driven by economic difficulties.  President Thomas Sankara’s revolutionary government faced internal and external pressure due to its radical economic policies. Compaoré and his supporters accused Sankara of neglecting economic development and plunging the country into poverty. The coup promised a return to stability and economic growth but ultimately led to decades of authoritarian rule and economic stagnation (Harsch, 2014).  In 2011, Senegal faced fiscal issues that contributed to the coup attempt.  President Abdoulaye Wade’s administration was accused of numerous failures, including economic mismanagement.  The country experienced high unemployment rates and slow economic growth, which fuelled public discontent.  The coup attempt, led by a group of dissatisfied military officers, had proposed to address these grievances.  However, the coup was quickly foiled, and Senegal maintained its democratic trajectory (Gellar, 2005). 

Similarly, under President Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana faced significant fiscal and economic difficulties that ultimately contributed to his overthrow in the 1966 coup.  Nkrumah’s seven-year development plan, which included large-scale industrialisation and infrastructure projects centred on the Volta River Project, for instance, was seen as a cornerstone of economic modernisation and independence with immediate and long-term returns. Following the 1966 coup, this plan and its policies, which were to ensure the building of a sovereign national economy, were jettisoned upon the advice of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The 1972 coup led by Col. Ignatius Kutu Acheampong also through the policies of debt repudiation and “Operation Feed Yourself” sought to build a self-reliant autonomous national economy under the National Redemption Council (NRC). But, once again, these policies were reversed by the Supreme Military Council 2 (SMC-2) under Lieutenant General Frederick William Kwasi Akuffo in July, 1978.

A Sierra Leone‘s history includes coups driven by economic difficulties.  The 1967 coup, led by Colonel Andrew Juxon-Smith, was partly motivated by dissatisfaction with the government’s failure to address poverty and economic inequality.  The country’s economy was heavily reliant on exports such as diamonds, which led to uneven development and social tensions.  The military intervention promised to address these issues but ultimately failed to bring about lasting change (Gberie, 2005). 

The Gambia experienced fiscal issues that contributed to the coup in 1994.  President Dauda Jawara’s government was accused of, amongst other issues, economic mismanagement, which had worsened the country’s economic situation.  The coup, led by Yahya Jammeh, promised to address these issues and bring about economic prosperity.  However, Jammeh’s regime became known for its corruption and human rights violations, further intensifying the country’s economic woes (Hughes & Perfect, 2008). 

Also, in Cape Verde, financial hardship led to a coup attempt in 1977.  The ruling party’s economic policies were criticised for failing to address poverty and unemployment.  The coup attempt, led by Antonio Mascarenhas Monteiro, addressed these grievances.  However, it was quickly suppressed, and Cape Verde maintained its democracy, eventually becoming known for its stable governance and economic development (Lobban Jr., 1995). 

Liberia‘s history is marked by coups driven by fiscal issues.  The 1980 coup, led by Master Sergeant Samuel Doe, was partly motivated by dissatisfaction with the ruling elite’s economic policies, which favoured the Americo-Liberian elite over the Indigenous population.  Doe’s regime promised to address economic inequality but ultimately failed to bring about meaningful change, leading to further instability and civil war in the country (Ellis, 2006). 

C.3.  ECONOMIC INEQUALITY AND WEALTH DISTRIBUTION  

During the 1950s and 1970s, Sierra Leone faced economic exploitation and inequality driven by partnerships between mining companies and NGOs.  The dominance of mining corporations in the economy perpetuated exploitative labour practices, such as low wages and poor working conditions.  NGOs, aiming to stimulate economic development, often aligned their agendas with corporate interests, inadvertently contributing to the marginalisation of local communities and widening economic disparities.  The Sierra Leone Selection Trust (SLST), a subsidiary of the British Consolidated African Selection Trust, played a significant role in the diamond mining industry during the period.  SLST’s control over diamond mines allowed the company to dictate employment terms, resulting in low wages and inadequate working conditions for local labourers.  The economic benefits were largely extracted by the company, with minimal reinvestment in the local economy, intensifying inequality and economic exploitation (Zack-Williams, 1995; Reno, 1995). 

Furthermore, the labour practices enforced by mining companies, including SLST, often violate basic labour rights.  Workers face hazardous conditions without adequate safety measures or fair compensation.  Economic exploitation was entrenched by the limited bargaining power of the local labour force and the collusion between corporate and governmental interests, which prioritised profit over people (Zack-Williams, 1995; Reno, 1995).  NGOs operating in Sierra Leone during this era often partnered with mining companies to foster economic development. However, their initiatives were frequently aligned with the interests of mining corporations rather than addressing the needs of local communities.  For example, some NGOs focused on providing basic services and infrastructure that supported mining companies’ operational needs, such as roads and utilities, rather than prioritising community development projects that could lead to sustainable economic empowerment for the local population (Richards, 1996; Smillie, 2010).  This alignment of interests between NGOs and mining corporations has contributed to the marginalisation of local communities.  Economic disparities widened as wealth generated from mining activities benefited small elites and foreign corporations, while most of the local population remained impoverished.  The lack of substantial reinvestment in local communities has led to endure economic inequalities and social tensions (Gberie, 2005; Smillie, 2010). 

Partnerships between mining companies and NGOs in Sierra Leone during the mid-20th century also contributed significantly to economic exploitation and inequality.  By aligning their agendas with corporate interests, NGOs have inadvertently supported the marginalisation of local communities.  Addressing these historical injustices requires a focus on sustainable development, equitable resource distribution, and the empowerment of local communities to ensure that economic growth benefits all segments of society. 

C.4.  ACCOUNTABILITY ISSUES 

One recurring theme in West African military coups is the lack of accountability and oversight. Military regimes often operate with impunity, suppressing dissent and consolidating power without fear of consequences.  The case of Togo, where the Gnassingbé family has ruled for decades, highlights how military leaders can maintain their grip on power through repression and lack of accountability.  Military regimes in Nigeria often cited the failure of civilian governments to address corruption, nepotism, and ethnic tensions as justifications for their interventions.  However, these regimes often operated with impunity.  For example, General Sani Abacha’s regime from 1993 to 1998 was notorious for its brutal repression of dissent, corruption, and lack of accountability.  Abacha’s regime was marked by execution of political opponents, including activist Ken Saro-Wiwa, and the large-scale embezzlement of state funds (Lewis, 1994). 

The most notable military regime in Ghana was led by Flight Lieutenant Jerry John Rawlings, who first came to power in a coup in 1979 and again in 1981.  Rawlings’ regime initially promised to address corruption and mismanagement but ultimately operated with significant impunity, suppressing opposition and ruling by decree.  One of the critical decrees during his rule was the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) Law 42, which allowed the detention of individuals without trial, significantly curtailing civil liberties and silencing political dissent.  Additionally, PNDC Law 4 established the People’s Defence Committees (PDCs) and Workers’ Defence Committees (WDCs), which were grassroots organisations meant to mobilise local communities but often acted as instruments for the regime to exert control and monitor political activities.  Another significant decree was PNDC Law 111, which enabled the expropriation of properties deemed to have been acquired through corrupt means, further centralising power and resources under the regime’s control. These measures, while presented as efforts to combat corruption and promote national security, effectively stifled political opposition and entrenched Rawlings’ authoritarian rule (Agyeman-Duah, 1987; Nugent, 1995).

The 1992 coup led by Captain Valentine Strasser in Sierra Leone was justified by frustration with corruption and mismanagement under the civilian government.  However, Strasser’s regime soon became known for its lack of accountability, and human rights abuses and corruption becoming rampant.  The military regime failed to address the underlying issues facing the country, leading to further instability and eventual civil war (Kandeh, 2004).

The most recent (2008) coup, led by Captain Moussa Dadis Camara of Guinea, was a response to corruption and economic mismanagement under President Lansana Conté. However, Camara’s regime quickly gained a reputation for brutal suppression of dissent, lack of transparency, and gross human rights violations, including the massacre of protestors in 2009. The lack of accountability and oversight during Camara’s rule highlighted recurring issues with military regimes in the region (Arieff, 2009). 

D.  EXTERNAL INTERESTS 

D.1. COLD WAR AND GEOPOLITICAL RIDGES  

Throughout the 1950s to the 1960s, West African countries found themselves entangled in geopolitical rivalry, largely influenced by the Cold War dynamics between the Western bloc, led by the United States; and the Eastern bloc, spearheaded by the Soviet Union. 

Ghana‘s 1966 coup, which saw President Kwame Nkrumah overthrown, serves as a poignant example of this rivalry. Other examples included the CIA overthrow of Guatemala’s President Jacobo Arbenz in 1954, the 1951 MI6 and CIA backed military coup in Iran and the Suez Crisis of 1956 which led to the overthrow of the president of Egypt.   

The early 1950s marked a period of decolonisation across Africa, with many West African nations gaining independence from European colonial powers.  However, this newfound independence often meant navigating the complex web of Cold War politics.  As leaders like Nkrumah in Ghana espoused socialist ideologies and sought closer ties with the Eastern bloc, they became targets for Western powers keen on maintaining their influence in the region (Schmidt, 2005).  Kwame Nkrumah’s alignment with the Eastern Bloc and his socialist policies threatened Western interests because of Ghana’s strategic resources and location.  Nkrumah sought united Africa and economic independence through nationalisation and state control, thus alienating Western businesses and governments, particularly given Ghana’s rich resources like gold, bauxite, manganese, iron ore and cocoa (Osei, 2003). 

Furthermore, Ghana’s geographical importance in West Africa made Nkrumah’s policies even more concerning for the West, as they feared the spread of communism.  The 1966 coup that ousted Nkrumah was funded and supported by Western powers, notably the United States and the United Kingdom. Evidence suggests the CIA’s involvement in aiding coup plotters to align Ghana with Western interests (Gleijeses, 1994; Mahoney, 1983).  Following the (1966) coup, the new government reversed many of Nkrumah’s policies and strengthened ties with the West, illustrating the Cold War dynamics influencing Africa.  This coup highlighted the interplay between internal political factors and external geopolitical strategies (Osei, 2003; Gleijeses, 1994). 

Similar scenarios have been observed in other West African countries during this period. For instance, in neighbouring Nigeria, which gained independence in 1960, Western powers, particularly the United Kingdom, closely monitored developments due to its oil reserves and strategic position.  Nigeria’s first Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, pursued a nonaligned stance, yet his government faced pressure from both sides.  Fearing the spread of communism, the UK supported conservative factions and military leaders who were opposed to socialist policies.  This tension culminated in the Nigerian Civil War of 1967-1970, fuelled by Cold War interests and internal divisions (Falola & Heaton, 2008). 

Under the leadership of President Sekou Touré, Guinea declared itself a socialist state and closely aligned with the Soviet Union. This moves provoked France and other Western powers, leading to economic isolation and covert attempts to undermine Touré’s regime (Rivière, 2005; Kaba, 1977). 

D.2. GLOBAL POWER DYNAMICS 

Coup dynamics in West Africa are not isolated events but are often intertwined with broader global power struggles and interests.  In-depth analysis of West Africa reflects deeper global power dynamics, including geopolitical rivalries, economic interests, and the pursuit of strategic influence.

D.2.1. Geopolitical Rivalries 

Geopolitical rivalries in West Africa have been a longstanding feature, shaped by historical legacies and contemporary power dynamics.  Former colonial powers like France, the United Kingdom, and Portugal under United States hegemony have maintained significant interests in the region, often competing for control over resources, markets, and strategic military bases. This historical backdrop has laid the foundation for ongoing geopolitical manoeuvring in West Africa. 

In the contemporary context, the rivalry has evolved to include global powers such as the United States, China, and Russia, adding another layer of complexity to the region’s geopolitics. These powers engage in various strategies to extend their influence, including soft power diplomacy, economic investments, and military partnerships.  For instance, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has seen significant investments in infrastructure projects across West Africa, aiming to enhance connectivity and secure access to resources (Alden et al., 2018). 

The competition for influence is also reflected in military engagements and security partnerships.  The United States, through its Africa Command (AFRICOM), has maintained a military presence in West Africa, conducting training programmes and counterterrorism operations.  Meanwhile, Russia has sought to expand its military cooperation with countries like Mali and Guinea, by selling and training to bolster its influence in the region (Oladipo, 2020).  These geopolitical rivalries often intersect with internal dynamics, including coups and political transitions. 

External actors may support factions or leaders aligned with their interests, either overtly or covertly.  For example, Western powers may support coups that install leaders sympathetic to their economic and political agendas, viewing them as strategic allies in regional stability and security.  Conversely, other actors, including non-Western powers and regional players, may seek to undermine Western influence through alternative alliances and support for opposition movements (Ismay, 2021).  The implications of these geopolitical rivalries are multifaceted. On the one hand, they can contribute to economic development through investments and infrastructure projects.  However, they also pose challenges such as worsening local conflicts, fuelling arms races, and creating dependencies on external actors.  Moreover, competition for influence can undermine continental unity, regional cooperation and conflict resolution, as competing interests may prioritise strategic gains over broader stability (Büscher & Krijnen, 2019). 

In conclusion, West Africa’s geopolitical landscape is characterised by historical legacies and contemporary rivalries among major powers.  These dynamics influence the region’s political transition, security strategies, and economic development.  Understanding and managing these rivalries is essential for promoting stability, fostering regional cooperation and addressing the complex challenges facing West Africa. 

D.2.2. Economic Interests 

West Africa’s rich natural resources, including crude oil, natural gas, minerals, and agricultural land, make it a target for global economic interests. International corporations backed by powerful states often seek to exploit these resources for profit, sometimes at the expense of local populations and the environment.

D.2.2.1. Examples of Economic Interests Influencing Coups 

Nigeria‘s oil wealth has attracted significant foreign involvement, especially during the Biafra War (1967-1970), when international oil companies and foreign governments were driven by the desire to control crude oil resources.  Multinational corporations like Shell, Mobil, Elf, Total and Agip have been implicated in supporting political factions to maintain favourable conditions for oil extraction (Coll, 2012; Frynas, 2001).  A classic and more instructive example of multinational corporate bodies deposing governments in their areas of operations was the controversial role of the United Fruit Company[2] in the 1954 CIA coup in Guatemala.   

France has historically maintained strong influence in its former colonies in West Africa, often intervening to protect its economic interests.  For instance, the 2011 intervention in Côte d’Ivoire, where French forces supported Alassane Ouattara during the political crisis, is seen as partly motivated by protecting French economic interests, including the cocoa and oil sectors (Arieff, 2011; Charbonneau, 2012). 

Although not in West Africa, the DRC‘s experience provides a relevant example of how resource wealth can drive conflict.  That country’s vast mineral wealth, including cobalt and coltan, has led to prolonged conflicts with heavy foreign involvement.  Various foreign companies and governments have supported different factions in securing access to these minerals (Autesserre, 2010; Nest, 2011). 

China’s increasing investments in West Africa, particularly in infrastructure and mining, have shifted local power dynamics.  In Guinea, Chinese investments in bauxite mining have had significant political implications.  China’s economic influence indirectly supports certain regimes, providing them with financial stability to maintain power amidst internal conflicts (Corkin, 2011; Power, Mohan, & Tan-Mullins, 2012). 

D.2.2.2. Economic Competition and Proxy Conflict 

Economic competition between global powers often intensifies instability in West Africa.  Rival states sometimes support opposing factions within a country to gain strategic advantages.  For example, during the Cold War, the U.S. and the Soviet Union supported different sides in various African conflicts to expand their influence.  This trend continues today with new global players like China and the U.S. vying for influence in resource rich regions. 

The influx of foreign capital and competition can lead to increased militarisation. In Mali, the ongoing conflict has been fuelled by the competition for control over gold mines and other resources. External actors provide arms and support to different factions, further destabilising the region.  Coup dynamics can be influenced by these economic interests, with corporations and their allies leveraging political instability to gain control over lucrative sectors or secure favourable contracts and concessions. For instance, coups may be orchestrated or supported by foreign powers to hire leaders who are willing to prioritise the interests of multinational corporations over those of their citizens.  Moreover, economic competition between global powers can intensify instability in West Africa, as rival states vie for market access. This competition can fuel proxy conflicts, arms races, and support for armed groups, further destabilising the region and undermining peace and development prospects.

D.2.2.3. Strategic Influence  

West Africa’s geostrategic importance stems from various factors, making it a focal point for global powers aiming to project influence and maintain strategic control in the region.  Its proximity to Europe, extensive maritime routes, and potential as a hub for trade and investment have all contributed to its significance on the international stage (Adebajo, 2014; Bach, 2008).  Global powers often view West Africa as a critical area to secure their strategic interests.  For example, its proximity to Europe makes it a gateway for trade, energy resources, and migration. Additionally, its maritime routes, including key waterways, such as the Gulf of Guinea, are vital for global trade, energy transportation, and maritime security (Onuoha, 2010; Ukeje & Ela, 2013). 

Coup dynamics in West Africa are often intertwined with broader strategic approaches.  External actors, including major powers and regional stakeholders, may seek to shape the political landscape to serve their long-term interests.  This can involve various strategies, such as supporting friendly regimes that align with their geopolitical agendas, establishing military bases for strategic positioning, or influencing regional organisations and alliances to promote their interests (Boas, 2001; Kieh, 2007).  For instance, France, as a former colonial power with significant interests in West Africa, has maintained a strategic presence in the region through military bases.  French military interventions and cooperation agreements with regional governments have been part of the strategy undertaken to ensure stability, protect French interests, and counter security threats, such as terrorism and piracy (Charbonneau, 2008; Vines, 2013). 

Similarly, the United States views West Africa as an important partner in its global security strategy.  Through initiatives like the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership

(TSCTP) and the Africa Command (AFRICOM), the U.S. has engaged in military training, counterterrorism operations, and security cooperation with West African countries to address threats like extremism, illicit trafficking, and maritime piracy (Ploch, 2010; Tardy, 2014).  China’s growing economic presence in West Africa also reflects strategic calculations aimed at securing resources, expanding markets, and enhancing geopolitical influence.  China’s investments in infrastructure, energy projects, and trade agreements with countries in the region contribute to its efforts to build strategic partnerships and extend its influence in Africa (Brautigam, 2009; Alden, 2007).   

These strategic influences and calculations underscore the complex dynamics at play in West Africa’s geopolitical landscape.  While external actors may bring resources, investment, and security cooperation, their interventions can also influence local politics, governance structures, and regional dynamics negatively.  Balancing these competing interests and ensuring that external engagements contribute to sustainable development, peace, and prosperity remains a challenge for West African countries and their international partners. 

D.2.3. Implications for Governance Stability  

The prevalence of coups in West African countries highlights the significant challenges to regional governance stability.  These coups often arise from weak and unstable political institutions, which hinder effective governance and impede socioeconomic development.  The erosion of the rule of law and public trust in government perpetuates a culture of political violence and instability.  Addressing the root causes of coups, such as political, economic, and social inequalities, and mitigating external interference in domestic affairs is crucial for achieving sustainable governance stability in West Africa. 

Historically, external actors, like the United States and China, have played significant roles in West African affairs and has continued to be involved in the region to combat terrorism and piracy recently.  Meanwhile, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has led to increased investment and infrastructure projects in West Africa, altering the balance of power and influence in the region (Schraeder, 1994; Brautigam, 2009).  To break the coups cycle, concerted efforts are needed to address the underlying issues.  For example, regional organisations like ECOWAS and the African Union have tried to enforce democratic norms and intervene in times of crisis, but their success has been mixed.  They often face challenges in maintaining effective peacekeeping forces and developing sustainable peace agreements.  Therefore, a more inclusive mediation and peace process strategy before elections can help to address grievances and create a more stable political environment (Aning & Atuobi, 2009; Williams, 2009). 

Historically, the United States has indeed intervened in West African countries to counter communist spread during the Cold War.  For instance, the U.S. supported anti-communist regimes and factions in various African countries as part of its broader Cold War strategy.  After the Cold War, U.S. involvement shifted towards combating terrorism, particularly post-9/11. Though the establishment of the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) in 2007 reflects the growing importance of Africa in U.S. security strategy, focusing on countering terrorism and other security threats such as piracy (Schraeder, 1994; Ploch, 2010), it does not represent the long-term interest of the region which is continental unity. 

China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has significantly increased Chinese investments and infrastructure projects across Africa, including West Africa.  This has altered the geopolitical landscape, increasing China’s influence in the region.  Chinese investments often focus on building critical infrastructure, like roads, ports, and railways, which can bolster economic development but may also increase recipient countries’ dependency on China (Brautigam, 2009; Alden, 2007). 

D.3.  ROLES IN MULTINATIONAL CORPORATE SECTOR AND BRETTON

         WOODS INSTITUTIONS  

D.3.1. Financial Influence and Policy Capture 

The financial influence of international corporations is at the heart of the corporate sector coup. Through generous financial contributions, lobbying efforts, and strategic alliances with governments, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and other stakeholders, corporations effectively acquire their way into decision-making processes. They use their economic leverage to shape policies and regulations that serve their interests, often at the expense of the broader public. 

In Nigeria, for instance, the oil sector has long been dominated by international corporations, such as Shell and Chevron. These companies are known to use their significant financial resources to influence government policies and regulatory frameworks. Through lobbying and financial contributions, they have secured favourable terms that allow them to maximise profits while minimising their obligations to environmental and social standards (Frynas, 2000; Watts, 2004). 

Similarly, in Ghana, the mining sector has been influenced substantially by multinational corporations, like Newmont and AngloGold Ashanti. These companies have established strong relationships with government officials and local elites, often leading to policies that prioritise corporate interests over community welfare and environmental sustainability. Reports have highlighted how financial incentives and strategic alliances have led to regulatory capture, where policies are tailored to benefit corporations at the expense of broader societal needs (Ayee et al., 2011; Hilson, 2002). 

In Liberia, the rubber and timber industries have been significantly influenced by international corporations, such as Firestone and various logging companies. These corporations have used their financial power to gain favourable concessions and influence legislation. The result has been policies that often overlook environmental degradation and labour rights issues, and focus instead on facilitating corporate profit-making (Brock, 2009; Global Witness, 2017). 

The case of Sierra Leone’s diamond industry further exemplifies the impact of financial influence on policy. International corporations and diamond traders have historically wielded significant power, shaping policies to ensure continued access to the country’s lucrative diamond resources. This influence has often resulted in weak regulatory oversight and inadequate enforcement of laws meant to protect local communities and the environment (Reno, 1995; Smillie, 2010). 

In conclusion, the financial influence of international corporations in West African countries often leads to policy capture, where economic leverage is used to shape regulations and policies that serve corporate interests. This dynamic typically results in the prioritisation of profit over the broader public good, leading to environmental degradation, social inequality, and weakened governance structures. 

In West Africa, the influence of international corporations extends far beyond the boardrooms.  With their deep pockets and extensive resources, these corporations often wield significant power over policymaking, governance, and socioeconomic development, shaping the destinies of millions in the region.  This phenomenon, known as a Corporate Sector Coup, represents a subtle yet pervasive form of influence that can have profound implications for the region’s economic prosperity, resource management, and social well-being.

D.3.2. Partnerships and Alliances 

Strategic partnerships and alliances play a crucial role in facilitating corporate influence in West Africa.  Corporations often form alliances with governments, NGOs, and international organisations, presenting themselves as partners in development and sustainability initiatives. However, behind these partnerships lies a deeper agenda aimed at advancing corporate interests and securing access to valuable resources. 

In Nigeria, multinational oil companies have established partnerships with both the government and local NGOs under the guise of corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives.  For example, Shell has engaged in numerous community development projects and environmental sustainability programmes.  However, critics argue that these partnerships primarily serve to enhance the company’s public image while ensuring continued access to the Niger Delta’s oil resources.  These alliances often result in policies that favour corporate interests over local communities (Idemudia, 2009; Omeje, 2006). 

Similarly, in Ghana, the cocoa industry has seen significant involvement from international corporations, such as Nestlé and Mars.  These companies have partnered with government agencies and NGOs to promote sustainable cocoa farming practices.  While these initiatives are presented as efforts to improve livelihoods and sustainability, they also help secure the corporations’ supply chains and market dominance.  Such partnerships can influence government policies and regulations, by aligning them more closely with corporate interests (Fold, 2002; Abbott, 2013). 

In Liberia, corporations in the forestry sector, including large logging companies, have formed alliances with both the government and international conservation organisations.  Partnerships often involve commitments to sustainable forest management and community development projects.  However, investigations have revealed that these alliances sometimes facilitate access to Liberia’s rich timber resources under favourable terms, benefiting corporations while local communities see minimal improvements (Global Witness, 2012; Mvondo, 2006). 

In Sierra Leone, diamond mining companies have partnered with international development agencies and local NGOs to promote development and peace-building initiatives.  These partnerships are often portrayed as efforts to rebuild the country post-civil war.  However, they also serve to stabilise the business environment for corporate operations and ensure continued access to diamond resources.  Such alliances can lead to regulatory frameworks that prioritise corporate stability over comprehensive community development (Zack-Williams, 2012; Smillie, 2010). 

In Mali, gold mining corporations have engaged in partnerships with government bodies and international organisations to support economic development programmes.  While these initiatives are framed as contributions to national development, they also help secure the companies’ operations in the country.  These alliances can influence policies and regulations, often leading to an environment where corporate interests are given precedence over broader social and environmental concerns (Campbell, 2003; Hilson & Garforth, 2013).  Strategic partnerships and alliances between corporations, governments, NGOs, and international organisations in West Africa often serve to advance corporate interests under the guise of development and sustainability. These alliances help secure access to valuable resources and influence policies in ways that benefit corporations, sometimes at the expense of local communities and sustainable development. 

D.3.3.  The Bretton Woods Agreement, Structural Adjustment Programs (SAP), and Neoliberal Policies in Ghana               

The Bretton Woods Agreement, established in 1944, created the International Monetary

Fund (IMF), International Financial Corporation (IFC) and the World Bank (IBRD).  These institutions were designed to ensure global economic stability and provide financial assistance to countries in need.  While the Bretton Woods institutions have had significant global impact, their influence on Ghana, particularly during the late 20th century, has been profound and, in many ways, controversial. 

Ghana, like many developing countries, has sought assistance from the IMF and the World Bank during times of economic difficulty.  In the early 1980s, Ghana faced severe economic challenges, including high inflation, debt, and a stagnant economy.  To address these issues, Ghana entered into several agreements with the Bretton Woods institutions, starting with the Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) in 1983.  These agreements typically came with stringent conditionalities, including structural adjustment policies (SAPs) (Boafo-Arthur, 1999). 

The key components of the SAPs in Ghana included economic liberalisation, which involved market deregulation, a reduction of trade barriers, deindustrialisation and the promotion of foreign investment (Konadu-Agyemang, 2000).  Privatisation was another critical aspect, where many state-owned enterprises were privatised to improve efficiency and reduce public sector deficits (Boafo-Arthur, 1999).  Fiscal austerity measures were implemented, leading to cuts in government spending, including reductions in subsidies and public services (Hutchful, 2002). Furthermore, the Ghanaian cedi was devalued to make exports more competitive (IMF, 2000). 

The negative impacts on Ghana are significant.  The reduction in government spending on social services, such as education, health, and housing, led to a deteriorated quality of life of many Ghanaians.  The removal of subsidies on essential goods and services made them unaffordable for the poor (Konadu-Agyemang, 2000).  Privatisation and the downsizing of the public sector resulted in significant job losses, as many state-owned enterprises that were privatised either reduced their workforce or shut down entirely, leading to higher unemployment rates (Boafo-Arthur, 1999).  The focus on liberalisation often favoured cash crops for export over local food production, leading to reduced support for small-scale farmers and decreased food security. Additionally, cheaper imported goods flooded the market, undermining local producers (Hutchful, 2002). 

Despite the initial relief provided by the Bretton Woods institutions, Ghana’s external debt grew. Servicing this debt required significant portions of government revenue, which could have been invested in development projects (IMF, 2000).  Frequent cedi devaluations, a requirement under the SAPs, led to hyperinflation, eroded ordinary Ghanaians’ purchasing power; and prices of goods and services skyrocketed, creating economic instability (World Bank, 1984).  Cuts in public spending have severely affected health and education services. Many hospitals and schools are underfunded, leading to a decline in the quality of these essential services. User fees were introduced, making health care and education less accessible to the poor (Boafo-Arthur, 1999). 

The negative impacts of Bretton Woods policies in Ghana have had long-lasting effects. Although some economic indicators, such as GDP growth, improved in the years following the implementation of the SAPs, the social costs were significant.  The increased inequality, weakened social safety nets, and sustained economic vulnerabilities highlighted the limitations and often counterproductive nature of the one-size-fits-all policies imposed by the Bretton Woods institutions (Hutchful, 2002). 

While the Bretton Woods institutions aimed to stabilise and stimulate Ghana’s economy, the conditions attached to their assistance often intensified social and economic problems providing another pretext for coups.  The 1972 coup led by Col. Ignatius Kutu Acheampong was one of such coups.  The case of Ghana illustrates the complex and often detrimental effects of global economic policies on developing nations.  The experience highlights the need for more nuanced and locally tailored economic interventions that consider the unique social and economic contexts of coups.

D.3.4. The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) 

The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) in Ghana provides a clear example of how larger corporations use ostensibly benevolent initiatives to advance their interests.  While the MCC presents itself as a development-focused organisation providing aid and investment to improve infrastructure and economic growth, critics argue that it serves as a tool for American corporate interests to gain a foothold in Ghana’s economy.  Under MCC agreements, Ghana was required to implement policy reforms favourable to corporate interests, including privatisation of viable state-owned enterprises, liberalisation of markets, and deregulation of key sectors.  These reforms have been criticised for benefiting multinational corporations at the expense of local businesses and workers, contributing to economic inequality and social instability (Whitfield, 2011).  By imposing these conditions, the MCC perpetuates a silent coup orchestrated by larger corporations to destabilise Ghana’s economy and exploit its resources for their own gain.  It exemplifies how seemingly altruistic initiatives can be used as Trojan horse to advance corporate interests and undermine the sovereignty and well-being of West African nations (Opoku, 2010).   

D.3.5. Resource Control and Social Impact 

Control over key natural resources is central to the corporate sector coup in West Africa. Whether crude oil and natural gas, minerals, or agricultural land, corporations wield immense economic and political power through their control of these resources.  This control – through complex and complicated capital shareholding structures – allows them to dictate terms of exploitation, negotiate favourable agreements with governments, and influence national development priorities to the detriment of general welfare of the peoples of West Africa. 

In Nigeria and Ghana, multinational oil companies, like Shell, Chevron, Eni, and Tullow, have significant control (in excess of 87 per cent) over the oil and gas sector.  This control has allowed companies to negotiate favourable terms with the government, often leading to policies that prioritise corporate interests over job creation, environmental protection and community welfare.  The Nigerian Niger Delta region, where much of this oil extraction takes place, has experienced severe environmental degradation, displacement, and loss of livelihood due to oil spills and gas flaring (Frynas, 2001; Watts, 2004). 

Again, in Ghana, international companies, such as Newmont and AngloGold Ashanti, dominate the gold mining sector with shareholding of 98 per cent of the corporate capital stock.  These corporations have secured extensive land concessions and favourable mining agreements, often at the expense of local communities.  Residents near mining sites frequently face displacement, loss of agricultural land, inadequate potable water and health issues related to mining activities (Akabzaa & Darimani, 2001; Hilson, 2002). 

In Liberia, the rubber and timber industries are controlled by major international corporations, like Firestone and various logging companies.  The control of these resources has enabled these corporations to influence national policies and secure advantageous concessions.  The social impacts include deforestation, loss of biodiversity, and adverse effects on the livelihoods of local communities that depend on forest resources (Brock, 2009; Global Witness, 2012). 

In Sierra Leone, the diamond mining industry, dominated by international corporations, has had profound social impacts.  Control over diamond resources has led to weak regulatory frameworks that fail to protect local communities.  The result is often environmental degradation and severe social disruption, including displacement and poor working conditions for miners (Reno, 1995; Smillie, 2010). 

In Mali, gold mining by multinational corporations, such as Randgold Resources, has resulted in significant control (in excess of 90 per cent) over the country’s valuable gold deposits. This control allows these corporations to shape the country’s mining policies and negotiate terms that are favourable to their operations. The social impacts include displacement of communities, loss of farmland, and environmental pollution (Campbell, 2009; Hilson & Garforth, 2013). 

The corporate sector coup represents a significant challenge to democracy, good governance, and sustainable development in West Africa. By leveraging their financial power, forming strategic partnerships, and controlling key resources, international corporations can effectively hijack the policymaking process and advance their interests at the expense of the broader population. Addressing this phenomenon requires greater transparency, accountability, and civic engagement to ensure that policies and decisions reflect the needs and aspirations of all West Africans, rather than the profit motives of a privileged few. 

D.4.  FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE  

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has been involved in covert operations in several West African countries, often aimed at influencing political outcomes.  This has included supporting or overthrowing governments deemed favourable or unfavourable to U.S. interests.  In Ghana, one of the most significant examples of CIA involvement in West Africa was the February, 1966 coup, which led to the ousting of President Kwame Nkrumah^[3] .  Nkrumah, a leading advocate of Pan-Africanism and socialism, posed a substantial threat to Western interests^[4], particularly those of the United States, due to his anti-colonial rhetoric and alignment with the Soviet Union. Nkrumah’s socialist policies and attempts to nationalise key industries, such as cocoa and timber, threatened Western powers, particularly the United States and Britain, who saw his regime as a challenge to their economic dominance in the region.  With CIA support, opposition groups staged a successful coup in 1966, allowing Western powers to regain control over Ghana’s valuable resources and influence its trajectory (Osei, 2003; Schlesinger, 2003). 

The U.S. is also known to provide military aid, training, and funding to various West African governments and military.  In some cases, this assistance has been used to suppress dissent or maintain authoritarian regimes, contributing to political instability.  The foreign intelligence agencies use several overt and covert methods in facilitating the planning, financing and mobilising support for would be coups.  In Ghana, for instance, before the coup that led to Nkrumah’s overthrow, the CIA circulated a now-declassified report titled “The Outlook for Ghana^[5]” to the White House, the National Security Council, and various other Federal entities, including students in the local institutions of higher learning.

Global geopolitical shifts and the response of the international community to coups also play a role.  During the Cold War, superpower rivalries often influenced coups in West Africa.  The U.S. and Soviet Union’s competition for influence in Ghana contributed to the 1966 coup against Nkrumah.  In the post-Cold War era, the international community’s responses to coups have varied, often influencing, outcomes.  The swift condemnation and sanctions following the 2021 coup in Guinea illustrate this dynamic.  Following Nkrumah’s overthrow, Ghana experienced significant political and economic shifts.  The new regime, which was more aligned with Western interests, received substantial support from the CIA to consolidate power and stabilise the country (Williams, 2021, Chapter 11). 

The CIA also played a pivotal role in Nigeria‘s political instability, particularly during the Nigerian Civil War (Biafran War, 1967-1970).  The agency’s actions were driven by the strategic importance of Nigeria and the need to prevent Soviet influence in the region.  The CIA exploited ethnic and regional tensions to weaken Nigeria’s central government. By fostering divisions, the agency aimed to ensure that Nigeria remained fragmented and less likely to align with the Soviet Union (Williams, 2021, Chapter 12).  The CIA’s covert support for the Biafran secessionist movement highlighted how the agency provided arms, intelligence, and other resources to the Biafran leaders.  This support was part of a broader strategy to destabilise Nigeria and prevent it from becoming a unified, pro-Soviet state (Williams, 2021, Chapter 13). Nigeria experienced a series of coups in 1966, resulting in the overthrow of the civilian government and the establishment of military rule. While the exact extent of CIA involvement has been debated, there have been allegations that the CIA provided support to certain factions within the Nigerian military during this period.  The coups were driven by ethnic tensions and power struggles among military elites.  During Nigeria’s civil war (1967-1970), the United States provided support to the Nigerian government against the breakaway state of Biafra.  This support prolonged the conflict and contributed to political instability in the region (Bassey, 2014; Stremlau, 1977). The use of intelligence and propaganda to influence public perceptions and political outcomes in Nigeria, and the CIA’s efforts to spread misinformation and manipulate media narratives to undermine the Nigerian government and support factions favourable to American interests (Williams, 2021, Chapter 14).   

While Liberia did not experience a direct CIA coup, the agency exerted a significant influence on the country’s leadership transitions and maintained a pro-American stance. The CIA’s support for pro-American leaders in Liberia, ensured that Liberian leadership remained aligned with U.S. interests, providing financial and political backing to favourable regimes (Williams, 2021, Chapter 15).  The CIA manipulated political events in Liberia to maintain the government’s supportive regime. The agency’s involvement in supporting Samuel Doe’s government in the 1980s is highlighted, illustrating how American aid and intelligence were used to stabilise and control the political landscape (Williams, 2021, Chapter 16). 

In 1987, Thomas Sankara, Burkina Faso‘s revolutionary leader, known as “Africa’s Che Guevara”, was assassinated in a coup led by his close associate, Blaise Compaoré. There have been persistent allegations that Compaoré’s coup was supported by Western powers, including the CIA, due to Sankara’s anti-imperialist stance and socialist policies (Harsch, 2017; Chafer, 2002).  Additionally, under the leadership of President Sékou Touré, Guinea pursued a policy of nonalignment and socialism. In the 1970s, there were reports of CIA attempts to destabilise Touré’s government, including alleged support for opposition groups and dissident factions through funding and training opposition groups, seeking to undermine Touré’s rule and advance Western interests in the region.  However, these efforts were largely unsuccessful, and Touré remained in power until he died in 1984. 

Former colonial powers often influenced coups in West Africa.  France’s involvement in coups in its former colonies underscores the impact of foreign interference.  For instance, the 1977 coup in Benin against President Mathieu Kérékou received significant support from France.  France has historically had close ties with Guinea, dating back to the latter’s independence in 1958.  In 2021, when Colonel Mamady Doumbouya led a military coup that ousted President Alpha Condé, France’s reaction was significant.  While condemning the coup, French President Emmanuel Macron emphasised the need for a swift return to civilian rule but also expressed concern over Condé’s human rights record, indicating a nuanced stance (Schmidt, 2007; Cooke, 2021).  France’s involvement in Mali has been particularly notable in recent years.  In 2012, when Islamist militants and Tuareg rebels took control of northern Mali, France launched Operation Serval, a military operation aimed at restoring government control and combating terrorism.  Although not a direct coup, France’s military intervention effectively changed the political landscape in Mali.  Subsequently, in 2020, France’s continued military presence and influence in the region were cited as factors in the military coup that ousted President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta (Lebovich, 2020; Charbonneau, 2014). 

In the Ivory Coast, France’s involvement in the 2010-2011 post-election crisis was controversial.  After incumbent President Laurent Gbagbo refused to concede defeat in the presidential election to Alassane Ouattara, the country descended into violence.  Under then President Nicolas Sarkozy, France played a significant role in supporting Ouattara’s claim to the presidency, including through military intervention.  Meanwhile, French forces alongside the UN and local forces, helped oust Gbagbo from power, leading to Ouattara’s assumption of the presidency (Bah, 2010; McGovern, 2011).  France has had a long-standing influence in Burkina Faso, particularly during the presidency of Blaise Compaoré. In 2014, Compaoré, who had been in power for 27 years, faced mass protests over his attempt to extend his rule. French government was accused of backing opposition groups and indirectly supporting Compaoré’s ouster. Compaoré fled the country, and a transitional government took over, eventually leading to democratic elections. In Burkina Faso, the assassination of revolutionary leader, Thomas Sankara in 1987, was allegedly supported by Western powers, particularly France, with covert backing. Sankara’s antiimperialist stance and socialist policies posed a threat to Western interests. Covert tactics, including funding and training, were reportedly employed to facilitate his overthrow (Harsch, 2017; Melly, 2014).

D.4.1. Diplomatic Pressure and Misinformation 

Misinformation campaigns in West African countries have been strategically used to manipulate public opinion, create social divisions, and justify foreign interference.  In Liberia, these campaigns exacerbated political tensions and fuelled the civil conflict by spreading false narratives about ethnic divisions and government corruption, which undermined stability and justified foreign intervention (Doe, 2020; Smith, 2019).  In Niger, misinformation has also been used to justify the 2010 coup led by Salou Djibo. 

False accusations of corruption and authoritarianism were spread to undermine President Mamadou Tandja’s government and justify military intervention.  While Western countries condemned the coup, they also contributed to misinformation campaigns aimed at discrediting Tandja’s government (Anderson, 2020; White, 2019).  These examples illustrate the pervasive role of misinformation in destabilising West African nations and facilitating foreign interference. 

Foreign powers from the West have frequently employed diplomatic pressure and arms support as part of their strategy to plot coups in various West African countries, leaving behind a legacy of political instability and unrest.  In Ghana, for instance, the CIA used diplomatic channels to exert pressure on internal dissent against President Kwame Nkrumah’s government in the 1960s.  This pressure, coupled with covert support for opposition groups, ultimately led to the successful coup in 1966 (Mahoney, 1983; DeRoche, 2006). Similarly, in Nigeria‘s history of coups during the same period, Western powers used diplomatic pressure and arms support to influence factions within the military, contributing to the instability and cycles of military rule (Siollun, 2009; Joseph, 1987). 

In Liberia and Sierra Leone, the West ferried arms to support rebel factions and prolong civil conflicts.  During Liberia’s civil war, Western powers provided arms and military training to rebel groups, worsening violence and prolonging the conflict for over a decade (Ellis, 1999; Moran, 2006).  In Sierra Leone, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) received support from external actors, including Western powers, to continue terror and destabilisation. The influx of weapons fuelled atrocities and contributed to the breakdown of governance in both countries (Richards, 1996; Gberie, 2005). 

Concurrently, the Ivory Coast experienced a post-election crisis in 2010-2011, where diplomatic pressure and arms support were instrumental in ousting President Laurent Gbagbo. Western powers, particularly France and the United States, used diplomatic channels to rally international support for opposition leader Alassane Ouattara.  This included imposing sanctions on Gbagbo’s government and providing arms support to Ouattara’s forces, ultimately leading to Gbagbo’s removal from power and Ouattara’s assumption of the presidency (Bah, 2010; Akindès, 2004).  In Mali, the West’s use of diplomatic pressure and arms support was evident during the 2012 military coup and subsequent conflicts. France, in particular, intervened militarily to combat Islamist militants in the north, and exerted diplomatic pressure to influence political developments in the country.  Arms support to Malian government forces and regional allies aimed to stabilise the situation but also contributed to the militarisation of politics and ongoing instability in the region (Lecocq & Klute, 2013; Boeke & Schuurman, 2015). 

In summary, the West’s use of diplomatic pressure and arms support has played a significant role in coups plotting and perpetuating political instability in several West African countries, including Ghana, Nigeria, Liberia, Sierra Leone, the Ivory Coast, and Mali.  Through these tactics, foreign powers have sought to advance their strategic interests, maintain influence, and shape regional political outcomes. 

D.5.  REGIONAL CONFLICTS AND INSECURITY 

Ongoing conflicts and terrorism weaken state institutions, creating conditions conducive to coups.  Regional conflicts and security threats have also provided justifications for military intervention in West Africa.  Mali‘s 2012 coup was precipitated by the government’s failure to effectively manage the Tuareg insurgency and Islamist terrorism in the northern regions.  The coup occurred on March 22, 2012, when mutinous soldiers led by Captain Amadou Sanogo stormed the presidential palace and seized power.  The immediate trigger for the coup was the Malian government’s perceived failure to adequately support the military in its fight against the Tuareg rebels, which had launched a major offensive in January, 2012.  The rebels, strengthened by weapons and fighters who had entered the Libyan conflict, quickly made significant gains in the northern regions of Mali (Wing, 2013). 

The Malian military felt poorly equipped and unsupported by the government in their efforts to combat the Tuareg rebels and Islamist groups (Lecocq & Klute, 2013).  The civilian government was seen as ineffective and slow to respond to the rapidly deteriorating security situation (Wing, 2013).  There was widespread disillusionment among the ranks about the military leadership and the political class’s handling of the crisis (Boeke & Tisseron, 2014). Following the coup, Mali went into further chaos.  The Tuareg rebels declared independence in the north, and Islamist groups, including Ansar Dine and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), capitalised on the instability to take control of significant parts of the region. This led to a humanitarian crisis and to international intervention, including a French-led military operation in 2013 (Boeke & Tisseron, 2014).   

Burkina Faso‘s instability caused by jihadist attacks and the government’s perceived inability to handle the security situation contributed to the 2015 (failed) coup against the transitional government.  Fragile security forces often cannot prevent or counteract coups.  In Burkina Faso, the weak and divided security forces could not prevent the popular uprising that led to Compaoré’s ousting in 2014, and the subsequent coup against the transitional government in 2015.  Niger‘s poorly equipped and fragmented security apparatus also failed to counter the 2010 coup that ousted President Mamadou Tandja amid political and economic crises. 

E.   OTHERS 

E.1.  THE MILITARY: AN EXCLUSIVE ORGANISED FORCE AT

         INDEPENDENCE   

The history of West Africa is replete with military coups and political instability, often driven by the significant influence wielded by the military in the region’s politics.  From historical precedent to economic interests and regional conflicts, military intervention has shaped the political landscape of the various countries.  

E.1.1.  Historical Precedent 

West African countries, upon gaining independence from colonial rule, often saw military figures play prominent roles in their political transition.  One such example is Ghana, where the country’s first president, Kwame Nkrumah, relied heavily on the military to consolidate power after Ghana’s independence in March, 1957, setting a precedent for military involvement in politics that paved the way for subsequent coups and military regimes across the region. Nkrumah initially enjoyed military support, seeing it as essential for maintaining stability and enforcing his policies.  He used the military to suppress opposition and manage internal security, a strategy that underscored his reliance on military power (Gocking, 2005, p.102).  In 1958, Nkrumah introduced the Preventive Detention Act, which allowed him to detain opponents without trial.  This legislation was supported by the military, which played a crucial role in enforcing the Act (Addo, 1997, p.14).  Discontent within the military, often due to poor conditions and lack of resources, has also frequently led to coups in West Africa.  In Guinea, the 2008 coup led by Captain Moussa Dadis Camara was partly driven by grievances within the military over poor conditions and neglect under President Conté’s regime.  

Mali‘s 2012 coup against President Amadou Toumani Touré was driven by military dissatisfaction with the handling of the Tuareg rebellion and poor support for soldiers on the front lines.  Ambitious military leadership and internal rivalry within the armed forces often lead to coups.  General Robert Guéï’s coup in Côte d’Ivoire, in 1999, against President Henri Konan Bédié, highlighted the role of military ambition and internal rivalries.  Similarly, Thomas Sankara’s assassination and the subsequent coup led by Blaise Compaoré in Burkina Faso, in 1987,were driven by internal power struggles and ambitions within the military leadership.  Compaoré, a close ally of Sankara, capitalised on internal dissent to seize power (Harsch, 2017).  

Nigeria has experienced numerous military coups since its independence in October, 1960.  The first coup in January, 1966, led by Major General Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi, was partly driven by discomfort over corruption and ethnic tensions.  Subsequent coups, in 1975, 1983, and 1985, were similarly motivated by grievances over corruption and internal rivalry (Falola & Heaton, 2008).  Sierra Leone‘s political instability has been marked by coups and a brutal civil war.  In April, 1992, Captain Valentine Strasser staged a coup against President Joseph Saidu Momoh, citing corruption and economic mismanagement. The coup was also driven by frustration among the military over poor conditions and lack of support (Keen, 2005).  

In April, 1980, Samuel Doe of Liberia, seized power in a coup against President William Tolbert.  The coup was motivated by grievances over corruption and favouritism of the ruling Americo-Liberian elite.  Despite promises to combat corruption, Doe’s regime became notorious for its brutality and graft, leading to further unrest and eventually civil war (Sawyer, 1992).  Mauritania has experienced multiple coups driven by corruption and nepotism.  In August, 2005, General Ely Ould Mohamed Vall ousted President Maaouya Ould Sid’Ahmed Taya, for corruption and abuse of power.  The coup reflected deep-seated frustrations within the military over leadership and internal rivalry (Pazzanita, 2006).  Niger has also faced political instability with several coups, the most notable being in February, 2010, when the military ousted President Mamadou Tandja.  The coup was driven by Tandja’s attempts to extend his rule through a controversial constitutional referendum and allegations of corruption and nepotism (Idrissa, 2012). 

E.1.2. Weak Civilian Institutions 

In many West African countries, weak civilian institutions and unstable governments have created opportunities for military intervention. Nigeria, for example, has experienced multiple coups since its independence in 1960.  The military often cited the failure of civilian governments to address corruption, nepotism, and ethnic tensions as justifications for their interventions.  The coup of 1966, which ousted Nigeria’s first civilian government, is a stark example of how weak civilian institutions can pave the way for military rule. 

E.1.3. Economic Interests 

Military leaders in West Africa have frequently exploited their position to control lucrative economic sectors, such as natural resources and state-owned enterprises.  In Guinea, for example, the military seized power in 1984, following the death of President Ahmed Sékou Touré.  The new regime, led by Lansana Conté, was accused of using its power over the country’s bauxite industry to enrich military elites, worsening poverty and inequality.  

Nigeria‘s military rulers have similarly exploited the country’s vast oil resources for personal gain.  Since the January, 1966 coup, successive military governments established tight control over the oil industry, the backbone of Nigeria’s economy.  General Yakubu Gowon, who ruled from 1966 to 1975, oversaw the nationalisation of the oil industry, creating opportunities for corruption and patronage.  Under General Sani Abacha (1993-1998), billions of dollars in oil revenues were siphoned into private accounts, depriving the country of essential development funds and exacerbating poverty and inequality (Falola & Heaton, 2008). 

Sierra Leone‘s diamond industry has been a significant source of wealth for those in power, particularly during periods of military rule.  In 1992, Captain Valentine Strasser led a coup against President Joseph Saidu Momoh, citing corruption and economic mismanagement. Strasser’s regime, however, became embroiled in the illicit diamond trade, with revenues from diamonds fuelling the prolonged civil war (1991-2002).  Both the military and rebel groups exploited diamond resources, leading to widespread suffering and economic devastation (Keen, 2005). 

Liberia has also seen its natural resources exploited under military regimes.  After the 1980 coup, led by Master Sergeant Samuel Doe, the exploitation of Liberia’s resources, including iron ore, rubber, and timber, became a significant issue.  Doe’s regime was marked by corruption and the funnelling of state resources into the hands of military elites.  This exploitation continued during the presidency of Charles Taylor, who used revenues from the illicit diamond trade and timber exports to finance his rule and the country’s brutal civil wars (1989-2003).  Taylor’s involvement in the “blood diamond” trade further fuelled regional instability and economic hardship (Sawyer, 1992). 

Military leaders often exploit their position for economic gain.  After the 1983 coup that brought Thomas Sankara to power, Burkina Faso implemented significant reforms aimed at reducing corruption and promoting economic self-reliance.  However, following Sankara’s assassination in a 1987 coup,led by Blaise Compaoré, the country saw a reversal of many of these reforms. Compaoré’s regime has been accused of corrupt practices and economic exploitation, particularly in the mining sector, where gold has become a significant resource.  The regime’s exploitation of mineral wealth has exacerbated economic disparities and fuelled social discontent (Harsch, 2017).  Côte d’Ivoire‘s political instability has also been linked to the control and exploitation of economic resources.  Following the December, 1999 coup led by General Robert Guéï, the military regime was accused of corruption and exploitation of the country’s cocoa and coffee industries, which are critical to its economy.  Economic mismanagement within the military intensified ethnic tensions and economic inequality, contributing to the civil conflict that plagued the country in the 2000s (Bah, 2010).  Economic interests often play a significant role.  

The August, 2005 coup that ousted President Maaouya Ould Sid’Ahmed Taya was justified by the military in response to corruption and economic mismanagement.  Under Taya, Mauritania’s exploitation of iron ore and fishing resources primarily benefited a small elite, including military leaders.  This concentration of wealth and economic power has fuelled widespread poverty and social discontent, setting the stage for repeated military interventions (Pazzanita, 2006). 

Guinea-Bissau has been plagued by political instability, often driven by economic interests. The military’s involvement in the illicit drug trade, particularly cocaine trafficking, has been well documented.  Military leaders have exploited Guinea-Bissau’s position as a transit point for drugs destined for Europe, enriching themselves at the expense of the country’s stability and development.  This exploitation has fuelled corruption, weakened state institutions, and intensified poverty (Vigh, 2006).  After seizing power in a 1967 coup, Eyadéma exploited Togo‘s phosphate resources, a major source of revenue.  The regime’s control of these resources enabled the enrichment of the ruling elites and military leaders, while the broader population faced economic hardship.  This concentration of wealth and power contributed to political repression and social unrest (Decalo, 1996). 

E.2.   NGO’S PARTICIPATION IN CORPORATE COUPS 

The influence of American institutions and the CIA on African affairs during the mid20th century was multifaceted and profound.  This study examines the involvement of various American delegates, organisations, and cultural programmes in shaping African politics and society, drawing on insights from Susan Williams’ “White Malice: The CIA and the Covert Recolonization of Africa” (2021). 

In 1959, Richard Nixon’s telegram to US delegates highlighted the strategic importance of Africa during the Cold War.  Nixon emphasised the need for American presence and influence in Africa, particularly in the context of emerging national independence movements.  This period marked a significant shift in U.S. foreign policy, with a focus on countering Soviet influence in newly independent African states (Williams, 2021, Chapter 2).  The Council on African Affairs (CAA), founded by prominent African American leaders, supported African liberation movements.  However, the organisation faced intense scrutiny from the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) because of perceived communist affiliations.  The investigation led to a decline in CAA’s influence, reflecting the broader impact of McCarthyism on African-American activism (Williams, 2021, Chapter 3).  The National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People (NAACP) played a critical role in advocating for African issues.  Leaders like Walter White and Arthur Spingarn leveraged their positions to foster international solidarity and support for African liberation.  Their efforts were instrumental in bringing African concerns to the forefront of American civil right discourse (Williams, 2021, Chapter 4). 

The American-African Institute (AAI) emerged as a key player in the U.S. efforts to influence African education and leadership.  The CIA’s covert funding of AAI facilitated cultural and educational exchanges designed to cultivate pro-American African elites.

This strategy ensured that African leaders aligned with U.S. interests during the Cold War (Williams, 2021, Chapter 5).  The American Society of African Culture (AMSAC) represented another facet of the CIA’s cultural diplomacy.  By promoting African art and literature through AMSAC, the CIA sought to counteract Soviet cultural influence and project a favourable image of American culture. 

This initiative highlighted the use of soft power in the ideological battle for Africa (Williams, 2021, Chapter 6).  The revelation of CIA funding for the National Student Association (NSA) in the 1960s exposed the extent of covert operations influencing young African leaders.  The NSA’s involvement in organising student exchanges and conferences was part of a broader strategy to shape the political orientation of African future leaders (Williams, 2021, Chapter 7). The 1967 exposé of CIA front organisations, including those involved in African affairs, underscored the ethical and political implications of covert operations.  The revelation prompted public outcry and congressional investigations, leading to a reassessment of U.S. foreign policy and intelligence practices (Williams, 2021, Chapter 9). 

In West Africa, the involvement of NGOs like Oxfam and Save the Children with larger corporations has led to major issues, spanning economic, social, and environmental domains across several countries over the decades.  From the 1950s to the 1970s, during the colonial era, West African countries, including Sierra Leone, experienced economic exploitation and inequality intensified mainly by NGO collaborations with corporations.  Mining companies dominated the economy, leading to exploitative labour practices, such as low wages and poor working conditions, which were perpetuated by partnerships with NGOs that focused on economic development. 

Indeed, since the beginning of the 2000s to the present, Nigeria has faced severe environmental degradation because of NGO partnerships with oil and gas corporations, typically in the Niger Delta region.  Projects have been, paradoxically, supported by Oxfam and Save the Children for local communities’ health and livelihoods.  Additionally, in Mali, largescale agricultural projects supported by NGOs and foreign-owned corporations resulted in land grabbing, loss of livelihoods for smallholder farmers, and intensified food insecurity and rural poverty. 

E.2.1.  Land Grabs and Human Rights Violations in Liberia and Mali 

In Liberia, from the 1950s to the 1970s, the establishment of large-scale plantations owned by foreign corporations, often with the support of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), resulted in significant land grabs, forced resettlement, and human rights violations.  NGOs, like Save the Children, while aiming to improve livelihoods in these communities, have inadvertently contributed to the exploitation of vulnerable populations.  These efforts often intensified social injustice and economic disparities, as the focus on large-scale agricultural projects displaced local communities and deprived them of their traditional lands and livelihoods (Wiley, 2012).  The encroachment of foreign entities on communal lands, backed by international aid and development rhetoric, led to the marginalisation of local populations and heightened social tensions (Moyo, 2011). 

Similarly, in Mali, large-scale agricultural projects supported by both NGOs and corporations have resulted in widespread land grabbing, leading to the loss of livelihoods for smallholder farmers and exacerbating food insecurity and rural poverty.  Despite the purported goals of poverty alleviation and agricultural development, these initiatives often perpetuate economic dependency and marginalise local communities.  The focus on creating large-scale, export-oriented agricultural enterprises has overlooked the needs and rights of local farmers, leading to increased economic disparities and social unrest (Cotula, Vermeulen, Leonard, & Keeley, 2009).  The economic and social consequences underscore the complexities and unintended negative impacts of well-intentioned development projects on local populations in both Liberia and Mali.

E2.2.  Environmental Degradation and Oil Exploitation in Nigeria 

Predominantly, from the 2000s to the present, Nigeria has faced severe environmental degradation in the Niger Delta region, due to extensive oil and gas exploration. Nongovernmental organisations (NGOs), such as Oxfam and Save the Children, while advocating for community development, have sometimes partnered with oil companies, inadvertently contributing to environmental issues like oil spills, water contamination, and deforestation.  These collaborations, despite their intentions to foster development, have often intensified the environmental and social costs of oil exploitation, severely affecting the health and livelihoods of local communities.  The persistent oil spills have led to widespread water contamination, making water unsafe for drinking and harming aquatic life, which many local communities rely on for their livelihoods (Nriagu, Udofia, Ekong, & Ebuk, 2016).  Furthermore, deforestation driven by infrastructure development for oil extraction has resulted in the loss of biodiversity and disruption of ecosystems (Orubu, Odusola, & Ehwarieme, 2004). The adverse effects on agriculture and fishing, critical sources of income and food for local populations, have intensified poverty and social instability in the region, underscoring the complex interplay between development initiatives and environmental sustainability. 

E.3.    IMPACT AND IMPLICATIONS 

E.3.1. Economic Consequences for Fallout from Coups in West Africa  

Coups d’états, whether overt or subtle, have profound economic consequences that can significantly impact the development of governments. Beyond immediate political upheaval, coups often lead to long-term economic instability, neo-colonial manipulation, and structural deterioration. 

E.3.1.1. Economic Instability and Uncertainty       

One of the most immediate consequences of a coup is economic instability and uncertainty. The sudden overthrow of a government creates an environment of political turmoil, investor apprehension, and capital flight.  Businesses hesitate to invest, both domestically and abroad, leading to a slowdown in economic activity, reduced consumer confidence, and declining productivity.  This instability can persist long after the initial coup, making it difficult for countries to recover and attract investment.  In West Africa, coups have consistently led to capital flight and economic declines.  The uncertainty and instability associated with such political upheavals deter domestic and foreign investments, disrupt key economic sectors, and reduce consumer confidence. Collectively, these factors contribute to a significant slowdown in economic activities, making recovery difficult and prolonged.  Addressing the causes of political instability and fostering a stable environment are crucial for economic resilience and regional growth.  

The May, 1997 coup in Sierra Leone, for instance, resulted in immediate capital flight, with investors withdrawing their money in the ensuing political chaos.  Foreign aid and investments were significantly reduced, which exacerbated the country’s economic difficulties (BBC, 1997).  The mining sector, particularly diamonds, had faced severe disruptions, affecting exports and national revenue.  The coup and subsequent civil unrest led to a decline in agricultural production, resulting in food shortages and reductions in economic activities. Prolonged instability deterred new investments and hindered economic recovery efforts, leading to a slow and challenging recovery.  

The December, 1999 coup in Côte d’Ivoire resulted in substantial capital flight as investors and multinational companies moved their funds to more stable environments. 

Banking faced a crisis due to dwindling deposits and capital outflows (Akindele, 2001).  The political turmoil caused a decline in cocoa production, the country’s main export earner, and severely affected the economy.  Foreign investments in infrastructure and other sectors had to be either put on hold or cancelled, leading to a slowdown in economic activities.  The prolonged instability reduced consumer confidence and spending, further hampering economic growth.  

Following the January, 2022 coup in Burkina Faso, significant capital flight occurred, as businesses and investors moved assets out of the country to avoid potential losses.  The withdrawal of foreign aid and the reduction in foreign investments intensified financial challenges (Reuters, 2022).  Agricultural production, a key sector in Burkina Faso, had been disrupted, leading to food insecurity and reduced economic output.  Mining operations, particularly in gold, experienced disruptions, affecting exports and national revenue.  Overall, the uncertainty hindered new investments, reduced economic activities and slowed growth. 

The September, 2021 coup in Guinea caused an immediate capital flight, with investors seeking to protect their assets during instability.  The mining sector, particularly bauxite mining, experienced disruptions, as some international investors withdrew or paused their investments (International Crisis Group, 2021).  This sector is crucial to Guinea’s economy, and its disruption affected exports and national income.  Political uncertainty caused delays in infrastructure projects and reduced investment in other sectors, thereby slowing economic growth.  Consumer confidence plummeted, leading to reduced spending and economic inactivity. 

In Mali, the coups in August, 2020 and December, 2021 resulted in significant capital flight as investors feared political instability.  Foreign direct investment (FDI) declined sharply, reflecting the reassessment of risks by international businesses (World Bank, 2021).  The tourism sector, which had shown promise, experienced a severe downturn as travellers avoided the region due to safety concerns.  Infrastructure projects were either halted or cancelled, reducing economic activities and slowing growth.  The uncertainty also affected local businesses, diminishing consumer confidence and spending. 

E.3.1.2.  Neocolonial Manipulations                                                    

Coups d’état often provide opportunities for neocolonial manipulations by external actors seeking to exploit chaos for their own economic gain.  Powerful nations or multinational corporations may intervene in the internal affairs of a country to install leaders sympathetic to their interests.  These puppet regimes may then enact policies that prioritise the needs of external actors over those of their citizens, perpetuating a cycle of dependency and exploitation. 

For instance, following the death of President Lansana Conté in December, 2008, a military junta, led by Captain Moussa Dadis Camara, assumed power in Guinea.  During this period, various international actors, including mining corporations, took advantage of the political instability to secure lucrative deals.  Guinea is rich in bauxite, the main ore used to produce aluminium; and companies, such as Rio Tinto and BHP Billiton, have significant interests in the region.  Reports indicate that these corporations were able to negotiate favourable terms for mining contracts during the junta’s rule, which did not necessarily benefit the Guinean economy or its people, but rather prioritised the profits of these foreign entities (Burgis, 2015).  Similarly, in December, 1999, Côte d’Ivoire experienced its first coup d’état, leading to the overthrow of President Henri Konan Bédié by General Robert Guéï.  In the aftermath, international financial institutions and Western powers pressured the new government to adopt structural adjustment policies.  These policies included privatising state-owned enterprises and opening up markets for foreign investment.  While these measures were presented as necessary for economic stability and growth, they often resulted in the erosion of local industries, increased unemployment, and increased economic inequality.  The cocoa industry, vital to the Ivorian economy, experienced increased foreign control, with multinational corporations reaping the benefits, while local farmers struggled (McGovern, 2011). 

In March, 2012, a coup in Mali, led, by Captain Amadou Sanogo, plunged the country into chaos, creating a power vacuum that was quickly exploited by various external actors. France, a former colonial power, intervened militarily under the guise of combating Islamist militants. While the intervention was partly successful in addressing immediate security concerns, it also facilitated the entry of French and other Western companies into Mali’s mining sector, particularly in gold extraction.  These interventions often resulted in contracts that favoured foreign companies, leaving the Malian government with limited revenue and perpetuating economic dependency (Vorrath, 2014).  

The mechanisms of neocolonial manipulation include economic leverage, conditional aid, military intervention, and diplomatic recognition.  Powerful nations and international financial institutions, like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, often use the promise of aid or loans to influence policy decisions in coup-stricken countries.  Conditional aid is typically linked to the implementation of neoliberal economic reforms, such as privatisation and deregulation, which serve the interests of multinational corporations rather than the local population (Peet, 2009). Military intervention is another common tool for neocolonial manipulation.  By providing military support to coup leaders or by directly intervening, external powers can secure political and economic concessions.  This was evident in France’s interventions in West Africa, where military support often came with expectations of favourable economic agreements and political allegiance (Chafer, 2002).  External actors also manipulate post-coup regimes through diplomatic recognition.  By choosing which leaders to recognise and support, they can legitimise regimes that align with their interests.  Diplomatic backing can stabilise a puppet regime long enough for it to implement policies favourable to foreign actors (Young, 2013). 

The impact on local populations includes increased economic inequality and dependency, as well as a weakening of sovereignty.  Policies enacted by puppet regimes under the influence of external actors often lead to increased economic inequality and dependency.  For instance, the focus on attracting foreign investment and privatising state assets typically benefits a small elite connected to the ruling regime and foreign investors, whereas the broader population experiences little improvement in living standards.  This economic model undermines local industry and agriculture, leading to job losses and social unrest (Rodney, 1972).  Neocolonial manipulations also undermine the sovereignty of affected countries.  By prioritising the interests of external actors, local governments become less accountable to citizens and more beholden to foreign powers.  This erosion of sovereignty can lead to long-term political instability and hinder genuine democratic development (Mbembe, 2001). 

E.3.1.3.   Unequal Trade Relations                                         

Unequal trade relations significantly impact West African countries, perpetuating economic dependency and hindering local industry development.  Neocolonial powers often impose trade agreements and policies that favour their own economies, leading to a cycle of dependency and economic stagnation.  Countries such as Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, and Nigeria exemplify the adverse effects of these unequal trade relationships. 

In Ghana, the cocoa industry is an example of this imbalance.  As one of the world’s largest cocoa producers, Ghana exports primarily raw cocoa beans, while foreign companies dominate the processing and manufacturing stages.  This arrangement leaves Ghana with only a fraction of its potential economic benefits.  Trade policies and agreements often impose high tariffs on processed cocoa products while allowing raw beans to enter Western markets with minimal duties.  This system discourages local value addition and sustains Ghana’s role as a raw material supplier (Gilbert, 2006). 

Côte d’Ivoire, another major cocoa producer, faces similar challenges.  The country’s dependence on cocoa exports makes it vulnerable to price fluctuations in the global market. The structure of trade agreements favours multinational corporations, which control the processing and distribution stages and capture most of the industry’s profits.  Local farmers receive low cocoa prices, limiting their economic gains and contributing to rural poverty.  The dominance of foreign interests in the cocoa sector highlights the unequal nature of trade relations (Losch, 2002). 

Nigeria, which has significant oil reserves, presents another case of unequal trade relations. Despite being a leading oil producer, Nigeria’s economy suffers from the “resource curse”, where vast natural resources paradoxically contribute to economic underdevelopment.  Foreign oil companies dominate the extraction and exportation of crude oil, whereas Nigeria imports refined petroleum products at higher prices.  This dependency on foreign refining capacity and the lack of domestic industrialisation hinders Nigeria’s economic growth and development.  The imbalance in trade relations ensures that the country remains reliant on foreign expertise and markets (Watts, 2004). 

The agricultural sector in West Africa also demonstrates the harmful effects of unequal trade relations.  For instance, Senegal‘s rice farmers face significant challenges because of the importation of heavily subsidised rice from the United States and Asia.  These imports often sell at lower prices than locally produced rice, thereby undermining Senegalese farmers’ competitiveness.  This scenario leads to reduced local production, job losses, and increased dependency on foreign imports.  The trade policies favouring subsidised foreign agricultural products create a challenging environment for local farmers and stifle domestic agricultural development (Aziz, 2017). 

Moreover, the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) between the European Union (EU) and West African countries illustrate the complexity of trade relations.  While these agreements promote trade and investment, they often result in West African markets being flooded with European goods, to the detriment of local industries.  The reduction of tariffs on European imports limits the ability of West African countries to protect and nurture emerging industries. Consequently, local businesses struggle to compete, leading to economic stagnation and increased dependency on European markets (Busse & Großmann, 2007). 

In conclusion, the unequal trade relations imposed by neocolonial powers have significantly hindered the economic development of West African countries.  The exploitation of natural resources, combined with trade policies that favour foreign interests, perpetuates a cycle of dependency and economic stagnation.  Addressing these imbalances requires renegotiating trade agreements, supporting local industries and developing policies that promote value addition and economic diversification.  

E.3.1.4. Structural Deterioration   

Structural deterioration is a common consequence of coups, leading to significant damage to a country’s economic infrastructure and institutions.  After a coup, governance structures often become fragmented, corruption tends to increase, and the rule of law weakens.  As a result, key economic sectors, such as agriculture, manufacturing, and finance, can suffer due to neglect, mismanagement, and/or the diversion of resources towards maintaining political power. Deterioration can have long-lasting effects on a nation’s development prospects. 

In Nigeria, the numerous military coups, between 1966 and 1999, severely impacted the country’s economic infrastructure.  Each regime change brought instability and policy discontinuity, which discouraged long-term planning and investment.  The agricultural sector, once a cornerstone of the Nigerian economy, was particularly affected.  Neglect and mismanagement under military regimes have led to a decline in agricultural productivity, forcing the country to increasingly depend on oil exports.  This overreliance on oil left Nigeria vulnerable to global price fluctuations and hampered efforts to diversify the economy (Bevan, Collier, & Gunning, 1999). 

Similarly, in Guinea, the April, 1984 coup that brought Lansana Conté to power led to significant economic mismanagement and structural deterioration.  Under Conté’s rule, corruption ramped up, and public institutions weakened.  The mining sector, crucial to Guinea’s economy because of its rich bauxite and other mineral reserves, has suffered from mismanagement and lack of investment.  Resources were often diverted to maintain political control, leaving little or no room for development projects.  This corruption and poor governance environment have deterred foreign investors, further stalling economic growth and development (McGovern, 2007). 

The impact of structural deterioration following coups is also evident in Sierra Leone.  The May, 1997 coup, for instance, plunged the country into chaos, disrupting economic activities and leading to widespread destruction of infrastructure.  The manufacturing sector, which was already fragile, collapsed entirely, and agricultural productivity declined sharply.  The diversion of resources to support military activities and maintain political power further intensified economic decline.  Additionally, the breakdown of the rule of law and increase in corruption hindered efforts to rebuild the economy and attract foreign investment (Reno, 1998). 

In Mali, the March, 2012 coup against President Amadou Toumani Touré led to severe structural deterioration.  The coup created a power vacuum that allowed rebel groups to gain control of large parts of the country, further destabilising the region.  The government’s focus shifted to military expenditures and efforts to regain control, diverting resources away from critical sectors, such as education, healthcare, and infrastructure development.  This shift in priorities, coupled with weakened governance structures and increased corruption, has hindered Mali’s economic recovery and development efforts (Boas, 2012). 

Moreover, the social fabric of society often deteriorates after coups, leading to intensified ethnic or regional tensions that further destabilise the economy.  In Côte d’Ivoire, the December, 1999 coup, led by General Robert Gueï, intensified existing ethnic and regional divides.  The subsequent political instability and civil conflict disrupted economic activities, particularly in the vital cocoa sector.  The breakdown of social cohesion and increased violence has made it challenging to implement coherent economic policies, attract foreign investment, or foster sustainable development.  As a result, the country experienced a prolonged period of economic stagnation and underdevelopment (Klaas, 2008). 

In conclusion, structural deterioration, following coups d’état, significantly harms a country’s economic infrastructure and institutions.  As governance structures become fragmented, corruption increases, and the rule of law weakens, leading to the neglect and mismanagement of key economic sectors.  This deterioration hinders the implementation of coherent economic policies, deters foreign investment, and fosters a downward spiral of poverty and underdevelopment.  Addressing these challenges requires restoring stable governance, strengthening institutions, and promoting inclusive development to rebuild the economy and social fabric. 

E.3.2.  DEPENDENCY ON EXTERNAL AID AND LOANS    

Dependency on external aid and loans is a significant consequence of political instability and coups d’état, worsening economic setbacks in affected countries.  In the absence of stable governance and effective economic management, these nations often turn to international financial institutions or donor countries for assistance to prop up their faltering economies.  However, this reliance on external aid frequently comes with stringent conditions, including austerity measures, structural reforms, and debt servicing obligations, which further entrench dependency and limit sovereignty. 

After the March, 1991 coup in Mali that ousted President Moussa Traoré, the new government faced immense economic difficulties and sought assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.  These institutions provided loans under the condition that Mali implemented structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) designed to stabilise the economy.  These programmes required severe austerity measures, including cuts in public spending, privatisation of state-owned enterprises, and liberalisation of trade policies.  While these measures aimed to stabilise the economy, they also led to increased unemployment, reduced social services, and increased poverty levels, disproportionately affecting the most vulnerable segments of society (Bingen, 1994).  

Similarly, in Ghana, the political upheaval and economic mismanagement following multiple coups throughout the 1970s and early 1980s led to the country’s dependence on external aid. The military government, struggling with economic crises, sought assistance from the IMF and the World Bank.  The SAPs implemented under these Bretton Woods Institutions’ guidance required significant cuts in public expenditure, currency devaluation, and trade liberalisation. Although, these measures eventually led to some economic stabilization and growth, they also caused widespread social hardship, increased inequality, and limited the government’s ability to independently manage its economic policies (Konadu-Agyemang, 2000). 

After various military coups, Nigeria has also experienced a similar cycle of dependency.  Economic mismanagement and corruption during periods of military rule severely weakened the economy, leading successive governments to seek external financial assistance.  The loans and technical grants or aid received came with conditions that required structural adjustments and austerity measures, often leading to social unrest and economic difficulties.  Reliance on oil revenues further complicated the economic situation, as fluctuations in global oil prices left the country vulnerable to external shocks and necessitated further borrowing to stabilise the economy (Lewis, 2007). 

In addition, the conditions imposed by lenders can intensify inequalities and social tensions. For instance, in Senegal, after the economic crisis of the 1980s, the government turned to the IMF and World Bank for assistance, which required the implementation of SAPs.  The austerity measures included reducing public sector employment, cutting social services, and increasing taxes.  These measures disproportionately affected the poor and led to widespread social discontent, contributing to political instability and undermining government legitimacy (Diop, 2012). 

The accumulation of debt, due to external borrowing, can become unsustainable, creating a cycle of borrowing and repayment that hampers long-term economic development.  Countries like Sierra Leone, which experienced a coup in May, 1997, faced severe economic difficulties and relied heavily on international aid and loans to rebuild their economies.  The debt servicing obligations from these loans limited the government’s ability to invest in critical sectors, such as education, healthcare, and infrastructure, thereby impeding long-term development and perpetuating dependency (Conteh-Morgan, 2006). 

In conclusion, dependency on external aid and loans is a profound consequence of political instability and coups, leading to increased reliance on international financial institutions and donor countries.  The conditions attached to this aid, including austerity measures and structural reforms, often intensify social inequalities and limit sovereignty.  Furthermore, debt accumulation can become unsustainable, trapping countries in a vicious cycle of borrowing and repayment that hinders long-term economic development. 

E.3.3.  SOCIAL AND HUMANITARIAN CHALLENGES

E.3.3.1.  Disruption of Education                                  

The disruption of education is one of the most immediate and lasting effects of political instability and conflict.  In many instances, schools are forced to close due to violence and insecurity, depriving children of their fundamental right to education and disrupting their learning processes.  This disruption is particularly severe in conflict-affected areas, where children are often unable to attend school because of safety concerns, leading to a generation of “lost” or displaced youth who miss out on critical educational opportunities. 

For example, in Nigeria, the ongoing conflict with Boko Haram in the northeastern region has led to significant disruptions in educational activities.  Boko Haram’s attacks on schools, teachers, and students have created an environment of fear and insecurity.  Many schools have been closed, and children are often too scared to attend those that remain open.  This has resulted in thousands of children missing out on education, contributing to high illiteracy rates and limiting future opportunities for these children (UNICEF, 2015). 

Similarly, in Mali, the March, 2012 coup and subsequent conflicts in the northern regions severely impacted the education system.  Schools were closed due to the insecurity caused by rebel groups and Islamist militants.  Many teachers fled, and the lack of security made it difficult to deliver educational materials and resources.  This disruption not only deprived children of immediate educational opportunities but also had long-term effects on their cognitive and social development (Human Rights Watch, 2017). 

In Côte d’Ivoire, the civil conflict between 2002 and 2011 had also had a devastating impact on education.  Schools were destroyed, teachers were displaced, and students were forced to abandon their studies.  Even after the conflict, the education system struggled to recover because of ongoing political instability and economic challenges.  Lack of investment in education infrastructure and resources continues to hamper the quality of education, affecting literacy rates and overall educational outcomes (Novelli & Lopes Cardozo, 2008). 

In addition to the physical closure of schools, political instability often leads to shortages of essential resources, such as teachers, textbooks, and school supplies.  For instance, in Liberia, during and after the civil wars (1989-1996 and 1999-2003), the education sector was severely affected.  Many teachers were killed or fled the country, and the destruction of infrastructure meant that schools lacked basic supplies.  Even when the fighting subsided, the government struggled to rebuild the education system, and many families could not afford school fees or transportation, further worsening educational barriers (Smith, 2011). 

Furthermore, the economic impact of political instability can strain families’ finances, making it difficult for parents to afford school-related expenses.  In Sierra Leone, the aftermath of the civil war (1991-2002) saw many families unable to pay for school fees, uniforms, and books. This economic hardship, combined with the psychological trauma experienced by children and parents, made returning to normal educational routines challenging.  The prolonged absence from school for many children resulted in decreased literacy rates and limited future employment opportunities, perpetuating cycles of poverty and underdevelopment (Banya, 2005). 

In conclusion, the disruption of education due to political instability and conflict has profound and lasting effects on societies.  Schools may be forced to close, depriving children of their right to education and disrupting their learning processes.  Even when schools remain open, the lack of resources, economic hardship, and insecurity intensify barriers to education.  This leads to declining literacy rates and perpetuates cycles of poverty and underdevelopment, highlighting the critical need for stability and investment in education to ensure the future prosperity of conflict-affected regions. 

E.3.3.2.  Health Care Access and Infrastructure 

Political instability has severe repercussions on health care access and infrastructure, particularly in West African countries.  In conflict-affected regions, health care facilities are often damaged or destroyed, and medical personnel may flee due to safety concerns.  This leads to communities lacking access to essential health care services, including maternal and child health care, vaccinations, and infectious disease treatment. 

E.3.3.2.1.  Damaged Health Care Infrastructure 

In Nigeria, the ongoing insurgency by Boko Haram in the northeastern region has led to the destruction of numerous health care facilities.  The violence has forced many health care workers to flee, leaving a significant proportion of the population without access to health care. The displacement of millions of people further strains the limited health care resources available, and exacerbates the region’s health crises (World Health Organisation, 2017).  The disruption of vaccination campaigns has led to outbreaks of preventable diseases, such as measles and cholera, in already vulnerable populations (Médecins Sans Frontières, 2019).

E.3.3.2.2.  Disrupted Supply Chains 

Similarly, in Sierra Leone, the decade-long civil war, from 1991 to 2002, resulted in the widespread destruction of health care infrastructure.  The conflict disrupted supply chains for essential medicines and medical supplies, making it difficult to provide basic health services. Even after the end of the conflict, the health care system struggled to recover, and the 2014 Ebola outbreak further exposed the fragility of the country’s health care infrastructure.  Lack of adequate health care facilities and resources significantly hampered the response to the epidemic, leading to a high mortality rate (Centres for Disease Control and Prevention, 2016).

E.3.3.2.3.  Targeted Health Care Facilities 

In Mali, the March, 2012 coup and subsequent conflict in the northern regions saw health care facilities deliberately targeted and used as sites of violence by armed groups.  This approach did not only damage infrastructure, it also undermined trust in the health care system.  Many health care workers were either threatened or attacked, leading to a severe shortage of medical personnel.  The lack of access to health care services, particularly in rural and conflict-affected areas, has had long-term implications for public health in the region (Human Rights Watch, 2017). 

E.3.3.2.4.  Impact of Maternal and Child Health 

Political instability also severely affects maternal and child health. In Liberia, civil wars from 1989 to 1996 and from 1999 to 2003 led to the collapse of the health care system.  The destruction of hospitals and clinics, coupled with the flight of health care professionals, left pregnant women and children without essential medical care.  High maternal and infant mortality rates were the direct consequences of a lack of access to skilled birth attendants and emergency obstetric care (Smith, 2011). 

E.3.3.2.5.  Trust in Health Care Systems 

The deliberate targeting of healthcare facilities and the use of violence in such spaces further erode public trust in the health care system.  In Côte d’Ivoire, during the civil conflict, between 2002 and 2011, hospitals and clinics were often sites of violence.  This led to a reluctance among the population to seek medical care, even when it was available, due to fear of attacks or reprisals.  The prolonged instability has hindered efforts to rebuild the health care infrastructure and restore public confidence in the healthcare systems (Novelli & Lopes Cardozo, 2008). 

In conclusion, political instability and conflict have profound and far-reaching impacts on health care access and infrastructure in West Africa.  Damaged facilities, disrupted supply chains, and the targeting of health care services undermine the ability to provide essential care. These challenges intensify health crises, particularly affecting vulnerable populations, such as women and children.  Addressing these issues requires not only rebuilding physical infrastructure but also restoring public trust and ensuring the safety of health care workers, systems and facilities.

E.3.3.3.  Decline in Standards of Living 

Political instability significantly deteriorates the overall standards of living in West Africa, affecting various aspects of society.  In countries like Mali, the March, 2012 coup and subsequent conflicts in its northern regions disrupted economic activities, leading to job losses, inflation, and poverty.  The displacement of populations also contributed to overcrowded and unsanitary living conditions, increasing the risk of disease outbreaks and malnutrition (Boas, 2012). 

Similarly, in Guinea-Bissau, political instability, resulting in multiple coups, and several coup attempts, has had detrimental effects on the economy and living standards.  Disruptions in governance structures and economic mismanagement led to a decline in economic activities, high unemployment rates, and inflation.  Overall living standards which deteriorated, as essential services and infrastructure were neglected, further exacerbated poverty and social inequalities (Costa & Vieira, 2019). 

The impact of political instability on living standards is also evident in Liberia.  The civil wars in Liberia, particularly from 1989 to 1996 and from 1999 to 2003, devastated the economy and infrastructure.  Businesses shut down, and many people lost their livelihoods, leading to widespread poverty.  Displaced populations faced dire living conditions in camps, where they lacked adequate sanitation, clean water, and health care services.  This deterioration in living standards has perpetuated cycles of poverty and underdevelopment in the country (Smith, 2011). 

Furthermore, in Sierra Leone, the civil war (1991-2002) severely impacted living standards. The conflict disrupted economic activities, leading to job losses and economic decline. Displaced populations faced overcrowded and unsanitary conditions, increasing the risk of diseases, like cholera and malnutrition.  The overall quality of life deteriorated, especially for marginalised communities, perpetuating social inequalities and hindering development efforts (Humphreys & Weinstein, 2008). 

Additionally, political instability in Nigeria, particularly in regions affected by insurgency and conflict, has led to a decline in living standards.  The Boko Haram insurgency in the northeast has disrupted economic activities, displaced populations, and contributed to food insecurity and malnutrition.  The conflict has also strained health care services, exacerbated health challenges, and reduced overall well-being (Amnesty International, 2021). 

In conclusion, political instability in West Africa has profound effects on living standards, leading to economic decline, job losses, inflation, and poverty.  Displaced populations face challenges in accessing basic necessities, such as clean water, sanitation, and health care.  Social inequalities are intensified, with marginalised communities bearing the brunt of these hardships.  Restoring stability, promoting economic growth, and, addressing social disparities are crucial for improving living standards and fostering sustainable development in the region. 

E.3.3.4.  Psychological and Social Trauma 

Political instability in West Africa has far-reaching effects beyond tangible impacts on education, healthcare, and living standards.  One significant consequence is the infliction of psychological and social trauma on affected populations.  Individuals and communities often experience fear, anxiety, and trauma stemming from violence, displacement, and the loss of loved ones.  This trauma can have profound and long-lasting effects on mental health and emotional well-being. 

For instance, in Sierra Leone, the civil war (1991-2002) left deep scars on the population, with many individuals experiencing psychological trauma from witnessing or being victims of violence.  The war’s atrocities, including widespread killings, mutilations, and displacement, had a devastating impact on mental health.  The psychological trauma endured by survivors, particularly children, has lasting effects on their emotional wellbeing and ability to lead productive lives (Human Rights Watch, 2003). 

Similarly, in Liberia, the civil wars between 1989 and 2003 resulted in widespread psychological trauma among the population.  The conflict’s brutality, including massacres, sexual violence, and forced displacement, has left many individuals traumatised and struggling with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and other mental health challenges.  The psychological scars of war continue to affect communities, hindering social cohesion and contributing to ongoing challenges in rebuilding trust and reconciliation (UNHCR, 2021). 

Political instability also affects social cohesion and trust in institutions, worsening social fragmentation and the breakdown of community ties. In Guinea-Bissau, multiple coups and political instability have eroded trust in government institutions and undermined social cohesion.  The frequent changes in leadership and governance instability have contributed to a sense of insecurity and uncertainty among the population, hindering efforts to build resilient and cohesive communities (Costa & Vieira, 2019). 

Furthermore, psychological and social trauma caused by political instability can impede efforts to rebuild and recover from conflict or turmoil.  In Mali, the 2012 coup and subsequent conflict resulted in widespread displacement and trauma among communities in the northern regions. The breakdown of social networks and trust intensified challenges in delivering humanitarian aid and rebuilding infrastructure, thereby prolonging the cycle of instability and intensifying the humanitarian crisis (Boas, 2012). 

Addressing psychological and social trauma requires comprehensive approaches that prioritise mental health support, psychosocial services, and community-based interventions.  Rebuilding trust in institutions, fostering social cohesion, and, promoting reconciliation are also vital for long-term stability and peacebuilding in West Africa.  

E.4.   THE QUEST FOR SOLUTIONS                                        

E.4.1.  REGIONAL RESPONSES 

Regional organisations play a crucial role in addressing coup-related crises in West Africa, with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) being the most prominent actor in this regard.  In this Section, we examine the roles and effectiveness of ECOWAS and other regional bodies in responding to coups and promoting regional stability, using examples of past interventions, from the late 1950s to the present. 

E.4.1.1.  Early Warning and Prevention 

In the late 1950s, the establishment of the West African Power Pool (WAPP) marked a significant step towards promoting cooperation and stability among West African states.  The WAPP served as a platform for dialogue and collaboration, particularly during periods of political tension.  By facilitating communication and fostering mutual understanding between member states, WAPP played a crucial role in preventing conflicts from escalating into more severe crises, including coups (Soyinka, 2015). 

Recently, ECOWAS has demonstrated a proactive approach to conflict prevention and early warning mechanisms.  One notable example is ECOWAS’ successful intervention in Guinea in 2009, following the death of President Lansana Conté. The country was at risk of a coup due to heightened tensions and power struggles.  Through diplomatic efforts, mediation, and dialogue, ECOWAS played a key role in defusing the crisis and maintaining stability in Guinea.  This intervention not only averted a potential coup but also restored confidence and trust in democratic processes (Africa Centre for Strategic Studies, 2021). 

These examples highlight the effectiveness of regional organisations like ECOWAS in providing early warning and preventive measures against coup-related crises.  By fostering dialogue, promoting cooperation, and engaging in diplomatic interventions, these organisations contribute significantly towards maintaining peace and stability in West Africa. 

E.4.1.2.  Mediation and Conflict Resolution 

When coup-related crises arise in West Africa, regional organisations, like the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) often step in to mediate conflicts and foster dialogue among rival factions.  Mediation and conflict resolution have been instrumental in addressing political instability and promoting peace in the region. 

An illustrative example of ECOWAS’ mediation efforts dates back to the early 1990s during Liberia‘s civil war, characterised by political turmoil and ethnic tensions.  ECOWAS intervened by mediating between the conflicting parties, ultimately facilitating peace agreements and the deployment of peacekeeping forces to monitor ceasefire arrangements.  This intervention played a crucial role in stabilising Liberia and laying the groundwork for peacebuilding efforts (Fawundu, 2012)_.

Another notable instance of ECOWAS’ mediation process was its intervention in Mali, following the 2012 military coup that removed President Amadou Toumani Touré from power. ECOWAS swiftly engaged in diplomatic initiatives, mediating discussions between coup leaders and civilian authorities.  Through skilful negotiations, ECOWAS brokered a transitional agreement that paved the way for the restoration of civilian rule and the subsequent organisation of democratic elections (Africa Centre for Strategic Studies, 2021). 

These examples highlight ECOWAS’ effectiveness in mediating coup-related crises and resolving conflicts in West Africa.  By facilitating dialogue, building consensus, and brokering peace agreements, ECOWAS has played a pivotal role in mitigating the impact of political upheaval and fostering stability across the region. 

E.4.1.3.  Diplomatic Pressure and Sanctions 

When coups occur in West Africa, regional organisations, such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) often resort to diplomatic pressure and sanctions as tools to restore democracy and uphold regional stability.  These measures play a crucial role in signalling disapproval of unconstitutional changes in government and promoting adherence to democratic principles.  One notable instance of ECOWAS employing diplomatic pressure and sanctions occurred in the early 2000s, following a coup in Guinea Bissau that ousted President Kumba Yala.  In response, ECOWAS imposed targeted sanctions on the military junta, including travel bans, asset freezes, and the suspension of development assistance.  These measures were aimed at pressuring the junta to relinquish power and restore constitutional rule, demonstrating ECOWAS’ commitment to upholding democratic norms (Alemu & Ojo, 2014).

Similarly, in 2021, ECOWAS took decisive action in response to a coup in Guinea that removed President Alpha Condé from office.  The regional body imposed sanctions on key members of the military junta and their supporters, including travel bans and asset freezes.  These measures were accompanied by diplomatic engagement aimed at urging the junta to release political detainees and establish a transitional government.  The combination of sanctions and diplomatic efforts contributed to positive outcomes, highlighting the effectiveness of such strategies in promoting stability and democratic governance (Africa Centre for Strategic Studies, 2021).  

By using diplomatic pressure and targeted sanctions, ECOWAS and other regional organisations send a clear message that coups are unacceptable and that adherence to constitutional principles is paramount.  These measures not only exert pressure on coup perpetrators but also serve as deterrents to future unconstitutional actions, thereby contributing to the maintenance of peace, stability, and democratic values in West Africa.

E.4.1.4.  Capacity Building and Institutional Support 

Regional organisations also play a crucial role in building member state capacity to prevent and manage coup-related crises.  Since the late 1950s, ECOWAS has supported capacity-building initiatives in areas such as electoral management, human rights promotion, and security sector reform.  One significant focus has been electoral management, where ECOWAS has provided technical assistance and training to electoral management bodies in Nigeria and Ghana.  By doing so, ECOWAS has contributed to improving electoral processes, ensuring transparency, and fostering free and fair elections (Crook, 2012). 

Moreover, ECOWAS has prioritised human rights promotion as part of its capacity building agenda.  The organisation has supported initiatives aimed at enhancing human rights protections, strengthening rule-of-law mechanisms, combating impunity for human rights abuses.  This support has been instrumental in promoting a culture of respect for human rights and democratic principles in West Africa (Gberie, 2017)  

In the realm of security sector reform, ECOWAS has played a significant role in promoting accountability and professionalism among the military and police forces in member states.  Through training programmes, technical assistance, and capacity building initiatives, ECOWAS has enhanced the effectiveness and integrity of security institutions.  This has contributed to improving security governance, addressing security challenges, and preventing the misuse of security forces for political purposes (Adams, 2014). 

Overall, ECOWAS’ capacity-building efforts in electoral management, human rights promotion, and security sector reform have been instrumental in strengthening institutions, promoting good governance practices, and enhancing resilience against coup-related crises in West Africa.  By building the capacities of member states, ECOWAS contributes to creating stable and democratic societies that are better equipped to effectively prevent and manage political challenges. 

E.4.1.5. OAU and AU 

The Organisation of African Unity (OAU), which later became the African Union (AU), has played a complex role in addressing military coups in West Africa.  Historically, the OAU maintained a non-interference stance in the internal affairs of member states.  However, this changed over time as the AU adopted more proactive measures to respond to unconstitutional changes in government, including coups (Souaré, 2014).  

One key initiative was the adoption of the Lomé Declaration in 2000, which established the AU’s framework for responding to unconstitutional government changes.  This framework includes measures such as condemning coups, imposing sanctions, and suspending member states from the AU until constitutional order is restored (Campbell, 2021).  In practice, the AU and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have been involved in mediating and resolving conflicts arising from coups in West Africa.  ECOWAS, in particular, has a robust peace and security mandate, formalised through various protocols, such as the 2001 Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, which outlines democratic principles and sanctions for violations.  

Recent examples of AU and ECOWAS involvement include the coups in Mali, Guinea, and Burkina Faso.  In these instances, the AU and ECOWAS typically responded with condemnation, suspension, and sanctions.  For instance, after the 2021 coup in Guinea, the AU suspended its membership and worked with ECOWAS to negotiate a return to civilian rule.  Despite these efforts, the effectiveness of these interventions has been mixed.  Sanctions often impact the general population more than coup leaders, and the AU’s influence can be limited by internal politics and member states’ degree of commitment to uphold democratic norms. Moreover, the recurrence of coups suggests that deeper issues, such as governance, corruption, and political instability, must be addressed to prevent such unconstitutional changes in the future (Campbell, 2021).

In summary, while the OAU/AU and ECOWAS have developed frameworks and taken actions against coups in West Africa, their success has been variable, highlighting ongoing challenges in promoting stable and democratic governance in the region. 

E.4.2.  CIVIL SOCIETY ENGAGEMENT                  

Civil society activism and grassroots movements play a pivotal role in promoting democracy by advocating for accountability, transparency, and citizen participation.  In this Section, we explore the significance of civil–society engagement in West Africa and how it contributes to strengthening democratic institutions and fostering inclusive governance, drawing on historical examples. 

E.4.2.1.  Advocating for Human Rights and Rule of Law 

Civil society organisations (CSOs) have played a crucial role in advocating for human rights and the rule of law in West Africa, significantly contributing to democratic development and the protection of fundamental rights.  Throughout the region’s history, CSOs have been at the forefront of challenging authoritarian regimes, exposing human rights violations, and promoting accountability and transparency in governance. 

In the 1980s, Nigeria was under military dictatorship, characterised by widespread human rights violations and a lack of respect for the rule of law.  CSOs, such as the Civil Liberties Organisation (CLO) and the Committee for the Defence of Human Rights (CDHR), emerged as prominent voices advocating for human rights protection and democratic governance.  These organisations played a pivotal role in documenting human rights abuses, providing legal assistance to victims, and raising awareness both domestically and internationally about the need for political reforms and the restoration of democratic principles (Jibrin and Maikasuwa, 2018). 

The advocacy efforts of CSOs in Nigeria and across West Africa have not been limited to exposing human rights violations; they have also focused on promoting the rule of law and legal accountability.  CSOs have worked tirelessly to strengthen legal frameworks, advocate for judicial independence, and ensure access to justice for all citizens.  By engaging in legal advocacy, monitoring judicial processes, and providing legal aid services, CSOs have enhanced the rule of law and promoted a culture of respect for legal norms and institutions (Okeke-Uzodike and Agu, 2014). 

Moreover, CSOs have been instrumental in advocating for legislative reforms that protect human rights and advance democratic governance.  Through lobbying efforts, public campaigns, and policy advocacy, CSOs have influenced legislative processes and contributed to the enactment of laws that uphold human rights standards, safeguard civil liberties, and promote accountability in governance (Brown and Kugba, 2020). In recent years, CSOs in West Africa have continued to advocate for human rights, democratic governance, and the rule of law.  Their efforts remain essential in holding governments accountable, protecting vulnerable populations, and promoting a just and inclusive society based on principles of human rights and legal accountability. 

E.4.2.2.  Promoting Civic Education and Participation 

Civil society organisations (CSOs) play a vital role in promoting civic education and encouraging citizen participation in democratic process across West Africa.  These organisations contribute significantly to fostering informed and active citizenry, enhancing political awareness, and strengthening democratic institutions. 

In Ghana, the National Commission for Civic Education (NCCE) stands out as a notable example of a CSO dedicated to promoting civic education and citizen engagement.  Established in the early 1990s, the NCCE has been at the forefront of educating citizens about their rights and responsibilities, organising voter education programmes, and facilitating public debates during elections.  These initiatives empower citizens with knowledge about democratic principles, electoral processes, and the importance of active participation in governance (Ghana National Commission for Civic Education, no date). 

The NCCE’s efforts have had a tangible impact on Ghana’s democratic landscape, contributing to increased voter turnout and the cultivation of democratic norms and values.  By engaging citizens through education and outreach programmes, the NCCE helps citizens understand the significance of their role in shaping the political landscape and holding elected officials accountable (Awantungo and Danyi, 2015). 

CSOs in other West African countries also play crucial roles in promoting civic education and citizen participation.  These organisations conduct workshops, seminars, and awareness campaigns to educate citizens about their rights, civic duties, and the democratic process.  They also encourage citizens, particularly marginalised groups such as women and youth, to actively participate in decision-making processes, advocate for their interests, and, contribute to the development of inclusive and responsive governance structures (Isiugo-Abanihe and Amoo, 2018).

Overall, CSOs’ efforts in promoting civic education and citizen participation are fundamental to strengthening democracy and building a more politically engaged and empowered citizenry in West Africa.  By fostering civic awareness, encouraging active citizenship, and promoting democratic values, CSOs contribute significantly to consolidation of democratic governance and protection of citizens’ rights and freedoms. 

E.4.2.3.  Building Social Cohesion and Inclusivity 

Grassroots movements have been effective in mobilising marginalised communities and promoting social cohesion and inclusivity.  In Mali, during the Tuareg rebellion in the 1990s, organisations like Temedt brought together Tuareg and non-Tuareg communities to advocate for peace and reconciliation.  Through dialogue and community-based initiatives, Temedt helped to bridge ethnic divides and promote mutual understanding and cooperation among different groups.  Temedt, an organisation founded in 2006 in Mali, has significantly contributed to peace and reconciliation efforts, particularly following the Tuareg rebellion of the 1990s.                         

The rebellion, which sought greater autonomy for the Tuareg factions, ended in 1996, but left deep ethnic divisions and widespread displacement.  Temedt has played a crucial role in bridging the gap between Tuareg and non-Tuareg communities through initiatives such as community dialogues, awareness campaigns, and advocacy for legal reforms.  The organisation focuses on combating slavery and discrimination within Tuareg society, advocating for human rights, and promoting social cohesion among diverse ethnic groups.  Additionally, Temedt supports marginalised communities by providing legal assistance and human rights education, contributing to a broader civil society effort to build a more inclusive and peaceful Mali after years of conflict and instability (Chauzal and van Damme, 2015). 

E.4.2.4.  Bridging the Gap Between Citizens and Government 

Civil society organisations (CSOs) play a crucial role in bridging the gap between citizens and the government, facilitating dialogue, and promoting collaboration to address pressing issues and improve governance.  One notable example of this role can be seen in Sierra Leone, where the Campaign for Good Governance (CGG) has been instrumental in advocating for political reforms and holding governments accountable for their actions.  The Campaign for Good Governance (CGG) in Sierra Leone has been at the forefront of advocating for political reform, transparency and governance accountability.  Through advocacy efforts, CGG has engaged with both citizens and government institutions to address key challenges and promote democratic values. 

One of CGG’s significant contributions has been its advocating for establishing of democratic institutions and the adoption of electoral reforms.  By working closely with government agencies and advocating for legislative changes, CGG has played a critical role in enhancing the electoral process, promoting fair and transparent elections, and ensuring the integrity of democratic institutions (Kposowa, 2016).  Additionally, CGG’s efforts have focused on promoting transparency and accountability in governance.  The organisation has been active in monitoring government activities, advocating for anticorruption measures, and, promoting good governance practices. Through public awareness campaigns, policy advocacy, and engagement with government officials, CGG has raised awareness about governance issues and promoted a culture of accountability and transparency (Conteh, 2019). 

Overall, CGG’s work in Sierra Leone exemplifies the important role that civil society plays in bridging the gap between citizens and the government.  By advocating for political reforms, promoting transparency, and fostering accountability, CSOs like CGG contribute significantly to strengthening democratic governance, promoting citizen participation, and ensuring responsive and accountable leadership.

E.4.2.5.  Monitoring Elections and Promoting Democratic Processes 

Civil society organisations (CSOs) play a crucial role in monitoring elections and promoting democratic processes in West Africa.  Their efforts in election observation, advocacy for electoral reforms, and promotion of democratic values have significantly contributed to the integrity and fairness of regional electoral processes. 

In Nigeria, the Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD) is a leading CSO focused on promoting democratic governance, human rights, and peacebuilding.  Through election observation missions, training on electoral processes, and advocacy for electoral reforms, CDD seeks to enhance transparency and credibility in Nigerian elections (Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD) n.d.). Similarly, in Senegal, the Concertation Nationale de la Société Civile (CNSC) represents a coalition of civil society groups dedicated to promoting good governance, democracy, and human rights.  CNSC’s involvement in election monitoring, voter education initiatives, and advocacy for electoral reform ensures free and fair elections in Senegal (Concertation Nationale de la Société Civile (CNSC), n.d.). 

In Ghana, the Civil Society Situation Room (CSSR) functions as a coalition working to promote peaceful, transparent, and credible elections.  By monitoring electoral processes, providing real-time analysis, and engaging stakeholders, the CSSR has contributed to electoral integrity in Ghana (Civil Society Situation Room, n.d.).  Moreover, in Sierra

Leone, the Civil Society Consortium for Elections Observation (COSCE) plays a pivotal role in election observation and promoting democratic governance. COSCE conducts assessments, deploys observers, and issues reports to ensure transparency and accountability in Sierra Leone’s elections (Civil Society Consortium for Elections Observation (COSCE), n.d.). Lastly, the Transition Monitoring Group (TMG) in Nigeria has been instrumental in election monitoring, advocating for electoral integrity, and strengthening democratic processes.  TMG’s efforts, including deploying monitors and issuing reports, have pressured governments to conduct free and fair elections and uphold democratic standards (Babalola, 2018).

These CSOs, alongside many others in West Africa, play vital roles in promoting civic education, advocating for electoral reform, and fostering citizen participation.  Their collective efforts will significantly strengthen democratic institutions, enhance electoral integrity, and uphold democratic values across the region.

E.4.2.6.  Advocating for Policy Reform and Social Justice 

Civil society activism plays a crucial role in advocating for policy reforms and social justice across West Africa.  One notable example of this activism is seen in Senegal, through the movement Y’en a Marre in 2011.  This grassroots youth movement has advocated for political and social change through various means, such as protests, music, and social media campaigns. 

In addition to Y’en a Marre in Senegal, other civil society organisations (CSOs) in different West African countries have employed various strategies to advocate for policy reforms and social justice.  For instance, in The Gambia, the Coalition for Change-The Gambia (CCG) focuses on democratic reforms, human rights, and good governance, through legal advocacy, public awareness campaigns, and community mobilisation (Gaye, 2019). 

Similarly, in Liberia, the National Civil Society Council of Liberia (NCSCL) conducts policy analysis, advocacy campaigns, and public consultations to influence decision makers and promote social justice initiatives related to governance, transparency, and accountability (National Civil Society Council of Liberia (NCSCL), n.d.). Moreover, in Nigeria, Enough is Enough (EiE) Nigeria utilises advocacy campaigns, citizen engagement platforms, and media partnerships to advocate for policy reforms, address social injustices, and hold government officials accountable in areas such as good governance, accountability, and transparency (About EiE, 2010).  Additionally, the Civil Society Movement (CSM) in Sierra Leone focuses on policy dialogues, advocacy campaigns, and community outreach programmes to promote governance reforms, anticorruption measures, and social justice initiatives (Civil Society Movement-Sierra Leone, n.d.). 

These CSOs, along with Y’en a Marre in Senegal, demonstrate the diverse strategies employed by CSOs across West Africa to advocate for policy reforms, address social injustices, and promote democratic governance and accountability. 

E.4.2.7. Support in Transitional Justice and Reconciliation 

Civil society organisations have been instrumental in supporting transitional justice processes and promoting reconciliation in post-conflict societies.  In Liberia, groups like the Liberia National Bar Association and the Civil Society Human Rights Advocacy Platform played key roles in advocating for the establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) following the civil war.  The Liberia National Bar Association (LNBA) plays a significant role in promoting legal advocacy, capacity building, and ensuring adherence to the rule of law in Liberia.  One of its notable initiatives is to collaborate with the National Elections Commission (NEC) to host public dialogues and awareness events on electoral dispute resolution.  These efforts are part of a broader project funded by international partners, including a USD150,000 grant from the UNDP, aimed at ensuring free, fair, and transparent elections in Liberia.  The LNBA provides training to civil society organisations, the security sector, and the media on handling electoral complaints efficiently and effectively (Dawn, 2023). 

These activities highlight the LNBA’s commitment to strengthening the legal framework and supporting democratic processes in Liberia, playing a pivotal role in the country’s governance and legal infrastructure.  These organisations helped document human rights violations, facilitate victim participation, and promote healing and reconciliation. 

E.4.2.8.  Transparency and Accountability 

Advocating for transparency in international relations and holding external actors accountable for their involvement in coup dynamics is crucial for promoting stability, democracy, and respect for sovereignty in West Africa. Here are some key points to consider: 

E.4.2.8.1. Transparency in International Relations 

Transparency in international relations is essential for fostering trust among nations and ensuring that external actors’ actions conform with international norms and principles. 

This transparency includes disclosing diplomatic engagements, military assistance, and economic investments in a manner that respects the sovereignty of host countries. 

Example: In the 1960s, during the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union engaged in covert operations in West Africa, often supporting rival factions or governments to advance their interests.  However, the lack of transparency in these actions contributed to political instability and undermined the sovereignty of affected countries. 

E.4.2.8.2. Accountability of External Actors 

External actors, including governments, multinational corporations and international organisations, should be held accountable for their involvement in coup dynamics and their impact on the stability and governance of West African nations.  This accountability can take various forms, including legal, diplomatic, and economic measures. 

Example: In 2019, the African Union (AU) and ECOWAS condemned the military coup in Sudan and called for the restoration of civilian rule.  These regional bodies also imposed targeted sanctions on the military leaders responsible for the coup, including travel bans and asset freezes, to ensure accountability for their actions. 

E.4.2.8.3. International Legal Frameworks 

International legal frameworks, such as the United Nations Charter and regional conventions, provide guidelines for promoting transparency and accountability in international relations. These frameworks outline principles of sovereignty, noninterference, and respect for human rights that should guide the conduct of external actors. 

Example: The United Nations General Assembly has adopted resolutions condemning interference in state internal affairs and calling for respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity.  These resolutions provide a basis for accountability for external actors’ actions in West Africa and other regions (West Africa Civil Society Institute, n.d.). 

E.4.2.8.4. Civil Society Monitoring and Advocacy 

Civil society organisations play a crucial role in monitoring external actors’ actions and advocating for transparency and accountability in international relations. By documenting and publicising instances of interference or abuse, civil society helps to raise awareness and pressure governments and international organisations to act responsibly. 

Example: Civil society groups in West Africa, such as Transparency International and local human rights organisations, have been instrumental in exposing corruption, illicit financial flows, and other forms of malfeasance involving external actors.  Their advocacy efforts have led to increased scrutiny and calls for accountability in the region.  The West Africa Civil Society Institute (WACSI) (West Africa Civil Society Institute, n.d.) enhances CSO capacity across the region, through training, research, and advocacy, focusing on governance, accountability, and transparency.  Their efforts have significantly bolstered the effectiveness of various CSOs in advocacy and governance initiatives.  BudgIT (Budgit, n.d.), a prominent civic-tech organisation in Nigeria, simplifies public finance data to enhance fiscal transparency and accountability.  

Their initiatives have increased public engagement and scrutiny of government spending, exposed discrepancies and prompting fiscal reforms.  BudgIT focuses on simplifying and making public finance data accessible to the Nigerian populace through technology.  They advocate for transparency and accountability in budget processes and public spending by creating interactive and easy-to-understand infographics and data visualisations.  BudgIT’s efforts have led to increased public engagement with government budgets and expenditures, fostering greater accountability in public financial management.  Their initiatives have exposed discrepancies and mismanagement in public spending, leading to reforms and increased public scrutiny of government finances.  Connected Development (CODE) (Connected Development (CODE), n.d.) empowers marginalised communities through initiatives like “FollowCOVID19Money”, which tracks government spending to ensure proper utilisation of funds for developmental projects.  These organisations play crucial roles in monitoring government activities, advocating for transparency, and ensuring accountability in public spending, thereby contributing to socioeconomic development in the West. 

E.4.2.8.5. Economic Sanctions and Diplomatic Measures 

In cases where external actors engage in activities that undermine democracy or stability, economic sanctions and diplomatic measures can be imposed to deter such behaviour and promote accountability.  These measures may include travel bans, asset freezes, diplomatic isolation, and restrictions on financial transactions. 

Example: In response to the 2021 coup in Myanmar, several countries, including the United States and the European Union, imposed targeted sanctions on military leaders and their affiliated businesses, restricting their access to international markets and financial systems. Similar measures could be applied to external factors involved in coup dynamics in West Africa, to prevent future interference.  These measures include asset freezes, travel bans, and restrictions on financial transactions.  For example, the EU sanctioned 11 individuals, including the military’s commander-in-chief, Min Aung Hlaing, and imposed asset freezes and visa bans on them.  Additionally, entities such as Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited (MEHL) and the Myanmar Economic Corporation (MEC), which are military-controlled conglomerates, were targeted to block EU investors and banks from doing business with them (VOA News, 2021). 

Such measures can serve as a deterrent to external actors involved in undemocratic activities or destabilising actions in other regions, such as West Africa.  By imposing similar sanctions on those involved in coup dynamics or interference in democratic processes, the international community can promote accountability and discourage future interference.  These actions can help to uphold democratic norms and contribute to regional stability by pressing those who undermine governance to cease their activities. 

Transparency and accountability are essential principles that should guide international relations, particularly in regions like West Africa where coup dynamics can have profound implications for stability and governance.  By advocating transparency, holding external actors accountable, adhering to international legal frameworks, supporting civil society monitoring, and imposing appropriate sanctions and diplomatic measures, the international community can help prevent interference in the internal affairs of states and promote respect for sovereignty and democratic governance in the region. 

F.   CONCLUSION 

F.1. CALL FOR VIGILANCE AND COLLABORATION 

Coups d’état have been a recurring feature of political dynamics in West Africa, taking various forms throughout history.  Military coups, civilian takeovers, and hybrid coups involving collaboration between military and civilian actors have shaped the region’s political landscape. A prominent example is the January, 1966 coup in Nigeria, where a group of military officers led by Major Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu overthrew the government of Prime Minister Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, marking a significant turning point in Nigerian politics. 

Civilian coups, though less common, have also left their mark.  The April, 1980 coup in Liberia, led by Master Sergeant Samuel Doe, saw a non-military figure seizing power through nondemocratic means.  Similarly, hybrid coups, like the March, 2012 coup in Mali, in which disgruntled soldiers collaborated with political opponents to oust President Amadou Toumani Touré, underscore the complexity of regional coup dynamics. 

External actors have often played a significant role in influencing coup dynamics in West Africa.  The legacy of colonialism has had lasting effects, with European powers shaping political structures and instilling a military culture that sometimes led to coups after independence.  During the Cold War, West Africa became a battleground for competing ideologies, with the United States and the Soviet Union supporting rival factions or governments to advance their interests.  The February, 1966 coup in Ghana, orchestrated with CIA support, exemplifies Cold War interference in the region. 

Economic interests have also been a driving force behind external involvement in coup dynamics.  Multinational corporations, particularly in extractive industries, have sought to influence governance and resource management.  The involvement of companies like ExxonMobil in Guinea‘s natural resource sector has raised concerns about their influence on political dynamics in the country. 

The impact of coup dynamics in West Africa is profound and multifaceted.  Political instability stemming from coups has undermined democratic governance, eroded trust in institutions, and disrupted long-term development planning.  Human rights violations, often perpetrated by coup leaders to maintain power, have led to widespread abuses and social divisions.  Economic disruption, as seen in the aftermath of the March, 2012 coup in Mali, can intensify existing challenges, leading to investor uncertainty, capital flight, and economic downturns.  Furthermore, coup-related crises can have regional spill over effects, worsening instability and conflict in neighbouring states.  The civil war in Liberia, triggered in part by spill over from conflicts in Sierra Leone and the Ivory Coast, illustrates the interconnected nature of political instability in the region. 

Civil society activism and grassroots movements have played a crucial role in shaping the political landscape of West Africa, advocating for human rights, promoting civic education and participation, building social cohesion, bridging the gap between citizens and the government, monitoring elections, advocating for policy reforms, and supporting transitional justice and reconciliation.  Their contributions have been instrumental in advancing democratic governance, promoting accountability, and, fostering inclusive societies across the region. Therefore, supporting and empowering civil society organisations remain essential for the continued progress of democracy in West Africa. 

Coup dynamics in West Africa are deeply intertwined with broader global power struggles and interests.  Geopolitical rivalries, economic interests, and strategic calculations by major powers shape the political landscape in the region, often at the expense of local populations and stability.  Addressing the root causes of political instability in West Africa requires a comprehensive understanding of global power dynamics and their impacts on regional governance, development, and security.  Efforts to promote peace, democracy, and sustainable development must consider the complex interplay of interests at the global level, while prioritising the needs and aspirations of the people of West Africa. 

F.2.  IMPORTANCE OF CONTINUOUS RESEARCH 

West Africa has a turbulent history marked by political instability, coups, and external interference.  To safeguard democratic governance and prevent further disruptions, ongoing research and vigilance are paramount, and ought to be sustained. 

F.2.1. Forms of Continuous Research 

• By Understanding Evolving Dynamics (UED), continuous research allows scholars and policymakers to grasp the phenomenon of external interference in West African governance. By analysing historical patterns, geopolitical shifts, and emerging trends, researchers can identify new threats and vulnerabilities, providing valuable insights for policymakers in crafting effective prevention and mitigation.                                                                                  
• Identifying Actors and Strategies (IAS) goes a long way in assessing the actors and strategies employed by external forces to interfere in West African governance.  Whether through covert operations, economic incentives, or diplomatic pressure, understanding the tactics used by external actors is crucial when developing countermeasures and safeguarding national sovereignty.               
• Again, by Assessing the Impact on Democracy and Stability (AIDS), continuous research enabled the assessment of the impact of external interference on democracy and stability in West Africa.  By examining case studies and collecting empirical data, researchers can analyse the consequences of interference, including the erosion of democratic institutions, human rights violations, and conflict exacerbation, thereby providing evidence-based recommendations for policymakers to address these challenges.                            
• Monitoring Transnational Networks Research (MTNR) helps in checking illicit activities that facilitate external interference in West African governance.  From arms trafficking to illicit financial flows (e.g., money laundering), understanding the networks that enable interference is essential for disrupting such activities and strengthening regional cooperation to effectively combat them. 
• Research aimed at Developing Policy Solutions (DPS) informs the development of policy solutions to prevent external interference and promote good governance in West Africa. By generating evidence-based recommendations, researchers can help policymakers craft strategies that enhance transparency, strengthen democratic institutions, and mitigate the risk of external manipulation. 
• Enhancing Regional Cooperation Research (ERCR) contributes to the promotion of regional cooperation and collective responses to external interference.  By fostering dialogue and knowledge-sharing among West African countries, researchers can promote collaboration in intelligence sharing, capacity building and diplomatic efforts to counter external threats and safeguard regional stability. 

F.2.2. Collaborative Efforts/Initiatives 

Promoting democratic stability and sovereignty in West Africa requires collaborative efforts between governments, civil society, and international stakeholders.  Such collaborative efforts, all things being equal, can produce the following outcomes, among others: 

F.2.3. Strengthen Democratic Institutions 

Collaborative efforts can strengthen democratic institutions by promoting transparency, accountability, and the rule of law.  Governments, civil society organisations, and international stakeholders can work together to reform electoral systems, enhance judicial independence,and, build capacity within government institutions to ensure fair and inclusive governance. 

F.2.3.1. Fostering Civic Engagement 

Collaboration between governments and civil society is crucial to foster civic engagement and participation in democratic process.  By providing platforms for dialogue, encouraging citizen involvement in decision making, and promoting voter education, collaborative initiatives can empower citizens to hold their governments accountable and contribute to the democratic process. 

F.2.3.2.  Combating Corruption and Illicit Activities 

Collaborative efforts are essential to combat corruption and illicit activities that undermine democracy.  Governments, civil society organisations, and international stakeholders can work together to strengthen anticorruption measures, improve transparency in government transactions, and crack down on money laundering and other illicit financial flows. 

F.2.3.3.  Promoting Human Rights and Social Justice 

Collaboration between governments and civil society is essential to promote human rights and social justice.  By supporting civil society initiatives, advocating for the protection of vulnerable populations, and holding perpetrators of human rights abuses accountable, collaborative efforts can help create a more inclusive and equitable society. 

F.2.4.  Regional Challenges 

Collaboration among governments, civil society, and international stakeholders is crucial for addressing regional challenges that threaten democratic stability and sovereignty.  From addressing cross-border security threats to promoting regional economic integration, collaborative initiatives can strengthen regional cooperation and promote peace and prosperity in West Africa. 

F.2.4.1.  Supporting Sustainable Development 

Collaborative efforts can support sustainable development by aligning policies and investments with democratic governance principles.  By promoting good governance, fostering economic growth, and addressing social inequalities, governments, civil society, and international stakeholders can contribute to long-term stability and prosperity in the region. 

F.2.4.2.  Leveraging International Support 

International stakeholders, including multilateral organisations and donor agencies, play a critical role in supporting collaborative efforts to promote democracy and sovereignty in West Africa.  International partners can complement local efforts and amplify their impact by providing financial and technical assistance, facilitating dialogue, and, advocating for democratic governance principles. 

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[1] Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) is used by the United States Government to reorganise and run aid as business. It ensures every dollar spent on compacts brings the best return to the American taxpayer and its corporate partners. Compacts are funded secured on policy-related conditionalities that promote privatization of the energy sector in particular and opening up juicy sectors of the African economies to benefit foreign capital rather than work at poverty alleviation and reduction.    

[2] United Fruit Company, now rebranded as Chiquita Brands International, was versatile in creating and deposing Central American governments it perceived as unfriendly in its areas of operation.

[3] Nkrumah’s efforts to unify Africa against colonial and neo-colonial powers; his policies and vision for

Africa as independent and self-sufficient, positioned him as a central figure in the struggle against Western dominance (Williams, 2021, Chapter 5).  

[4] Nkrumah’s close ties with the Soviet Union and China, as well as his nationalist and socialist policies, made him a target for Western intervention.  

[5] It is worth recalling, this report aside highlighting Nkrumah’s ambitions to swiftly modernise Ghana’s economy and promote Pan-Africanism across the continent, it also propagated the significant challenges being faced due to the country’s insufficient financial resources. It was further rumoured that the coup, led by Major General Joseph Arthur Ankrah of the National Liberation Council (NLC), would receive support from Western powers, including the CIA.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS/ACRONYMS

Abbreviation	Meaning	Remarks
AAI	American-African Institute	Key player in the U.S. efforts to influence African education and leadership.
ACAR	Accra Centre for Applied Research	An Accra-based Research Institute.
AFPRC	Armed Forces Provisional Ruling Council	Gambia; established by Lt. Yahya Jammeh in July, 1994.
AFRC	Armed Forces Revolutionary Council	Ghana, June, 1979; Sierra Leone, May, 1997
AFRICOM	Africa Command	United States
AG	Action Group	Nigeria’s post-independence ethnically and regionally based political party.
AIDS	Assessing the Impact on Democracy and Stability	Form of Socio-political Research.
AMSAC	American Society of African Culture	A facet of the CIA’s cultural diplomacy, promoting African art and literature
APC	Army-Police-Civilian	Ghana; General Kutu Acheampong’s model of governance rejected in the mid-1970s.
APC	All-People’s Congress	Sierra Leone; Political Party led by Prime Minister Siaka Stevens
AQIM	Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb	Took control of northern Mali in 2012.
AU	African Union	Continental Organisation
BRI	Belt and Road Initiative	Chinese investments in critical infrastructure, like roads, ports, and railways.
CAA	Council on African Affairs	Founded by prominent African-American leaders, supported African liberation movements.
CCG	Coalition for Change – The Gambia	Gambia; focuses on democratic reforms, human rights, and good governance, through legal advocacy, public awareness campaigns, and community mobilisation.
CDD	Centre for Democracy and Development	Nigeria; enhance transparency and credibility in Nigerian elections.
CDHR	Committee for the Defence of Human Rights	Nigerian NGO prominent voice and advocates for human rights protection and democratic governance.
CGG	Campaign for Good Governance	Sierra Leone; at the forefront of advocating for political reform, transparency and governance accountability.
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency	Played pivotal roles in West Africa’s political instability
CLO	Civil Liberties Organisation	Nigerian NGO prominent voice and advocates for human rights protection and democratic governance.
CMRPN	Military Committee of Recovery for National Progress	Burkina Faso; established by Col. Saye Zerbo.
CNSC	Concertation Nationale de la Société Civile	Senegal; coalition of civil society groups dedicated to promoting good governance, democracy, and human rights.
CODE	Connected Development	Nigeria; empowers marginalised communities through initiatives like “FollowCOVID19Money”.
COSCE	Civil Society Consortium for Elections Observation	Sierra Leone; plays a pivotal role in election observation and promoting democratic governance.
CPP	Convention People’s Party	Ghana;in power, led by Kwame Nkrumah, from March, 1957 to February, 1966.
CRO	Commonwealth Relations Office	United Kingdom
CSM	Civil Society Movement	Sierra Leone; focuses on policy dialogues, advocacy campaigns, and community outreach programmes to promote governance reforms, anticorruption measures, and social justice initiatives.
CSOs	Civil Society Organisations	Play a crucial role in monitoring elections and promoting democratic processes in West Africa.
CSP	Council of Popular Salvation	Burkina Faso; established by Major Jean-Baptiste Ouédraogo in November, 1982.
CSR	Corporate Social Responsibility
CSSR	Civil Society Situation Room	Ghana; functions as a coalition working to promote peaceful, transparent, and credible elections.
DPS	Developing Policy Solutions	Form of Socio-political Research.
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EiE	Enough is Enough	Nigerian youth coalition; utilises advocacy campaigns, citizen engagement platforms, and media partnerships to advocate for policy reforms, address social injustices, and hold government officials accountable in areas such as good governance, accountability and transparency.
EPAs	Economic Partnership Agreements
ERCR	Enhancing Regional Cooperation Research	Form of Socio-political Research.
ERP	Economic Recovery Programme
EU	European Union
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GMT	Greenwich Mean Time
HUAC	House Un-American Activities Committee	1938-1975
IAS	Identifying Actors and Strategies	Form of Socio-political Research.
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IRO	Information Research Office
LNBA	Liberia National Bar Association	Liberia; plays a significant role in promoting legal advocacy, capacity building, and ensuring adherence to the rule of law in Liberia.
MCC	Millennium Challenge Corporation	Special development vehicle used by the United States Government to reorganise and run aid as business.
MEC	Myanmar Economic Corporation	A military-controlled conglomerate.
MEHL	Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited	A military-controlled conglomerate.
MI5	Military Intelligence, Section Five	UK counterintelligence agency.
MTNR	Monitoring Transnational Networks Research	Form of Socio-political Research.
NAACP	National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People	Played critical role in advocating for African liberation issues.
NCCE	National Commission for Civic Education	Ghana; Example of a CSO.
NCNC	National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons	Nigeria’s post-independence ethnically and regionally based political party.
NCSCL	National Civil Society Council of Liberia	Liberia; conducts policy analysis, advocacy campaigns, and public consultations to influence decision makers and promote social justice initiatives related to governance, transparency, and accountability.
NEC	National Elections Commission	Liberia; hosts public dialogues and awareness events on electoral dispute resolution.
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organisations
NLC	National Liberation Council	Ghana, 1966
NPC	Northern People’s Congress	Nigeria’s post-independence ethnically and regionally based political party.
NPRC	National Provisional Ruling Council	Sierra Leone; 1992
NRC	National Redemption Council	Ghana; 1972
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
PAIGC	African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde
PDCs	People’s Defence Committees	Ghana; established by PNDC Law 4
PNDC	Provisional National Defence Council	Ghana; 1981-1992
PTSD	Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
RPT	Rally of the Togolese People	Togo’s sole legal party, under Gnassingbé Eyadéma.
RSP	Presidential Security Regiment	Burkina Faso; Blaise Compaoré loyalists
RUF	Revolutionary United Front	A Sierra Leonean rebel group.
SAPs	Structural Adjustment Programmes
SLPP	Sierra Leone People’s Party	Sierra Leon; Party at independence, led by Prime Minister Sir Milton Margai.
SLST	Sierra Leone Selection Trust
SMC	Supreme Military Council	Ghana
TMG	Transition Monitoring Group	Nigeria; instrumental in election monitoring, advocating for electoral integrity, and strengthening democratic processes.
TRC	Truth and Reconciliation Commission	Liberia; established following the civil war.
TWP	True Whig Party	Liberia; has been the ruling party since the 1870s, creating a one-party state characterised by elitism, corruption, and the exclusion of the majority indigenous population.
UDV	Voltaic Democratic Union	Burkina Faso; previous political party.
UED	Understanding Evolving Dynamics	Form of Socio-political Research.
UK	United Kingdom (The British)	Colonised four (4) West African countries, namely:  The Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone.
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme	Provided grants to Liberia
UNICEF	United Nations Children’s Fund
UNRISD	United Nations Research Institute for Social Development
US	United States	Known to provide military aid, training, and funding to various West African governments and military.
USD	United States Dollar
WACSI	West African Civil Society Institute	Enhances capacity of CSOs across the region, through training, research, and advocacy, focusing on governance, accountability, and transparency.
WAPP	West African Power Pool
WDCs	Workers’ Defence Committees	Ghana; established by PNDC Law 4.

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